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ABSTRACT 
This thesis rejects the traditional picture of Fichte as a 'philosopher of subjectivity' who 
conceives of reality as the product of an 'absolute subject'. In opposition to this view, 
this thesis presents Fichte as a philosopher of intersubjectivity, whose primary concern 
is with relations between subjects. lt argues that the true originality of Fichte's 
philosophy lies in his claim that intersubjectivity is a condition of the possibility of self-
consciousness. 
Part 1 of this thesis defends Fichte's claim that Kant's transcendental idealism requires 
an account of how we recognize other rational beings. lt seeks to demonstrate the 
necessity of such an account by examining the role of intersubjectivity within Kant's 
transcendental philosophy. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 deal, respectively, with the significance 
of intersubjectivity for Kant's accounts of theoretical reason, practical reason and the 
unity of reason. 
Part 2 of this thesis considers Fichte's attempt to develop a theory of intersubjectivity 
within his system of transcendental philosophy or Wissenschaftslehre. Chapter 4 
considers Fichte's conception of such a system, and stresses the importance of 
political, ethical and pedagogical themes to this conception. Chapter 5 provides a 
detailed discussion of Fichte's first serious treatment of the topic of intersubjectivity -
Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation. Chapter 6 seeks to provide a 
reading of Fichte's first presentation of the 'foundations' of his system that is consistent 
with his concern with intersubjectivity. Chapters 7 provides an extensive discussion of 
Fichte's most complete presentation of his theory of intersubjectivity - the 
Foundations of Natural Right. 
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Introduction 
Within recent 'continental' philosophy, the question of intersubjectivity -the question 
of the nature and philosophical significance of the relations between subjects - has 
become an issue of crucial importance. Within the phenomenological tradition, writers 
such as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Schutz and Levinas have all 
stressed the significance (both 'ontological' and ethical) of our relation to others. The 
tradition of 'Critical Theory' has also evinced a concern with the significance of 
intersubjectivity, recent theorists moving away from a preoccupation with Marx's 
penetrating analyses of the value-form and commodity fetishism. 1 For writers such as 
Habermas, Apel and Honneth a theory of intersubjectivity provides the indispensable 
foundation for an ethical critique of late capitalism. 
Given the significance of this concern with intersubjectivity, several writers have 
sought to inquire as to its origins and development. Within the tradition of Critical 
Theory, Habermas and Honneth have explored this topic thoroughly. Whilst 
acknowledging the influence of the German philosophical tradition, they also 
emphasize the importance of American pragmatism -specifically G. H. Mead's theory 
of 'symbolic interaction' and the 'pragmaticism' of C. S. Peirce. Within phenomenology, 
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Schutz and Levinas have all provided detailed discussions of 
Husserl's infamous account of intersubjectivity in his Cartesian Meditations. Despite 
these differing influences, however, both groups of writers concur in stressing the 
importance of G. W. F. Hegel's account of intersubjectivity. This account is most 
commonly associated with Hegel's claim, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, that a 
relationship of mutual 'recognition' (Anerkennung) between agents is a condition of the 
possibility of self-consciousness. Whilst this claim is first advanced in Chapter IV of the 
Phenomenology, mutual recognition is only achieved with the transition to Spirit 
(Geist). The 'natural consciousness' first experiences self-consciousness as the 
agonistic, asymmetrical relation of mastery and servitude, a relationship resulting from 
the 'struggle for recognition'. This account of the struggle for recognition and of the 
relation of domination and subjection has played a crucial role in thinking about 
intersubjectivity. Hegel's claim that the master's domination is ultimately self-defeating 
(the slave's recognition meaning nothing to the master) and that the slave comes to 
realize a nascent freedom through transforming the natural world (through labour) 
clearly has affinities with Marx's conception of the class struggle. These affinities were 
emphasized by A. Kojeve, whose Paris lectures (1933-39) exerted a considerable 
influence upon the French 
conception of intersubjectivity as a relation of domination and subjection owes much to 
Kojeve's account of the dialectic of mastery and servitude. 
Now it is important to note that Hegel's discussion of recognition is not 
restricted to Chapter IV of the Phenomenology. The relationship between subjects is a 
constant preoccupation of Hegel's early writings, and is to be found in works from the 
Berne, Frankfurt and Jena periods. The significance of the Jena Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Spirit has been stressed by Habermas, who claims that their emphasis 
on the interconnection between work and interaction (two relations which are 
irreducible to each other) is abandoned in the later works. 3 Habermas' emphasis upon 
Hegel's early account of recognition has been further developed by Axel Honneth. In 
The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Honneth argues 
that the early Jena works provide a richer conception of recognition than that provided 
in the Phenomenology. 4 According to Honneth, the significance of Hegel's early notion 
of recognition lies in the fact that it is prior to the preoccupation with the 'philosophy of 
subjectivity' characteristic of the later work. By this, Honneth means that 'recognition' is 
not merely a moment in the formative development of Spirit, but a central aspect of all 
human experience. 
Habermas and Honneth have therefore advanced our understanding of the 
origins of the concept of recognition within Hegel's work. Yet they have little to say 
about the pre-Hegelian origins of this notion. They pay little attention to the fact that 
this concept is first to be found in the transcendental idealism of J. G. Fichte. For it is in 
his 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right ( Grundlage des Naturrechts) that Fichte first 
advances the claim that recognition is a condition of the possibility of self-
consciousness.5 In his essay on Hegel's Jena Lectures, Habermas draws upon the 
work of D. Henrich to present Fichte as a philosopher simply concerned to provide an 
innovative theory of self-consciousness. 6 And whilst Habermas acknowledges, in his 
essay on G. H. Mead, Fichte's reflections on intersubjectivity, he argues that they only 
represent a 'step' in the direction of a 'theory of intersubjectivity', being systematically 
subordinated to Fichte's 'philosophy of the subject'.7 In The Struggle for Recognition 
Honneth, whilst recognizing the significance of Fichte's account of recognition, places 
equal emphasis on the agonistic accounts of intersubjectivity provided by Hobbes and 
Machiavelli.8 For Honneth, Fichte's contribution is merely to have provided the starting 
point for Hegel's more comprehensive account of intersubjective relations. Both 
Honneth and Habermas therefore accord little importance to Fichte's account of 
recognition, considering Hegel's account to be of greater significance. 
Why, then, has Fichte's account of recognition been so comprehensively 
neglected by philosophers of intersubjectivity? it seems to me that the answer to this 
question is to be found in the history of the reception of Fichte's idealism. For many 
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scholars of post-Kantian idealism, Fichte is primarily the exponent of a metaphysics of 
transcendental subjectivity - a metaphysics in which a quasi-theological entity (the 
'absolute I') creates (or simply is) reality in its entirety. On this account, Fichte's 
idealism merely inflates Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of apperception 
into a Promethean all-creating force. Now it is important to note that this interpretation 
of Fichte's project was first advanced by Schelling and Hegel. In his 1795 essay Ofthe 
I as the Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge, 
Schelling suggested that the Fichtean absolute I was intuitively identical with Spinoza's 
'God or Nature'. 9 lt was, Schelling claimed, the source of all reality and being. Whilst 
Schelling initially defended Fichte's conception of the 'Absolute' he came to regard it as 
one-sided - as a merely 'subjective' idealism. A truly 'absolute idealism' must, 
Schelling argued, conceive of the 'unconditioned' (das Unbedingte- literally, the un-
thinged) source of all human experience as an 'absolute Subject-Object', as the identity 
of thought and being. This claim was further developed by Hegel in his 1801 essay The 
Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy. 10 There, Hegel 
argued for the superiority of Schelling's principle of 'absolute identity' over Fichte's 
merely 'subjective Subject-Object'. For Hegel, as for Schelling, Fichte's emphasis on 
absolute subjectivity entailed considering nature and objectivity as merely dependent 
realities. This led Hegel to argue that Fichte's claim that everything was dependent 
upon the absolute I conflicted with the claim, crucial to Fichte's 'practical' philosophy, 
that human agents enjoy a real, independent existence. 11 
Hegel's criticisms are complex, and require further discussion. What is of 
interest here is that they have been regarded as canonical by a whole generation of 
interpreters, writers such as Kroner, Lukacs and Gueroult all supporting the Hegelian 
interpretation of Fichte. For these writers, Fichte's notion of absolute subjectivity is 
incompatible with his emphasis on intersubjectivity as a relation between independently 
existing subjects. Clearly, any attempt to provide a coherent interpretation of Fichte's 
concern with intersubjectivity (that is, an interpretation that manages to resolve this 
apparent contradiction) must reject the traditional 'metaphysical'12 reading of Fichte's 
idealism. 
Within recent scholarship on Fichte's idealism there has been a concerted effort 
to replace the standard 'metaphysical' interpretation of Fichte's project with a 'non-
metaphysical' interpretation - an interpretation which stresses the 'Critical' nature of 
Fichte's project. While the exponents of this reading agree in their rejection of the 
standard picture, they differ as to the aspects of Fichte's project that they emphasize. 
For writers such as Henrich, Pippin, Martin and Neuhouser, Fichte's idealism consists 
in an attempt to articulate the way in which transcendental subjectivity inheres in all 
conscious human cognition and action. On this account, the absolute I does not 
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'create' all reality. Rather, a spontaneous subjective activity is regarded as the 
ineliminable condition of all thinking and willing. Now whilst this interpretation receives 
considerable support from Fichte's writings, it fails to account for Fichte's apparent 
concern with intersubjectivity. For it still presents Fichte as a philosopher of subjectivity, 
as a philosopher who is simply trying to explore Kant's claim that 'it must be possible 
for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations' .13 lt is therefore hardly surprising 
that Habermas draws upon Henrich's reading of Fichte to advance the claim that 
'Fichte only deepens Kant's transcendental unity of self-consciousness' .14 
In contrast to this approach, several writers have sought to present Fichte as 
primarily a philosopher of intersubjectivity - as a philosopher for whom the issue of 
the relation between subjects is of central importance. This interpretation was first 
advanced by Alexis Philonenko in his path-breaking work La liberte humaine dans la 
philosophie de Fichte. In the introduction to this work Philonenko points out that 
Fichte's preoccupation with intersubjectivity is present in his earliest writings, emerging 
as a response to problems internal to Kant's Critical idealism .15 Philonenko therefore 
claims that we should read Fichte's philosophy through the 'prism of intersubjectivity', 
regarding his idealism as an attempt to provide a theory of intersubjectivity. 16 Following 
this suggestion, writers such as Radrizzani and Renaut have provided fascinating 
explorations of Fichte's transcendental philosophy. 17 
This thesis takes Philonenko's claim seriously. Its seeks to interpret Fichte's 
transcendental philosophy as a serious attempt to provide a theory of intersubjectivity. 
lt attempts to trace the origins and development of Fichte's concern with 
intersubjectivity, and to show the originality of his attempt to provide a transcendental 
idealist account of our relations to others. 
In the first part of this thesis I defend Fichte's contention that the chief failure of 
Kant's Critical philosophy is its inability to justify our claim to know other rational beings 
like ourselves. I defend Fichte's contention by arguing that intersubjectivity plays a 
central role in Kant's accounts of theoretical and practical reason (chapters 1 and 2) 
and in his attempts to secure the unity of reason (chapter 3). Having demonstrated the 
importance of intersubjectivity for Kant's Critical philosophy, I argue that Fichte is 
correct to criticize Kant for failing to provide a justification for our claim that there are 
other rational beings. In the second part of this thesis I provide a detailed account of 
Fichte's attempts to develop a theory of intersubjectivity. My account follows the course 
of the development of Fichte's theory of intersubjectivity during the so-called 'Jena 
period' of his career (1794-9}, the period in which Fichte's concern with intersubjectivity 
is most evident. In chapter 4, I provide an account of Fichte's conception of a system of 
transcendental philosophy or Wissenschaftslehre. This account stresses the way in 
which Fichte's concerns with freedom, politics, morality and education are integral to 
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his conception of a system of transcendental philosophy. In chapter 5, I provide a 
detailed discussion of the work in which Fichte provides his first serious reflections 
upon intersubjectivity - Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation. I 
emphasize the way in which Fichte attaches great moral and political significance to 
intersubjectivity, and examine Fichte's attempt to provide an account of how we come 
to recognize other rational beings like ourselves. In chapter 6, I address a problem that 
threatens my interpretation of Fichte's philosophy: the claim that Fichte's 1794-5 
Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre advocates a 'subjective idealism' which 
regards other subjects as the 'products' of an 'absolute 1', thereby denying them 
independent existence. I address this issue by demonstrating the implausibility of this 
traditional 'metaphysical' interpretation, and by offering an alternative 'non-
metaphysical' interpretation of Fichte's idealism. Having advanced this interpretation I 
turn, in chapter 7, to consider Fichte's most developed statement of a theory of 
intersubjectivity - the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. I discuss Fichte's specific 
conception of a 'doctrine' or 'theory' (Lehre) of right and the role of such a doctrine 
within his system of transcendental philosophy. I then provide a detailed presentation 
of Fichte's infamous argument that a relationship of mutual recognition is a condition of 
the possibility of self-consciousness. I argue that, whilst Fichte's argument does not 
bear close scrutiny, it contains several original and philosophically plausible insights. I 
conclude the thesis with a brief consideration of the relevance that these insights might 
have for contemporary social and political thought. 
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Part I 
KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
6 
Introduction to Part I 
Fichte often presents his transcendental idealism as simply a systematic development 
of Kant's Critical philosophy. In his second Introduction to the new presentation of the 
Wissenschaftslehre of 1796 he claims that his philosophy 'is in complete accord with 
Kant's and is nothing other than the Kantian philosophy properly understood.>18 This is 
admittedly a puzzling claim, insofar as Fichte's transcendental idealism departs from 
Kant's Critical philosophy in many respects. Yet Fichte's claim is that he 'properly 
understands' Kant's philosophy, or that he grasps the 'spirit' (Geist) of Kant's 
philosophy as distinct from its 'letter' (Buchstab). For Fichte, the 'spirit' of Kant's 
philosophy is very different from the form it receives in the three critiques, and he 
hopes to provide this spirit with a new 'presentation' (Darstellung). 19 
Now whilst certain Kantian concerns are clearly developed in Fichte's idealism 
- such as the primacy of practical reason and the spontaneity of apperception -
Fichte also introduces concerns that seem entirely foreign to Kant's project. The most 
striking of these is Fichte's attempt to provide a transcendental justification of our 
everyday assumption that there are other rational beings like ourselves. According to 
Fichte, Kant's failure to provide such a justification is the central flaw of his Critical 
philosophy. This criticism is most clearly expressed in the 1796-9 Wissenschafts/ehre 
nova methodo. There, Fichte claims that: 
The most striking demonstration of the incompleteness of Kant's Critical philosophy is 
that Kant has never provided an explanation of this point, {that is, how I come to assume 
that there are rational beings outside of me}. {According to his system, I cannot answer, "I 
know this from experience", because, according to Kant, no experience, in the dogmatic 
sense, of something "in itself' is even possible. He himself also says that reason outside 
of us is not something that can be perceived and that no outer intuition of it is rcossible.} 
He came very close to answering this question in the Critique of Judgement[ ... ]. 0 
Fichte therefore considers Kant's system to be unable to account for our assumption 
that there are rational beings outside of us. Yet whilst we might be prepared to accept 
this criticism, we might ask why Fichte considers it to be so important. We might ask, in 
other words, why Fichte thinks that Kant needs to provide a transcendental justification 
of our common-sense belief that there are other rational agents like ourselves. And the 
most obvious, and immediately plausible, answer to this question is that Kant requires 
no such justification, having little interest in intersubjective relations. Nevertheless, this 
answer is not Fichte's answer. For Fichte, interpersonal relations play a central role in 
Kant's epistemological, moral, political and aesthetic theories. Given this centrality, 
Fichte rightly points out that our knowledge of other agents requires transcendental 
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justification similar to that provided for moral and theoretical judgements. We must, in 
other words, discover the a priori conditions for the possibility of our knowledge of other 
agents. Or rather, we must raise the quid juris concerning our knowledge of others. 
And it is Fichte's claim that Kant addresses this question inadequately. 
In what follows, I hope to demonstrate the legitimacy of Fichte's criticism of 
Kant. I shall consider the role that intersubjective relations play in Kant's Critical 
treatment of knowledge (chapter 1 ), morality (chapter 2) and the unity of reason 
(chapter 3), and assess Kant's discussions of the possibility of our knowledge of other 
rational agents. My account will draw upon Philonenko's claim that there are three 
structures of communication in Kant's philosophl1 and will occasionally refer to the 
work of Habermas, Wellmer and Apel. However, before turning to this account, some 
terminological clarifications are necessary. 
lntersubjectivity and lntersubjective Validity 
In the Introduction, I claimed that a concern with intersubjectivity is a concern with the 
nature and philosophical significance of the relations between subjects. Throughout 
this essay, the term 'intersubjectivity' will be used as a general term for the various 
modes of interaction or 'communicative action' (Habermas) between two or more 
subjects. These modes of interaction range from intimate personal relations to abstract 
legal relations. They may be reciprocal relations or one-sided relations of domination. 
What they have in common is that they are modes of activity that can only be realized 
in relations between agents. 
The term 'intersubjective validity' has been used by several writers in 
discussing the role of intersubjectivity in Kant's Critical philosophy. For writers such as 
Kneller22 and Gardner23 to claim that judgements are 'intersubjectively valid' is to claim 
that they apply necessarily and without exception to all subjects. On this definition, the 
'principles of the understanding' of the first Critique would be 'intersubjectively valid'. 
The problem with this conception of 'intersubjective validity' is that it omits the aspect of 
interaction which is central to intersubjectivity. In other words, it omits the 'inter' from 
intersubjectivity. Furthermore, this conception of 'intersubjective validity' is 
characteristically used to refer to Kant's notion of 'universal validity' 
(AIIgemeingattigkeit). For Kant, to say that principles or conditions of the possibility of 
experience are 'universally valid' is to say that they apply necessarily, and without 
exception, to all finite subjects of experience. 24 lt is not to say anything about the 
nature of the relations between such subjects, although the 'universal validity' of certain 
principles may have implications for such relations. If what the aforementioned 
commentators mean by 'intersubjective validity' is what Kant calls 'universal validity' it 
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seems preferable to retain Kant's term 25 , whilst using 'intersubjective validity' in the 
sense which stresses interaction. 
The term has also been used extensively by Apel, Habermas and Wellmer. 
Wellmer describes intersubjectively valid judgements as judgements which 'everybody 
could agree upon'. 26 Ape I states that propositions are intersubjectively valid just in case 
they are 'capable of a consensus by all possible members of an unlimited ideal 
argumentation community which we counterfactually anticipate in addressing our real 
discourse partners'. 27 Following these writers a judgement can be said to be 
intersubjectively valid just in case everyone could, in principle, reach a consensus 
concerning it through rational argument among themselves. This conception of validity 
stresses interaction insofar as the requisite consensus can only be achieved through 
rational dialogue. In what follows, I shall be using 'intersubjective validity' in this sense. 
With these clarifications in mind, I now wish to consider the role of 
intersubjectivity in Kant's Critical philosophy. 
9 
1 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THEORETICAL REASON 
lntersubjectivity seems to play no significant role in Kant's theoretical philosophy. 
Nevertheless, much of Kant's account of the conditions of the possibility of experience 
presupposes that communication and agreement between subjects of experience is 
possible. We can begin to see this by briefly considering some of the central aspects of 
Kant's transcendental idealism. 
In Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, Henry 
Allison presents transcendental idealism in relation to 'transcendental realism'. Both 
positions are, Allison argues, mutually exclusive meta-philosophical positions. 
Transcendental realism takes as its starting point an independently existing realm of 
objects. The (human) subject of experience28 is subsequently introduced into this realm 
and the question then arises as to how it comes to know the objects that constitute this 
realm. The epistemological assumption is that the subject's knowledge must somehow 
conform to, or become adequate to, this mind-independent realm. Yet, the fundamental 
gap postulated between subject and object raises an intractable problem for any 
account - whether 'empiricist' or 'rationalist' - of how this conformity or adequation 
takes place. Empiricism might seek to explain the acquisition of knowledge by the 
impress of 'reality' upon the subject's mind. But in order for the subject's experience to 
have any structure or coherence (rather than being a merely disorganized influx of 
sense-impressions) some capacity to recognize and discriminate between objects of 
experience must be presupposed. In other words, empiricism must presuppose what it 
seeks to explain; namely, an ability of the subject of experience to recognize objects of 
experience. Rationalism faces a similar structural difficulty. For it seeks to account for 
the conformity of the subject's ideas to reality by appealing to a supra-empirical 
principle, whether it be the intervention of God (Malebranche) or 'pre-established 
harmony' (Crusius, Leibniz). But it fails to give any account of how this principle itself is 
known and therefore merely displaces the problem. Its principle of justification is itself 
unjustified, leading Kant to claim (in his infamous letter to Herz of February 21, 1772) 
that the 'deus ex machina is the greatest absurdity one could hit upon in the 
determination of the origin and validity of our cognitions'. 29 
Furthermore, transcendental realism is committed to drawing a distinction 
between two modes of cognition, that of finite subjects of experience and that of an 
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infinite, omniscient subject (God). This distinction is an upshot of its explanatory 
strategy, which, as we noted, proceeds by postulating an independently existing 
ontological order. This order in its entirety is intelligible to God alone; we, finite 
subjects, have a merely limited cognitive access to it and can never hope to grasp 
reality sub specie aeternitatis ('under the aspect of eternity' - Spinoza). 
Transcendental idealism adopts a radically different approach, which Allison 
describes as 'anthropocentric'. Here, the fundamental epistemological assumption 
(although, as we shall see, there are others) is the 'Copernican' assumption that 
'objects conform to our cognition'. 30 The idea, simply put, is that the world of 
experience is not a bare unconceptualized 'given' into which we are placed. Rather, the 
fundamental structure of this world is constituted by our cognitive capacities - the 
spontaneous capacity of understanding and the receptive capacity of sensibility. These 
cognitive capacities and their operations are the conditions for the possibility of 
experience; without their constitutive function there would be no experience. But they 
are also, and crucially, the conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience; 
without the schematized categories there would be no experiential world. 31 
Now, the task of demonstrating that the categories have objective validity is a 
central concern of the first Critique. For the bare fact that we possess and apply these 
categories to experience does not show that we have any right to do so. The 
application of the categories to a realm of objects ('experience' in an attenuated sense) 
must be justified; their objective validity must be demonstrated. This demonstration is 
provided in the 'Transcendental Deduction'. There, Kant argues for the objective 
validity of the categories (which are 'concepts of an object in general') by showing that 
they are required as rules for the synthesizing activity of transcendental self-
consciousness- the 'I think'. 32 Synthesis in accordance with these rules provides our 
judgements with objective validity- the capacity to refer to a realm of objects (objects 
in the 'weak' sense Objecte as opposed to Gegenstande). The synthesizing, 
spontaneous activity of the transcendental unity of apperception is therefore a 
condition of the possibility of our judgements having objective validity. However, unless 
our representations were synthesized in accordance with 'concepts of an object in 
general' (and, ultimately, in relation to the concept of the 'transcendental object') we 
would not be transcendental subjects - subjects which unify the manifold of 
representations into an objective order. 33 The Transcendental Deduction therefore 
establishes a relation of mutual dependence between transcendental subjectivity and 
objectivity. 
Now, this 'transcendental I' is a universal, undifferentiated I which is radically 
distinct from the particular I of empirical consciousness. lt is an 'empty concept' which 
can, as Kant notes in the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason', 'be applied to every thinking 
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subject'. 34 This I is common to a// subjects of experience, as are the categories and 
principles founded upon it. As such this I, and the principles founded upon it, are 
'universally valid'. 
In the section of the Prolegomena corresponding to the Transcendental 
Deduction of the first Critique, Kant provides further insight into the universal nature of 
this '1'. Kant opens his justification of the categories by drawing a distinction between 
two types of empirical judgement: 'judgements of experience' and 'judgements of 
perception'. 35 Judgements of perception are 'only subjectively valid'- they hold only 
for the subject's private sense-experience and are true relative to such experience. 
They do not state what is the case, but merely what seems to me to be the case at a 
particular time. Judgements of experience, by contrast, are 'objectively valid' - they 
refer to a realm of persisting objects which is, in principle, accessible to everyone. 
Judgements of experience are valid 'at all times for us and for everyone else', and Kant 
refers to this feature as their 'universal validity' (AIIgemeingultigkeit). 36 Judgements of 
experience are therefore both objectively and universally valid. 37 
The different modes of validity that judgements of perception and judgements of 
experience possess are functions of the different ways in which their constituent 
representations are unified. In judgements of perception, 'perceptions' or intuitions are 
contingently unified in a single empirical consciousness in accordance with empirical 
laws of association. 38 They do not, Kant claims, presuppose the categories and are 
merely subjectively valid. 39 In judgements of experience, intuitions are necessarily 
unified in 'a consciousness in general' in accordance with the categories. 40 The 
categories guarantee the objective validity of these judgements, unifying the manifold 
of intuitions into an ordered, objective whole. Yet the categories, as activities of 
'consciousness in general', also guarantee the universal validity of these judgements, 
insofar as such judgements are grounded upon cognitive capacities that are common 
to all subjects. 41 Objective validity and universal validity are 'interchangeable concepts' 
insofar as they are functions of one and the same 'consciousness in general' and its 
unifying activity. 
Judgements are therefore objectively valid just in case they are grounded upon 
a priori rules of synthesis (the categories) that are possessed by a// subjects of 
experience. As such, the objective validity of the categories is demonstrated. 
Now what is so striking about this deduction of the categories is its apparent 
concern to stress a seemingly 'social' aspect of cognition. This concern is evinced by 
the substitution of the term 'consciousness in general' for 'transcendental unity of 
apperception'. This substitution suggests that the 'transcendental subject' is not an 
isolated 'Cartesian' self but a consciousness that is common to all. lt is 'a 
consciousness in general' and this suggests a social dimension that is lacking from the 
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Transcendental Deduction.42 Transcendental subjectivity is not that which differentiates 
us from other subjects, but that which we have in common with them. lt may, following 
the Transcendental Deduction, be that feature of consciousness by virtue of which my 
representations are 'mine', but it also - the Prolegomena stresses - serves that 
function for every other subject. lt is an essentially public possession, a feature that 
may 'be applied to every thinking subject'. 43 Empirical consciousness, by contrast, is 
that which serves to individuate us, to differentiate us from other subjects. lt is, the 
Prolegomena suggests, a private consciousness. 
The discussion of the judgements based upon these different modes of 
consciousness also evinces a preoccupation with the seemingly social nature of 
cognition. Judgements of perception are valid only for the empirical subject who makes 
them. They do not refer to objects (which requires synthesis in accordance with the 
categories) but merely to the subject's sense-experience (which, in judgements of 
perception, is unified according to empirical laws). Judgements of perception are 
neither universally nor objectively valid. Judgements of experience are both universally 
valid - they hold for a// subjects - and objectively valid, they refer to a domain of 
objects. Now this domain is a publicly accessible domain, a domain that is cognitively 
available to all. Insofar as our judgements all refer to the same domain of objects we 
may come to an agreement about the properties of, and relations involving, such 
objects. The judgements of different subjects might, as Kant claims, 'harmonize among 
themselves' by virtue of the fact that they all agree upon the nature of an object.44 If 
this were the case an indirect relationship between subjects would be established, a 
mode of intersubjectivity that Philonenko - with reference to the first Critique - terms 
'objective communication' or 'communication in cognition'. 45 What characterizes this 
mode of communication is, Philonenko claims, 'the fact that it is indirect: it relies upon 
the mediation of the concept or the object' .46 In objective communication we 
'communicate indirectly, although objectively, through the mediation of the object'.47 
Such a notion of a mediate 'objective communication' is also to be found in the 
first Critique, towards the end of the Transcendental Deduction. There, Kant argues -
in opposition to the notion of a 'preformation-system of pure reason' -that if causal 
judgements were founded upon a merely 'subjective necessity' of combining 
representations there would be no necessary consensus regarding the 'causal' relation 
between objects. 48 My judgements would only have subjective validity, they would only 
be necessary for me, and there might therefore be a lack of agreement amongst our 
judgements. This, Kant claims, is precisely what the sceptic wants, 'for one would not 
be able to quarrel with anyone about that which merely depends on the way in which 
his subject is organized'. 49 If, however, we were a// necessarily constrained to structure 
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experience in the same way, in accordance with the categories, the possibility of 
cognitive consensus or 'objective communication' would be secured. 
This idea is further developed in the third section of the 'Canon of Pure Reason' 
of the first Critique: 'On having an opinion, knowing and believing.'5° Kant's main 
concern here is with 'taking something to be true' - das Furwahrhalten; the 
justificatory relationship of a subject to a judgment. Kant draws a distinction between 
two fundamental modes of Furwahrhalten - 'conviction' ( Oberzeugung) and 
'persuasion' ( Oberredung). Persuasion is 'mere semblance' - the subject takes her 
judgment to be objectively valid uustifiable with reference to an objective state of 
affairs) whereas, in truth, the 'ground of the judgment' lies only in the 'particular 
constitution of the subject.' The judgment is merely subjectively valid - it is only 
justifiable with reference to the particular experience of the subject. Conviction, in the 
theoretical or 'speculative' sense 51, is objectively valid - the subject's judgment is 
justifiable with reference to an objective state of affairs. Conviction is also universally 
valid, the justification could be accepted by a// subjects of experience - it is 'valid for 
everyone merely as long as he has reason'. 52 
At first glance, this distinction appears similar to that made in the Prolegomena. 
lt differs from the latter, however, insofar as Kant proceeds to make fully explicit the 
social nature of cognition. He achieves this by focusing upon the communicative 
aspect of the two modes of Furwahrhalten. Insofar as persuasion is justified with 
reference to the subject's private experience it has 'only private validity [nur 
Privatgu/tigkeit], and this taking something to be true cannot be communicated [und 
das Furwahrhalten laf3t sich nicht mittheilen]'. 53 Conviction, on the other hand, can be 
communicated. Kant explains as follows: 
Truth, however, rests upon agreement with the object, with regard to which, 
consequently, the judgments of every understanding must agree (consentientia uni tertio, 
consentiunt inter se). The touchstone of whether taking something to be true is conviction 
or mere persuasion is, therefore, externally, the possibility of communicating it and 
finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to take it to be true; for in that 
case there is at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgments, 
regardless of the difference among the subjects, rests on the common ground, namely, 
the object, with which they therefore all agree and through which the truth of the 
judgment is proved. 54 
'[Because of] agreement with one thing they agree among themselves (consentientia 
uni tertio, consentiunt inter se)'. This is perhaps Kant's clearest account of what we 
have called, following Philonenko, 'objective communication'. If judgments are 
objectively valid, i.e., refer to an object, the judgments of subjects will agree and 
cognitive consensus will be achieved. If, on the other hand, the subject's grounds for 
taking his judgments to be true have merely 'private validity' (Privatgultigkeit), the 
possibility of communication is not guaranteed. 
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If our Furwahrhalten is conviction, justified with reference to the object, the 
possibility of cognitive agreement is secured. lntersubjectivity is therefore, to use 
Philonenko's phrase, a 'function of objectivity'. 55 Nevertheless- and this is crucial-
the converse is not the case. The fact of intersubjective agreement does not secure 
conviction. lt is merely a 'touchstone' (Probierstein) of conviction. For it is quite 
possible that our judgments harmonize for some other reason - we might, for 
example, all believe something because it is a fundamental tenet of our religion. 56 For 
Kant, cognitive consensus is only an external criterion of conviction; objectivity is not a 
function of intersubjectivity. 
lt is important to note that whilst conviction is dependent upon our judgments 
having the possibility of objective validity, our judgments only have this feature by 
virtue of the synthesizing activity of the transcendental subject or 'consciousness in 
general' (which is governed by the categories). lt is this synthesizing activity which 
constitutes the realm of objects to which our judgements refer. Now, it is crucial to 
Kant's argument that we all possess this transcendental capacity and, moreover, 
possess it in the same way. For if subject A and subject B had qualitatively different 
cognitive powers they might constitute and judge the world differently. This would open 
up the possibility that our judgments fail to harmonize and this, as Kant noted in the 
Transcendental Deduction, provides a foothold for the skeptic. 57 Consequently, it is 
vital that the cognitive powers discussed in the first Critique and Prolegomena are valid 
for a// subjects of experience. 
Here a question emerges. How can Kant justify his assumption that we all have 
the same cognitive powers? In other words, with what right does Kant claim that 
transcendental subjectivity is, in the language of the Prolegomena, 'consciousness in 
general'? In order to answer this question it seems that the possibility of knowledge of 
other minds must be admitted by Kant's transcendental idealism. For it is hard to see 
how transcendental reflection upon one's cognitive capacities - the methodological 
approach of transcendental idealism - could justify the claim that the capacities 
discovered by such reflection are valid for everyone. In other words, there seems to be 
no way of justifying this claim except by reference to our knowledge of other human 
subjects of experience. Now, this knowledge must clearly be of the relevant kind. lt 
must either provide direct awareness of the transcendental capacities of other agents 
or provide a suitable basis for inferences to such capacities. Here a second question 
emerges: can Kant's transcendental idealism (as articulated in the first Critique) 
account for the possibility of such knowledge? 
Kant's answer to this question is - No, transcendental idealism cannot account 
for such knowledge. This is due to one of the most fundamental, and controversial, 
doctrines of transcendental idealism: Kant's strict distinction between phenomena and 
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noumena. Phenomena are objects of possible experience; we cognize these objects 
through the co-operation of sensibility and understanding. Noumena, by contrast, are 
uncognizable- we may think 'them', but can never cognize 'them' (for which intuition 
would be required). 
Now, the transcendental, apperceptive self furnishes the necessary conditions 
of the possibility of the experiential, phenomenal world. lt is the supreme condition of 
the possibility of experience. Consequently, it cannot be an object of experience (or 
phenomenon). Nevertheless, we can, Kant suggests, have a non-cognitive awareness 
-a 'feeling' (GefOhf) of our spontaneous, apperceptive selves through inner intuition. 58 
There is therefore, regarding my self-awareness, a possibility of 'ascending' from the 
sensible to the fringes of the intelligible. However, the same cannot be said with 
respect to our knowledge of other human beings. Here, the 'gulf' between the 
phenomenal and the noumenal is insurmountable. We are, to be sure, aware of human 
beings as bodies within the causally governed, phenomenal world of nature. Yet this 
world is structured by our cognitive capacities. We cannot somehow 'step outside' of 
our cognitive capacities and grasp other subjects as they are 'in themselves'. We 
cannot have access to their non-cognitive awareness of their apperceptive selves 
(which is provided by their inner sense). And as spontaneity is apparently exhibited in 
no other way, we have no justification for inferring that they are spontaneous, 
intelligible beings. Kant states his position clearly in the Paralogisms: 
In the transcendental aesthetic we have undeniably proved that bodies are mere 
appearances of our outer sense, and not things in themselves. In accord with this, we 
can rightfully say that our thinking subject is not corporeal, meaning that since it is 
represented as an object of our inner sense, insofar as it thinks it could not be an object 
of outer sense, i.e., it could not be an appearance in space. Now this is to say as much 
as that thinking beings, as such, can never come before us among outer appearances, 
or: we cannot intuit their thoughts, their consciousness, their desires, etc. externally; for 
all this belongs before inner sense. 59 
Kant therefore openly acknowledges that we cannot know other spontaneous, 
intelligible beings (thinking beings 'as such'). He also notes that it would 'be a great, or 
indeed the only stumbling block' to Critical philosophy, if it were possible to 'prove a 
priori that all thinking beings are themselves simples substances'. This is because such 
a proof would constitute a step 'into the field of noumena', a 'step' that would 
constitute a return to dogmatic metaphysics. 60 Transcendental idealism therefore 
cannot allow knowledge of other rational beings -they are cognitively inaccessible. 
Given the impossibility of such knowledge, it seems that Kant cannot hope to 
justify the putative universal validity of transcendental subjectivity. Nevertheless, Kant 
attempts - in the opening section of the Paralogisms - to provide an alternative 
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justification for his claim. The crucial discussion is contained in the following paragraph 
which, despite its length, is worth quoting in full: 
But right at the start it must seem strange that the condition under which I think in 
general, and which is therefore merely a property of my subject, is at the same time to be 
valid for everything that thinks, and that on an empirical-seeming proposition we can 
presume to ground an apodictic and universal judgment, namely, that everything that 
thinks is constituted as the claim of self-consciousness asserts of me. But the cause of 
this lies in the fact that we must necessarily ascribe to things a priori all the properties 
that constitute the conditions under which alone we think them. Now I cannot have the 
least representation of a thinking being through an external experience, but only through 
self-consciousness. Thus such objects are nothing further than the transference of this 
consciousness of mine to other things, which can be represented as thinking beings only 
in this way. The proposition "I think" is, however, taken here only problematically; not 
insofar as it may contain the perception of an existence (the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum), 
but only in its mere possibility, in order to see which properties might flow from so simple 
a proposition as this for its subject (whether or not such a thing might now exist). 61 
Kant therefore acknowledges that the claim that the 'I think' is universally valid for all 
finite subjects of experience is 'strange' (befremdlich). He justifies this claim by appeal 
to its 'cause' ( Ursache) -the necessity of ascribing 'to things a priori all the properties 
that constitute the conditions under which alone we think them'. Now, this necessity 
has been justified regarding the spatia-temporal objects of possible experience. This, 
after all, is the point of Kant's arguments for the transcendental ideality of experience. 
However, it has not been justified regarding the 'things' (Dingen) in question here. For 
Kant's arguments concerning the necessity of ascribing to things a priori the conditions 
of the possibility of thinking them are premised on the necessity of thinking them. Kant 
has shown (in the Transcendental Deduction and Refutation of Idealism) that we must 
think objects if we are to grasp ourselves as subjects of experience. He has not, 
however, shown that we must think other subjects of experience. For why should we 
think certain phenomenal beings we encounter as intelligible, apperceptive beings? 
The necessity of this thought needs to be demonstrated. 
The alleged justification - the necessity of a priori ascription - therefore rests 
on the unjustified assumption that we must think other subjects. 62 Kant has not 
demonstrated this necessity and, consequently, his attempt to justify his claim 
concerning the universal validity of apperception collapses. Moreover, even if Kant had 
demonstrated the necessity of thinking other subjects it is hard to see what such 
thinking would involve. lt would not be contentful (as no intuition of intelligible beings is 
possible) and would only be 'problematical'- only the thought of the possibility of such 
subjects. lt would merely be the 'transference' ( Obertragung) of my self-consciousness 
onto phenomenal beings. 
Here a summary might be helpful. I have argued that Kant cannot justify his claim that 
the 'I think' is universally valid - possessed by all human subjects of experience. For, 
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in order to provide such a justification, he would either have to show that we can 
represent other subjects as apperceptive beings or provide an alternative justification. 
Now, the possibility of our having knowledge of such beings is foreclosed by 
transcendental idealism. Kant therefore argues that we must think such beings as 
apperceptive on the grounds that it is necessary to ascribe to things the conditions of 
the possibility of thinking them. Yet this argument rests on the necessity of thinking 
such beings, a necessity which Kant fails to argue for. Consequently, Kant's attempted 
justification fails. 
Now the consequences of this failure are far-reaching, posing a serious threat 
to Kant's Critical epistemology. For, as noted previously, if Kant's claim concerning the 
universal validity of the 'I think' is groundless, the possibility arises that other subjects 
might constitute experience differently. If this possibility were realized, the objective 
and universal validity of our judgements would collapse, as would the cognitive 
consensus which is the 'touchstone' of this validity. Yet, it is not simply that Kant 
cannot justify the claim that other subjects of experience are similarly constituted to 
ourselves. lt is rather that he cannot justify the claim that there are other subjects at all. 
For whilst I may interact and communicate with certain phenomenal beings as though 
they are rational beings, the possibility remains that they are not rational, apperceptive 
beings. And this will clearly have deep consequences for Kant's account of morality. In 
the next chapter we shall see what these consequences are. 
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INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND PRACTICAL REASON 
How important is a concern with intersubjectivity to Kant's account of morality? In order 
to answer this question, it might be helpful to consider those accounts of morality for 
which intersubjectivity is a necessary condition. Now, it seems that intersubjectivity is a 
necessary condition of an account of morality just in case morality would be 
inconceivable without interaction between agents. If this is correct, we could say that 
intersubjectivity is a necessary condition of certain versions of social contract theory 
insofar as morality would be unintelligible without the notion of a 'contract' or 'compact' 
between agents. The fact that this agreement is hypothetical is irrelevant; what is 
relevant is the fact that an agreement between agents is invoked. An exception is the 
contract theory of John Rawls which relies upon the thought experiment of an isolated 
agent. The 'original position' only refers to other agents indirectly - the contracting 
agent chooses only those principles which she assumes everyone could choose 
without conflict. There is no requirement that she interacts - actually or hypothetically 
- with other agents. Ha berm as has described Rawls' approach as 'monological', 
insofar as it is quite conceivable that ethical deliberation could be undertaken by a 
single, isolated agent. 1 
lntersubjectivity is clearly a necessary condition of Habermas' own theory of 
'discourse ethics' which claims that norms are only justified through rational 
argumentation between agents. 2 According to this approach, the essentials of which 
are also advocated by Apel and Wellmer3 , moral deliberation and action depend, in the 
last instance, upon interaction between agents capable of speech and action. 
Other ethical theories for which intersubjectivity is a necessary condition are 
certain versions of the 'ethics of care'4 , which claim that concrete social relations are 
the source of moral obligation. For these theories, in the absence of such relations any 
talk of morality would be meaningless. Whether intersubjectivity can be regarded as a 
necessary condition of virtue ethics would seem to depend on which virtues are 
deemed to be essential, and which inessential. If virtues are considered to be 
essential, the exercise of which would be inconceivable without interaction with others 
(the so-called 'other-regarding' virtues such as generosity, justice, trustworthiness, 
etc.), then intersubjectivity would be a necessary condition of virtue ethics. 
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lntersubjectivity does not seem to be a necessary condition of most versions of 
utilitarianism insofar as calculations of utility can, at least in principle, be carried out 
independently of interaction with others. If other agents didn't exist the utilitarian agent 
could still seek to maximize utility for herself and other sentient beings (viz., animals). 
Furthermore, as both Rawls and Mackie have pointed out, the aggregative nature of 
utilitarianism leads to its not taking seriously the 'plurality and distinctness of 
individuals'. 5 Utilitarianism regards individuals as parts of a social whole which can, if 
necessary, be sacrificed to promote the good of that whole. If this observation is 
correct, subjects and their interaction are of little importance to utilitarianism: it is 
overall utility that really matters. 
lt should be clear from the foregoing that intersubjectivity cannot be regarded 
as a necessary condition of Kant's account of morality. After all, Kant's ethics is 
concerned primarily with the relationship between the agent and an abstract practical 
principle, rather than with the relationship between agents. Nevertheless, although 
intersubjectivity cannot be described as a central concern of Kantian ethics, it is still a 
concern. We can begin to see this by considering the various formulae of the 
categorical imperative. 
The most renowned formulation of the categorical imperative is the Formula of 
Universal Law (hereafter, 'FUL'): 'act only in accordance with that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it become a universallaw'. 6 This formulation and its 
variant, the Formula of the Law of Nature (hereafter, 'FLN'): 'act as if the maxim of your 
action were to become by your will a universal law of nature'; have been persistently 
attacked by enemies of Kantianism. Indeed, most of the classical criticisms of the 
categorical imperative have identified the categorical imperative with these formulae. 7 
Thus, Hegel's charge that the categorical imperative is 'empty' rests upon the claim 
that even morally impermissible maxims are universalizable. Hegel's criticism therefore 
holds only of FUL and FLN. The other formulae remain untouched. 8 
Of the three other formulae - the Formula of Autonomy, the Formula of the 
Kingdom of Ends and the Formula of Humanity, the third is the most obvious 
alternative candidate for the 'supreme principle of morality'. The Formula of Humanity 
(hereafter, FH) runs as follows: 'So act that you use humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely 
as a means'. 9 
Strictly speaking, intersubjectivity is not a necessary condition of FH. For it 
would be possible, at least in principle, to act in accordance with FH even if no other 
rational beings existed (by treating humanity in my own person 'always at the same 
time as an end, never merely as a means'). Nevertheless, assuming that other rational 
beings do exist, FH commands us to treat them as ends in themselves. As such, FH 
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allows us to see that Kantian ethics is not concerned solely with the relationship of the 
agent to an abstract moral principle, but with the nature of the relationship between 
agents. Now this relationship is of a specific nature - it requires us always to treat 
humanity as an end (in itself) and never merely as a means. In order to grasp the 
nature of this relationship, a brief summary of Kant's discussion of FH will be helpful. 10 
'Humanity' (Menschheit) has a specific meaning for Kant. lt is used 
interchangeably with the term 'rational nature' and refers to the capacity to rationally 
choose and set ends. 11 This capacity does not, despite its name, belong solely to 
human beings. lt is a capacity possessed by 'the human being and every rational being 
as such' .12 Now, for Kant, every action has an end. The categorical imperative 
prescribes ways of acting that are universally binding on all rational beings. There must 
therefore be an end that is universally binding on all rational beings - insofar as they 
are rational they must will this end. This end must, as the end of the categorical 
imperative, possess 'unconditional value', its worth must not be conditional on any 
other ends. lt must, Kant claims, be an 'end in itself.' 
Kant contends that our 'humanity' or capacity for setting ends is an end in itself. 
lt has absolute and unconditional worth. Kant reaches this conclusion by an 'analytic' 
or 'regressive' argument which seeks unconditioned value or absolute worth. 13 
Absolute worth cannot, Kant claims, be found in the objects of inclination, for the worth 
of these objects is contingent upon the inclinations whose objects they are. Nor can 
absolute worth be found in the inclinations themselves for, in Kant's opinion, finite 
rational beings - insofar as they aspire to be purely rational beings - would ideally 
wish to be free of these inclinations. Unconditioned worth is only to be found, Kant 
concludes, in 'humanity' - our capacity for rationally setting ends. Part of Kant's 
reason for this conclusion is that he thinks that our humanity has - in Korsgaard's 
words - 'value-conferring status' .14 He thinks, in other words, that objects possess 
worth precisely insofar as they are objects of our capacity for rational choice. For Kant, 
our capacity to rationally choose objects as ends is the source of their value; their 
value is conditional upon, and 'bestowed' by, this capacity. Humanity is therefore the 
'source' of value. 
Now, insofar as humanity is the source of value it has unconditional value. 
Humanity's value is not conditional on anything but itself; it alone has 'intrinsic' value. A 
being possessing such value is an 'object of respect' ( Gegenstand der Achtung) which 
must never be treated 'merely as a means'. 15 The notion that humanity has 
unconditional value might appear to contradict Kant's claim that only a good will 
possesses unconditional value. However, this apparent contradiction disappears when 
we realize that humanity is the capacity to possess a good will. Humanity possesses 
unconditional value because, when fully developed and perfected, it is 'personality' or 
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the 'good will'. Insofar as rational beings possess the capacity for rationally setting 
ends they are potentially capable of possessing a good will. And this potential, Kant 
suggests, deserves respect regardless of whether it is realized or not. 16 
Having discussed Kant's argument for FH we shall now consider the specific 
nature of the intersubjective relationship that it prescribes. 
Firstly, Kant tells us that humanity as an end in itself is to be understood as a 
'negative' end as opposed to a 'positive' end. A positive end is one which we actively 
promote and seek to realize, whereas a negative end is an end 'which must never be 
acted against'. 17 FH therefore does not exhort us to seek to actively develop the 
rational nature of ourselves and others. Rather, it tells us that we should never harm or 
interfere with such rational nature. Our respect for others' capacity for rational choice 
-their humanity- should prevent us from interfering with them. 
Secondly, FH does not say that we may never treat the humanity in others and 
ourselves as a means. lt says that we should never merely treat humanity as a means. 
FH therefore doesn't proscribe the use of the humanity of agents as a means. This 
qualification is important, insofar as treating agents as means seems to be an 
ineluctable feature of daily life. Thus, to provide an example, I treat the humanity of my 
postman as a means; I rely upon his capacity to rationally set ends (to decide upon the 
end of delivering my post and to will the means necessary to it). Such treatment is 
consistent with FH. All FH forbids is that I should treat him merely as a means; to treat 
him as nothing more than a convenient mechanism for delivering mail. 
Thirdly, by telling us to respect the 'humanity' in other people, FH tells us that 
human beings deserve respect independently of circumstance and context. Race, 
gender, sexual preference, and 'social status' are, from the 'moral point of view', strictly 
irrelevant. lt is the capacity for autonomous and rational choice - a capacity that is 
shared, at least potentially, by all human agents- that commands respect. 18 
FH therefore reveals a concern with intersubjectivity to be of considerable 
importance to Kant's ethics. The importance of this concern is reinforced by the 
formulation of the categorical imperative which commands us to legislate as if we were 
members of a 'kingdom of ends' (Reich der Zwecke) - a perfectly rational community 
in which the ends of individual and community are in total harmony. 19 
FH therefore seems a plausible alternative to FUL: lt dispels the misleading 
impression that Kantian ethics is primarily concerned with the agent's relation to an 
abstract principle and offers a model for practical deliberation that is preferable to the 
highly problematic universalizability tests. Nevertheless, Kant does - in the 
Groundwork at least- seem to accord FUL a privileged role in practical deliberation. 20 
Indeed, in discussing the system of formulae he claims that: 
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one does better always to proceed in moral appraisal by the strict method and put at its 
basis the universal formula of the categorical imperative: act in accordance with a maxim 
that can at the same time make itself a universallaw21 
Assuming, pace Wood22 , that the 'universal formula' is FUL, we are obliged to explain 
the apparent privilege Kant accords it over FH. Why doesn't Kant privilege the 
intuitively more plausible principle that is FH? 
An answer to this question is to be found in Kant's conception of the 
relationship that obtains between human beings and the moral law. Kant regards 
human beings as imperfectly rational beings or (in the language of the second Critique) 
'finite rational beings' - endlichen vernunftigen Wesen. 23 The fact that the human 
agent is a finite rational being has implications for her relation to the moral law. The 
moral law is an idea of reason which cannot be fully grasped by finite rational beings 
such as ourselves. Due to our cognitive limitations we can only grasp the moral law 
insofar as it is manifested in sensibility. In the section of the second Critique entitled 
the 'Typic of Pure Practical Judgement', Kant tells us that the moral law must be 
schematized - it must be exhibited in intuition. 24 Now the formulae of the 
Groundwor~5 are precisely schemata of the moral law- they are intended, Kant tells 
us, to bring an 'idea of reason closer to intuition (by a certain analogy), and thereby to 
feeling'. 26 They perform a mediating role that is analogous to the schematizing role of 
the imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason. 27 
The formulae serve a vital practical function - they make it easier for us to 
grasp and act upon the moral law. As we have seen, this is certainly the case with FH 
which presents an intuitively plausible account of moral deliberation. Yet FH may 
perhaps bring the categorical imperative too close to intuition. For we may easily 
confuse the moral law qua FH with other commonly accepted principles of morality 
such as the 'Golden Rule', which Kant rejects on the grounds that adopting it is 
contingent upon our desiring aid from others (' ... as you would have them do to you'). 28 
Furthermore, we may wrongly believe that actions motivated solely by feelings of love 
or sympathy for others satisfy FH. For Kant this is merely 'pathological' not 'practical' 
love, a love that is contingent upon our fickle sentiments and inclinations. Such a 
partial love cannot, in Kant's view, satisfy morality, which demands an impartial and 
universal respect for the humanity of all rational agents. 
Given that we may be misled in these ways it is perhaps not surprising that 
Kant insists upon the 'strict method for moral appraisal' -the very 'method' advocated 
by FUL. 29 Consistently adopting and utilizing this method will, Kant suggests, amount 
to treating humanity in oneself or others 'always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means'. 30 The Cl procedure will therefore allow us to reach the moral point 
of view, the standpoint at which only those principles are chosen which are universally 
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valid, where to be universally valid is to apply universally and without exception to 
every rational being. 31 In allowing us to reach the moral point of view, the Cl procedure 
constitutes a second 'indirect' mode of communication which Philonenko terms 'indirect 
communication in action'. In this mode of communication, Philonenko claims, 'a 
consciousness ideally agrees and communicates with all other consciousnesses 
through the mediation of the moral law, whose subject it wills to be'. 32 
However, as both Habermas33 and Wellmer34 have pointed out, there is a deep 
problem with this emphasis on the Cl procedure. This problem lies in Kant's 
assumption that a 'monological' procedure of deliberation - a procedure that is 
performed by an isolated agent - can generate norms that are intersubjectively valid, 
i.e., norms which all agents could, in principle, agree upon. Following Wellmer, this 
criticism can be elaborated as follows. 
Kant's requirement that I act only on maxims that I can will to be universal laws 
is, as Wellmer points out, 'identical in meaning' to the requirement that I should act only 
on maxims of which I can will that all others should act in accordance with them. 
However, Wellmer continues, Kant uncritically assumes that if I am unable to will that a 
maxim become a universal law, then 'any rational being will be similarly unable to do 
so' and this means that the universalizability test is also 'a test of whether a maxim can 
command general approval', viz., be intersubjectively valid. 35 Now, one might suggest, 
as Philonenko seems to, that the universalizability procedure would guarantee 
uniformity of judgement - that every rational being who followed the Cl procedure 
would, by virtue of following this procedure, produce the same judgement and therefore 
be able to agree with my judgement. However, this would be to assume that we all 
'universalize' in the same way- that we are all capable of willing in the same way. 
And this assumption is, Wellmer argues, far from unproblematic. For it does not seem 
unreasonable to assume a quite different scenario, namely, that what an agent is 
capable of willing to be a universal law will be governed by a specific 'matrix of 
concepts' which determines the agent's interpretation of 'social reality' and her 'own 
needs'. 36 Thus, to take Wellmer's example, an authoritarian whose moral universe is 
defined by the extremes of obedience and insubordination would readily universalize a 
maxim enjoining us to punish insubordination. A liberal, on the other hand, would find 
such a maxim inherently non-universalizable. And we might think of countless other 
standpoints from which this maxim might be universalized. If this were the case, if there 
were a plurality of such 'matrices', then the possibility would arise that there could 
never be a rational consensus concerning moral judgement, that there could be no 
such thing as an intersubjectively valid moral judgement. 37 
Kant, however, simply ignores such a possibility, assuming that we all judge in 
the same way by virtue of our all possessing the same rational capacities. He assumes 
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that the isolated deliberations of agents following the Cl procedure will harmonize on 
the basis of the pre-established harmony of our faculties. Here we encounter the 
practical analogue of the theoretical problem of the objective validity of our cognitive 
judgements: the notion that our moral judgements are in harmony rests upon the 
unjustified assumption that we all share the same capacities. Unless such an 
assumption can be justified, the harmony of our moral judgements is threatened and 
the possibility arises that the moral universe is composed of a 'plurality of moral worlds' 
(Wellmer). Yet it is hard to see how, given Kant's inability (in the first Critique) to justify 
the assumption that we all possess the same cognitive capacities, such a justification is 
possible. For we are still faced with the apparently insurmountable division between the 
phenomenal and the noumenal. Furthermore, the Groundwork adds a new dimension 
to the problem of our cognition of other rational beings. In the first Critique, the other 
rational beings we sought to cognize were finite subjects of experience like ourselves, 
beings who possessed space and time as pure forms of sensible intuition. it was not a 
question of cognizing those merely possible beings who possess different forms of 
sensible intuition or the hypothetical intuitive intellect which produces the objects of its 
intuition. Kant's modal claims about such beings were merely intended to throw into 
relief the specific nature of our epistemic situation. With the Groundwork and the 
second Critique, however, things are somewhat different. For the beings who are ends 
in themselves and for whom the moral law is universally valid, are not simply finite 
human agents but 'the human being and every rational being as such'. 38 We belong to 
the class of rational beings insofar as we possess 'humanity' - the capacity for 
rational choice. But this capacity is a capacity we possess precisely insofar as we are 
intelligible beings and is therefore, given Kant's strict separation between the sensible 
and intelligible worlds, not an object of possible experience. Furthermore, even if Kant 
did not insist upon such a separation, his definition of rational beings is so vague that 
its reference is indeterminate; it is difficult to ascertain what, if anything, belongs to the 
class of rational beings. There are simply no informative criteria with which we might 
identify rational beings as such. 
Kant therefore cannot justify his assumption that all rational beings possess the 
same rational capacities, and consequently cannot justify the claim that we all morally 
judge in the same way. This lack of justification results from Kant's inability to justify 
our claim to know other rational beings. Now, this last failing raises a crucial problem 
for the application of the categorical imperative. For the application of the categorical 
imperative is dependent upon my ability to identify such rational beings, for I am -
according to FH - enjoined to treat such beings as ends in themselves. As Fichte puts 
it in an important letter to K. L. Reinhold of 291h August 1795: 
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[W]here is the boundary of all rational being? The objects of my actions are, after all, 
always appearances in the material world. To which of these appearances should I 
assign the concept of rationality and to which should I not?[ ... ) "You know the answer to 
this question all too well", Kant would have to reply. Correct as this reply is, it is 
nevertheless anything but a philosophical reply. I ride a horse without asking its 
permission and without wishing to have it ride me in turn. Why do I have more qualms 
when it comes to the man who lends me the horse? The fact that the poor animal cannot 
defend itself is quite beside the point. Thus it will always remain a very delicate qtJestion 
whether, though my act is supported in this case by general opinion, I am not just as 
unjustified in riding a horse as the Russian nobleman is when he gives away his serfs, or 
sells them, or beats them for the fun of it-for his act too is supported by general 
opiniona9 
Kant's envisaged response is 'anything but' philosophical insofar as it fails to provide 
justification for our putative knowledge of rational beings. The fact that we are 
apparently capable of recognizing such beings is philosophically irrelevant. The critical 
question - the quid juris, concerns our justification for such an assumption and for our 
recognition of other rational beings. Fichte also recognizes that an answer to the critical 
question will consist in distinguishing rational beings from other sentient beings, and in 
justifying this distinction. The justification for this distinction will also, Fichte suggests, 
justify our treatment of certain sentient beings. For the categorical imperative only 
governs our treatment of rational beings, and has no direct relevance to our treatment 
of non-rational beings. 40 
We have therefore seen that, although intersubjectivity may not be a necessary 
condition of Kant's account of morality, it is still of considerable importance to it. We 
have also seen that Kant's inability to justify our claim to know other rational beings 
poses a serious threat to the applicability of the moral law. For the successful 
application of the categorical imperative depends upon our capacity to identify those 
beings who we are supposed to treat as ends in themselves. Having concluded our 
discussion of Kant's account of practical reason, let us now turn to his account of the 
unity of reason. 
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3 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THE UNITY OF REASON 
In recent Kant scholarship several writers have claimed that intersubjectivity is crucial 
to Kant's third Critique- the Critique of the Power of Judgement. Cassirer, Arendt and 
Philonenko have all pointed to the fact that relationships between human beings play a 
crucial role in both the assessment and formation of aesthetic judgements. 1 Philonenko 
has even gone so far as to claim that the Critique of the Power of Judgement 'is an 
attempt to solve the central problem of modern philosophy: intersubjectivity'. 2 If 
intersubjectivity plays such a crucial role in the third Critique, it does not seem 
unreasonable to assume that it plays a central role in the 'official task' of the third 
Critique- namely, the task of securing the unity of the Critical philosophy by providing 
a 'transition' ( Obergang) 3 between the 'two worlds' of theoretical and practical reason. 
We might even ask whether intersubjectivity plays a role in Kant's earlier attempts to 
establish the unity of the Critical philosophy. In what follows I shall argue that 
intersubjectivity plays a central role in two important attempts to establish the unity of 
the Critical philosophy - the third Critique and the 1784 essay Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Aim. I shall begin with the earlier work and then proceed 
to a discussion of the third Critique. 
As is well known, the search for the unity of reason amounts to the attempt to 
unite theoretical and practical reason. lt seeks to bring systematic unity to the Critical 
philosophy, uniting the first and second Critiques and their respective domains -
nature and freedom. Yet this systematic concern is only part of the story. For the 
search for the unity of reason is also a search for a total conception of the human 
being, a conception which unites the partial conceptions of the first and second 
Critiques. The agent of the Critique of Pure Reason is the human being as a 
'theoretical' being. This agent is, regarded as a 'transcendental' subject, the 
spontaneous 'author' of the laws of nature. Yet this agent is also, regarded 
'empirically', a natural, 'phenomenal' being- a being subject to the mechanistic laws 
of nature. The agent of the Critique of Practical Reason is the human being as a 
practical being. This agent is subject to natural needs and inclinations. Yet it is also-
as a rational, 'noumenal' being- capable of acting autonomously, in accordance with 
the moral law. Now, given Kant's strict separation between phenomena and noumena 
- between the domains of nature and freedom - it is hard to see how these aspects 
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of the human being are related. The possibility of a relationship between the 
'theoretical' and 'practical' aspects of the human being seems foreclosed. And this 
would lead to serious problems for Kant's account of morality, rendering unintelligible 
the concepts of moral action and responsibility. For it would be hard to see how, given 
such a separation, the human being could act freely in the world, or how he could be 
held responsible for actions which, being nothing more than natural events, are to be 
explained solely in terms of natural laws. 4 If Kant's account of morality is to be 
intelligible, the theoretical and practical aspects of the human being must be related. 
The possibility of a transition must be secured. Now it seems there are two possible 
ways of securing this transition, which are distinct from one another. The first way 
consists in discovering a faculty, domain or discipline which mediates between 
theoretical and practical reason. This way might be described as 'structural' insofar as 
its concern is primarily architectonic. The second way consists in providing an account 
of the process whereby humanity arises from its merely natural, theoretical being to 
freedom in accordance with the moral law. This way might be described as 'genetic' 
insofar as it is concerned to give an account of the realization of practical reason as full 
practical rationality. These two ways of bridging the transition are, in principle, distinct. 
Nevertheless, Kant seems to draw upon both in his attempt to secure the unity of 
reason. In what follows, this should be borne in mind. 
Kant's first attempt to secure the unity of reason is to be found in his early 
essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim of 1784. The notion that 
this essay seeks to provide an account of the unification of theoretical and practical 
reason might seem rather surprising. For the main task of this brief essay seems to be 
to provide an outline of a Critical account of history. Nevertheless, as Renaut has 
pointed out5, a concern with the problem of the unity of reason is clearly signalled by its 
opening sentence: 
Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, 
the will's manifestation in the world of phenomena, i.e. human actions, are determined in 
accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event. 6 
'History is concerned', Kant continues, 'with giving an account of these phenomena, no 
matter how deeply concealed their causes may be, and it allows us to hope that, if it 
examines the free exercise of the human will on a large scale, it will be able to discover 
a regular progression among freely willed actions'. 7 The aim of history is therefore to 
discern the progressive realization of freedom in the apparently senseless and 
naturally determined course of human affairs. By examining human history 'on a large 
scale', viz., by being a universal history, it hopes to discover rationality and meaning in 
the career of the human species. Now, the realization of freedom in history is 
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dependent upon the establishment of 'a civil society that can administer right 
universally' (einer allgemein das Recht verwaltenden bilrgerlichen Gesel/schaft), a 
society possessing a 'perfectly right civil constitution' (eine vollkommen gerechte 
bilrgerfiche Verlassung). 8 lt is only within such a society that freedom can be 
realized. The notion of a perfectly 'right'9 society therefore seems to play a crucial role 
in Kant's argument. Indeed, as Renaut has argued, Kant seems to present the domain 
of right as the domain in which theoretical and practical reason are united. And it is this 
idea that will play a crucial role in Fichte's decision to construct a philosophy of 'natural 
right'. 
The specific nature of the domain of right and its importance for Fichte's 
philosophy will be discussed in Part 11. Here I will limit myself to a brief explanation of 
the way in which the domain of right might unite theoretical and practical reason. The 
laws of a society that is in conformity with right are similar to natural laws insofar as 
they serve as a mechanism to regulate human behaviour. Yet these laws are instituted 
and created by human agents, they must therefore be regarded as products of 
freedom. Furthermore, insofar as these mechanical laws guarantee the 'external' 
conformity of human actions to the moral law, they secure the possibility of genuinely 
moral and autonomous action - action that is freely done from duty. Right serves, 
then, as the condition of the possibility of morality and freedom by virtue of its 
mechanical, 'quasi-natural' regulation of human behaviour. In this way the realization of 
freedom in the world of phenomena is secured. 
A perfectly right civil society is to serve as the realm in which nature and 
freedom are united. But what prompts the historical emergence of such a society? And 
how, given humanity's natural disposition towards evil- the fact that the human being 
is, to use Kant's lapidary phrase, fashioned from 'crooked timber' (krummen Holze) -
could such a society emerge?10 In the 1784 essay Kant's answer to both of these 
questions is to be found in his teleological conception of nature as possessing an 'aim' 
or 'definite plan' (einem bestimmten Plane). 11 Kant suggests that we think of nature 'as 
if (als ob) it had arranged things so that humanity unintentionally develops its rational 
capacities. The means nature uses to achieve this, Kant tells us, is the 'unsocial 
sociability' (ungesel/ige Geselligkeit) of human beings - 'their tendency to come 
together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which continually 
threatens to break this society up'. 12 This unsocial sociability presents a complex 
pattern of interaction. The human being has an inclination to live in society, since this is 
where he feels able to develop his natural capacities. Yet he also has a competing 
tendency to isolate himself, to live as an individual, insofar as he desires to direct 
everything according to 'his own ideas' (nach seinem Sinne). 13 The human being 
expects everyone to resist his projects, and knows that he will resist the projects of 
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others. This resistance, Kant claims, awakens the human being's capacities and forces 
him to overcome his natural 'laziness'. Human beings are forced to develop their 
capacities in order to resist and, ultimately, dominate other human beings: through the 
'desire for honour, power or property' (Ehrsucht, Herrschsucht, Habsucht) the human 
being is driven 'to seek status among his fellows whom he cannot bear yet cannot bear 
to leave' .14 Now, the conflict engendered by these tendencies is potentially fatal - it 
would be 'impossible' for human beings to 'exist side by side for long in a state of wild 
freedom'. 15 
The threat of mutual destruction forces human beings to exit the state of nature 
and establish a civil society. Within civil society the negative aspects of the human 
being's unsocial sociability are prohibited insofar as they conflict with right. Shorn of 
these aspects, the human being's unsocial sociability serves a positive function. The 
conflict and competition between human beings, which was so pernicious in the state 
of nature, leads to the progressive development of their capacities. The will to 
dominate one another serves as the motor of progress and the inherent 'crookedness' 
of human beings is gradually transformed into rectitude. Humanity therefore 
progresses toward a perfectly right society by means of its tendency towards 'unsocial 
sociability'. 16 As Kant puts it: 
once enclosed within a precinct like that of civil union, the same inclinations have the 
most beneficial effect. In the same way, trees in a forest, by seeking to deprive each 
other of air and sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they 
grow beautiful and straight - whereas those which put out branches at will, in freedom 
and isolation from others, grow stunted, bent and twisted. All the culture and art which 
adorn mankind and the finest social order man creates are fruits of his unsociability .17 
Humanity therefore undergoes a dialectical process in which the human being's 
conflict-producing and asocial tendencies are transformed into their opposites. This 
process might, following Philonenko and Renaut18 , be described as a 'ruse of nature', 
by way of analogy with Hegel's 'ruse of reason'. 19 For the dialectic takes place 'behind 
the backs' of human beings - human beings unwittingly realizing the plan of nature in 
their conflicts and crises. The analogy breaks down, however, in the status Kant 
accords this 'ruse': for it is merely a regulative idea, a heuristic device with which to 
think the history of humanity. 
Kant thus presents intersubjectivity as fundamentally conflict-producing. We are 
caught in an agonistic struggle to assert our individuality through interaction with 
others. Kant has little to say about modes of intersubjectivity which might be described 
as 'positive' - love, sympathy, friendship, respect, etc. The Kantian state of nature is, 
in its emphasis upon conflict, close to that of Hobbes, in which men - who are little 
better than 'wolves'20 - are engaged in a constant 'warre [ ... ] of every man, against 
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every man' 21 Indeed, Kant ridicules those writers (presumably Rousseau and Locke) 
who present the state of nature as a peaceful, innocent state: 'an Arcadian, pastoral 
existence of perfect concord, self-sufficiency and mutual love'. 22 If human beings lived 
in such a state of ovine bliss, Kant argues, they would have no incentive to develop 
their natural capacities; they would be as docile as the sheep they tend. The human 
being might desire concord but 'nature, knowing better what is good for his species, 
wishes discord'. 23 Of particular interest here is Kant's inclusion of a desire for 'honour' 
(Ehrsucht) amongst the potential sources of discord. For Kant recognizes that human 
beings have a desire to be recognized or honoured by other human beings. He 
recognizes, in other words, that being acknowledged by others is as important as the 
acquisition of power and material goods. The origin of this notion is, of course, Hobbes' 
notion of 'Glory' and Rousseau's notion of 'amour propre'. As we shall see in the 
second part of this study, this notion is crucial to Fichte's conception of 'recognition' 
(Anerkennung). 
Kant's emphasis on 'unsocial sociability' means that he places intersubjectivity 
at the heart of his 1784 solution to the problem of the unity of reason. For it is a mode 
of intersubjectivity which triggers the establishment of a civil society and, within this 
society, contributes to the development of humanity. 
We have therefore seen the extent to which an agonistic conception of 
intersubjectivity plays a central role in Kant's early attempts to link theoretical and 
practical reason. Now this conception of intersubjectivity is not only to be found in 
Kant's early work. lt also occurs in §83 of the second part of the Critique of the Power 
of Judgement - 'On the ultimate end of nature as a teleological system'. In this 
section, Kant considers the way in which the human being can be regarded as the 
ultimate end of nature as a teleological system. The end to be promoted could, Kant 
claims, be either the kind of end that could be fulfilled by the 'beneficence' of nature, or 
be the 'aptitude' and 'skill' for all sorts of ends for which the human being can use both 
'outer' and 'inner' nature. The former end is the earthly 'happiness' of the human being. 
The latter end is the 'culture' of the human being. Kant dismisses the notion that 
human happiness could be the ultimate end of nature for two reasons. Firstly, because 
happiness is a variable and unstable concept, there could be no universal law which 
would govern the satisfaction of happiness. Secondly, nature does not seem to have 
been especially benevolent to the human being. For nature has subjected the human 
being to the dangers of the environment and other animals. 24 And even if such 
'external' dangers were absent, the human being's inner nature would prevent his 
attaining happiness. As Kant puts it, the 'conflict in the natural predispositions' of the 
human being reduces him and his species 'by means of plagues that he invents for 
himself' to extreme need and indigence. 25 Culture, not happiness, must therefore be 
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the ultimate end of nature. Kant defines culture as the 'production of the aptitude of a 
rational being for any ends in general (thus those of his freedom)'. This aptitude is an 
aptitude for 'setting himself ends at all and (independent from nature in his 
determination of ends) using nature as a means appropriate to the maxims of his free 
ends in general'. 26 In seeking to produce culture, and therefore such an aptitude, 
nature intends that the human being should develop a capacity to choose his ends 
freely- viz., independently of natural needs and inclinations. Having developed such 
a capacity the human being can then attempt to realize his highest goal or 'end' - the 
end of being a totally free and autonomous agent. Nature's highest end - the 
development of culture- therefore serves to promote the human being's highest end. 
Now, there are two conditions of culture qua the production of the aptitude for 
freely choosing ends. These conditions, which are both forms of culture, are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient. The first condition is the 'culture of skill', 
which might be described as the technical ability to realize ends. it is, Kant claims, 'the 
foremost subjective condition of the aptitude for the promotion of ends in general'. 27 Yet 
it is not sufficient for promoting freedom in the choice of ends, which is 'essential for an 
aptitude for ends'. Another form of culture is required, which Kant calls the 'culture of 
training (discipline)'. This form of culture is 'negative' insofar as it consists in liberating 
the will from 'the despotism of desires'. The culture of training disciplines us to resist 
the pull of the inclinations and therefore allows us to choose our ends freely. Kant 
discusses the development of these two forms of culture in turn. 
The progressive development of the 'culture of skill' can only be attained, Kant 
claims, by means of 'inequality' amongst people. 28 This inequality takes the form of a 
division between two classes - an oppressed majority and an oppressive minority. 
The majority satisfy the material needs of society 'mechanically', their unskilled labour 
providing for the 'comfort and ease' of the minority. The majority are oppressed and 
dominated by the minority, their labour providing them little pleasure. The minority, 
liberated from the hardships of manual labour, are left free to pursue intellectual labour. 
They devote their lives to cultivating the 'less necessary elements of culture, science 
and art' which, as if by way of compensation, gradually spread to the majority. This 
state of extreme inequality is, Kant claims, deeply unstable and volatile. With the 
progress of this 'culture of skill' crises and 'calamities' increase on both sides. On the 
side of the majority these calamities are due to 'violence imposed from without' - the 
hardships of manual labour, poverty and domination. On the side of the minority these 
calamities are due to 'violence imposed from within' - by which Kant presumably 
means the hardships of profligate living and intellectual labour. Here the 'unsocial 
sociability' of the 1784 essay has been replaced by an almost Marxist conception of 
class struggle (almost Marxist, because Kant focuses primarily on the crises within 
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classes, rather than those occurring between them). Yet, as in the 1784 essay, this 
agonistic relationship undergoes a dialectical reversal, humanity unwittingly realizing 
nature's end. As Kant puts it, 'this splendid misery is bound up with the development of 
the natural predispositions in the human race and the end of nature itself, even if it is 
not our end, is hereby attained'. 29 Such development is only possible, as in the 1784 
essay, in a law-governed civil society which regulates individual liberty. lt is only within 
such a society (which itself presupposes a cosmopolitan federation of states) that the 
culture of skill can be fully developed. 
The culture of skill, however, is insufficient for culture qua the production of the 
aptitude for freely choosing ends. For skill is a merely technical mastery of ends, a 
capacity to determine and control the realization of ends. The ends themselves are not 
determined by skill, and may be dictated by our natural inclinations. A culture of 
training or discipline is therefore necessary, and Kant discusses this culture under the 
rubric of a 'discipline of the inclinations'. According to Kant, nature still exhibits a 
certain purposiveness regarding this second condition of culture; it displays 'a 
purposive effort at an education to make us receptive to higher ends than nature can 
afford'. This effort is manifested in the gradual development of the 'insatiable host' of 
inclinations that are aroused by the 'refinement of taste to the point of its idealization, 
and even by indulgence in the sciences as nourishment for vanity'. 30 Here Kant paints 
a picture of a thoroughly decadent society in which the arts and sciences are 
responsible for many evils; a picture that is clearly inspired by Rousseau's first 
Discourse. Yet Kant, unlike Rousseau, sees the development of this society as positive 
insofar as the 'crudeness and vehemence' of these inclinations are gradually refined. 
Our merely animal inclinations are gradually transformed and mastered, leaving room 
for the emergence of a capacity for rational, autonomous choice. Kant sees the 
development of the 'beautiful arts and sciences' as serving a socially ameliorative 
function: 
Beautiful arts and sciences, which by means of a universally communicable pleasure and 
an elegance and refinement make human beings, if not morally better, at least better 
mannered for society [fOr Gesellschaft, wenngleich den Menschen nicht sittlich besser, 
doch gesittet machen], very much reduce the tyranny of the sensible tendencies, and 
prepare humans for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power [ ... ). 31 
This 'universally communicable pleasure' which is associated with the 'beautiful arts 
and sciences' makes the human being 'better mannered for society' and therefore 
capable, at least in principle, of becoming moral. By guaranteeing the human being's 
conformity with the mores and manners of society, aesthetic experience secures a 
sphere in which he may act morally. Now this universally communicable pleasure 
results from a specific mode of intersubjectivity which we could, following Philonenko, 
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call 'aesthetic communication'. This mode of communication is, unlike its theoretical 
and practical counterparts, a direct mode of communication which requires neither the 
mediation of an object nor the moral law. As such, it requires neither theoretical nor 
practical concepts, and may therefore be described as 'non-conceptual'. 32 In aesthetic 
communication, Philonenko claims, 'man directly encounters man without a concept'. 33 
This aesthetic mode of intersubjectivity stands in stark contrast with the mode 
of intersubjectivity associated with the culture of skill. For aesthetic communication is 
pacific; it serves to unite human beings through a commonality of feeling. By contrast, 
the mode of intersubjectivity associated with the culture of skill is, like the 'unsocial 
sociability' of the 1784 essay, profoundly agonistic. What is of particular interest here is 
the way in which this new mode of intersubjectivity eclipses the agonistic mode. This is 
evinced by the fact that much of the first part of the third Critique is devoted to a 
discussion of aesthetic communication, and by the fact that the culture of discipline 
with which it is associated is said to be 'essential'. An important consequence of this 
foregrounding of aesthetic communication is a demotion of the notion of a civil society 
in conformity with right. Insofar as aesthetic communication promotes mores and 
manners, and stimulates an appreciation of beauty (which is the symbol of morality), it 
serves to prepare human beings for morality, a task initially assigned to the domain of 
right. The mediating function of right is now assigned to the domain of aesthetic 
experience. 34 Philonenko describes the mediating function of aesthetic communication 
as follows: 
In the idea of a direct communication between different subjects through and in the 
judgement of taste, Kant tries [ ... ] to present the mediation which founds the passage 
from the world of nature and cognition to the suprasensible world, which is the world of 
freedom. On the one hand, aesthetic communication is linked with the sensible; as such it 
is connected with the communication founded in cognition which presupposes the wholly 
human forms of sensibility. On the other hand, aesthetic communication is also linked 
with the suprasensible world: not only is beauty the symbol of the good but the aesthetic 
judgement is also based upon freedom, which expresses itself in the play of the faculties 
of the soul and in the absence of all constraint. 35 
Aesthetic communication therefore serves to mediate between theoretical and practical 
reason, and their characteristic modes of communication. lt is a 'non-conceptual' and 
direct mode of communication. Yet it is also, Kant claims, normative. How, then, are 
these characteristics related? Are the normativity and non-conceptuality of aesthetic 
communciation compatible? An answer to these questions is to be found in Kant's 
discussion of aesthetic judgements in the third Critique. I shall begin by discussing 
Kant's claim that judgements of taste are normative and then proceed to his claim that 
they are non-conceptual. 
lt is a commonplace to regard aesthetic judgements, or judgements of taste, as 
simply expressing our own personal preferences. Thus, my saying that I find x 
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'beautiful' might be regarded as an expression of personal taste. lt might therefore be 
surprising to learn that Kant claims that a pure judgement of taste is inherently 
normative. 36 For Kant, a pure aesthetic judgement is not merely an expression of 
personal preference - it contains an implicit 'demand' (Forderung) that everyone 
should agree with my judgement, that everyone should also declare x to be 'beautiful'. 
Kant speaks of this demand as an aesthetic 'ought' (So//en). 37 
Kant's notion of the normativity of taste is intimately connected with his claim 
that taste is a social phenomenon. A judgement of taste, in demanding that everyone 
should agree, links us with the community of other human beings. In judging 
aesthetically we speak as though with a 'universal voice' (allgemeine Stimme) which 
lays claim to the 'consent' (Beitritt) of everyone. 38 Kant even goes so far as to suggest 
that aesthetic pleasure is grounded upon the possibility of communicating and sharing 
our aesthetic experience with others. 39 
According to Kant, in making a judgement of taste I tacitly demand the 'assent' 
(Beistimmung) of everyone. Thus my claim that 'x is beautiful' implicitly contains the 
demand that everyone should judge 'x to be beautiful', or to use Kant's terminology, 
that the judgement is 'universally valid'. Now there may not be actual agreement -
others may actually experience real displeasure in the object I find beautiful. Yet Kant 
thinks this is of little significance. For my aesthetic claim is made a priori; it is, in 
principle, independent of, and incapable of being influenced by, what others actually 
feel. But how can such a claim be justified? I make the claim, Kant says, on the 
assumption that it is possible for everyone to experience the same feeling of pleasure 
as I do. This assumption rests on the notion that others possess the same cognitive 
capacities as I do - understanding and imagination - and that these capacities 
function in the same way in aesthetic experience. I therefore make my judgement on 
the assumption that everyone is cognitively 'wired-up' in the same way as I. I 
presuppose that everyone shares the same sense - that there is a 'common sense' 
(Gemeinsinn) or sensus communis. This presupposition is justified, Kant argues 
elsewhere, by the fact that communication would be impossible if we did not possess 
the same cognitive faculties. 40 
Agreement is therefore guaranteed a priori: it is secured by the fact we all share 
the same cognitive capacities. But this only tells us the conditions upon which 
agreements about judgement of taste - if there are any such agreements - rest. lt 
does not tells us how agreement takes place, or how, if at all, we can resolve 
disagreements. lt seems that some account must be given of how we can justify our 
aesthetic judgements to those who refuse to accept them. Such justification would 
seem to be crucial to the normativity of aesthetic judgement. After all, if I say (or imply) 
that you should do something or hold a certain belief, it seems that - if my claim is to 
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have any normative force - it must, at least in principle, be justifiable. And this 
defence characteristically consists in offering reasons for the recommended belief or 
action; reasons which could, in turn, be questioned. Now, as writers such as Brandom 
and Habermas have argued, this process of justification, this practice of 'giving and 
asking for reasons', is an essentially social practice. Justification is primarily an 
intersubjective affair; reasons are given in dialogues between agents. The notion that 
justification is characteristically the activity of an isolated reflecting individual is, these 
writers suggest, a violent abstraction. 41 
According to this 'intersubjectivist' conception of justification, a satisfactory 
account of normativity must also provide an account of how normative claims are 
justified or redeemed through dialogue or interaction. Such an account seems to be 
provided by Kant in the section of the third Critique entitled 'Taste as a Kind of Sensus 
Communis'. The following quote is taken from Kant's central account of the sensus 
communis: 
By "sensus communis,"[ ... ] must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e., a 
faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a prion) of everyone else's way of 
representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgement up to human reason as 
a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could 
easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgement. Now 
this happens by one holding his judgement up not so much to the actual as to the merely 
possible judgements of others, and putting himself into the position of everyone else, 
merely by abstracting from the limitations that contingently attach to our own judging; 
which is in turn accomplished by leaving out as far as is possible everything in one's 
representational state that is matter, i.e., sensation, and attending solely to the formal 
peculiarities of his representation or his representational state.42 
Now, although Kant describes this as a 'communal sense' and refers to our relations 
to others, dialogue or interaction are mentioned nowhere here. Kant does not provide 
us with any maxims for reasoning with others. He merely provides us with maxims for 
the formation of judgement. His instruction to compare our view with the views of 
others is only metaphorical - 'as it were'. We are told to adopt an 'enlarged way of 
thinking' -to put ourselves in the standpoint of others, and to reflect on our judgement 
from this 'universal standpoint'. 43 But this standpoint is to be reached, Kant tells us, by 
removing all 'matter' from our representations, so that we are left with nothing but the 
bare form of our representational states. Presumably, once I have reached this 
standpoint, any claims I make will be entirely transparent to others provided they 
possess the same cognitive capacities as I do. What is missing from this account is 
any sense of our reaching agreement through a process of dialogue - of advancing 
from our partial, prejudiced standpoints to rational agreement. Indeed, Kant's process 
of abstraction could - like the Cl procedure - be achieved by the private deliberation 
of a private individual; there is no reason why this process should depend upon 
interaction with others.44 Furthermore, we can never be sure if we have adopted the 
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standpoint of the sensus communis. Kant tells us to abstract from the private 'matter' of 
our judgements in order to reach this standpoint, but there may be competing 
descriptions about what constitutes the private 'matter' of judgements. What I consider 
to be a universal standpoint may, from another's point of view, be a very partial 
standpoint. 
Kant therefore does not appeal to a social process of justification - he does 
not present the giving of reasons as a social affair. There may, however, be a reason 
for this. lt might be argued that Kant does not present the giving of reasons as a social 
process because he does not think that reasons can be given for aesthetic 
judgements. But if reasons cannot be given for aesthetic judgements it would seem 
that their claim to normativity cannot be justified. This, it transpires, is Kant's view of 
the matter. Judgements of taste merely appear to be normative: they raise a claim to 
normativity which cannot be justified or 'redeemed'. This is due to the fact that 
judgements of taste are non-conceptual: they are solely expressions of our 'feeling' 
(GefOhf) of pleasure or displeasure and do not involve concepts. 45 Cognitive 
judgements, by contrast, - which include moral and theoretical judgements - do 
involve concepts. These concepts play a crucial justificatory role in theoretical or 
practical cognition. Thus, to give an example, I justify the claim that it is wrong to lie by 
appealing to certain concepts (such as the effects consequent upon lying being made a 
universal law). Concepts, Kant tells us, provide 'proof' (Beweis) for judgements. 
Judgements that do not involve concepts are, Kant tells us, incapable of proof. 
Consequently, aesthetic judgements - by virtue of their not being cognitive - are 
incapable of proof. 
This feature of aesthetic judgements poses serious problems for their supposed 
normativity. In §33 Kant tells us that neither a priori nor empirical grounds of proof 
could compel anyone to revise their judgement of taste. No supposed a priori rules of 
taste can make me change my judgement about a work of art. Giving the example of a 
poem, Kant claims that: 
Certain passages, which are the very ones that displease me, may even agree with rules 
of beauty (as they have been given [ ... ]and have been recognized): I will stop my ears, 
listen to no reasons and arguments, and would rather believe that those rules of the 
critics are false or at least that this is not a case for their application than allow that my 
judgement be determined by means of a priori grounds of proof, since it is supposed to 
be a judgement of taste and not of the understanding or reason 46 
Kant associates the notion of an empirical ground of proof with an appeal to the fact 
that others generally find something to be beautiful. Kant claims that what the public 
considers to be beautiful can never dissuade us from our judgement of taste. 
Testimony may persuade us to revise our epistemic claims, but it can never, Kant 
41 
argues, persuade us to revise our aesthetic claims. Only the refinement of our power of 
judgement through practice will enable us to revise our aesthetic judgements. 
We therefore cannot be compelled to adopt or revise aesthetic points of view. 
No reasons can be given for or against aesthetic judgements, and this calls into 
question their supposed normativity. Kant himself makes this point when he says that 
the normative claim these judgements make 'could only be made if it were an objective 
judgement resting on cognitive grounds and capable of being compelled by means of a 
proof'. 47 As no proof can be given, the normative claim these judgements make is 
empty. lt merely has the appearance of normativity. 
Nevertheless, there may, Kant suggests, be a way we can influence others to 
revise their aesthetic judgements. He suggests this when he says that while there can 
be no 'disputing' (Disputieren) about taste, it is certainly right to 'argue' (Streiten) about 
taste. Both disputation and arguing are oriented towards 'mutual agreement' about 
matters of taste. 48 'Disputation' attempts to decide about the status of a judgement by 
means of proofs. 'Arguing' does not appeal to rational grounds, but nevertheless 
assumes that there is a right or wrong in matters of taste. Kant is not very expansive on 
the nature of arguing, but it presumably amounts to an attempt to somehow 'stimulate' 
the other's cognitive powers in the hope that she will experience the requisite feeling. 49 
Such an attempt would perhaps consist in pointing to specific features of the aesthetic 
object that she may not have noticed. Yet, regardless of how artful this attempt was, 
the other's assent would only be attained if she experienced the feeling, and this is 
dependent on the attunement of her cognitive powers. Ultimately, agreement rests 
upon the notion that the cognitive powers of the disputing parties can be similarly 
aligned, and this presupposes that the parties possess qualitatively identical cognitive 
powers. Once again, the possibility of agreement is secured by the assumption that 
human beings are cognitively isomorphic. In order for this assumption to be justified it 
would seem that Kant must explain the possibility of our knowledge of other minds. 
Yet, more importantly, Kant must explain this possibility in order to account for the very 
aesthetic communication which facilitates agreement. For this communication, like all 
communication, obviously presupposes the capacity to recognize those with whom we 
communicate. Kant must therefore provide an account of our knowledge of other 
rational beings like ourselves. Does the third Critique provide this account? 
According to Fichte, an attempt to provide this account is to be found in Kant's 
discussion of reflective judgement. Fichte does not tell us explicitly where this attempt 
is, but Radrizzani 50 has argued that it is to be found in §64 of the Critique of the 
Teleological Power of Judgement - 'On the special character of things as natural 
ends.' There, Kant asks us to imagine a traveller in an uninhabited desert who sees a 
hexagon traced in the sand. Reflectively, he searches for a universal concept or idea 
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under which to subsume the particular representation. He finally formulates the 
hypothesis that no other cause could have produced it but a being like himself. The 
traveller therefore declares- 'Vestigium hominis video' (I see it as a trace of a man). 
Now, two things are worth noting about Kant's discussion. Firstly, it is, as Vieillard-
Baron points out, presented as a merely probable hypothesis. The traveller's reflective 
judgement (which is essentially an abductive inference) lacks any certainty; it 
expresses a possibility and nothing more. 51 Secondly, it is worth noting the specific 
nature of the phenomenon the traveller encounters: it is a geometrical figure. This 
choice of example brings to mind Kant's discussion of geometrical construction in the 
first Critique, in which he argues that the geometrical concept is necessarily 
'constructed' in intuition (whether pure or empirical). 52 I can, insofar as I recognize the 
geometrical figure and am familiar with the process of construction, infer that the figure 
was caused by a being possessing geometrical concepts and space and time as 
sensible forms of intuition, viz., a human being. However, and this is a point that is 
seldom noted, the human being is the human being as a 'theoretical' being. lt is not the 
human being as a 'practical' being; a being capable of acting in accordance with the 
categorical imperative. Kant provides no account of how we might cognize the human 
being as a practical being. 
We have therefore seen that intersubjectivity plays a crucial role in Kant's attempts to 
secure the unity of reason. In the Idea essay, an agonistic conception of 
intersubjectivity served to secure the transition from 'crookedness' to 'rectitude'. In the 
third Critique, this agonistic conception of intersubjectivity was subordinated to a pacific 
conception of intersubjectivity as aesthetic communication. We have discussed Kant's 
attempt to provide an account of how we can recognize other beings like ourselves, 
and have seen that this account only secures the possibility of our recognizing them as 
'theoretical' beings. Fichte will seek to rectify the deficiencies in Kant's account. He will 
attempt to provide absolutely certain knowledge of other human beings as practical 
beings. How successful this attempt is will be discussed in the next part of this thesis. 
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Part 11 
FICHTE'S THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
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Introduction to Part 11 
In this part of the thesis, I will trace Fichte's account of intersubjectivity from his early 
lectures at Jena to his Foundations of Natural Right. Yet, whilst I shall focus upon 
Fichte's account of intersubjectivity, I shall not consider it in isolation. Fichte is a 
systematic thinker and, if we wish to assess the significance of intersubjectivity for his 
philosophy as a whole, we must consider his account of intersubjectivity in relation to 
his system of transcendental idealism or 'Wissenschaftslehre'. lt will also be particularly 
important to consider the relationship of Fichte's account of intersubjectivity to his first 
presentation of the 'foundations' of this system - the 1794-5 Foundations of the Entire 
Wissenschaftslehre. For this presentation has often been taken to endorse a 
'subjective idealism' which is wholly incompatible with a theory of intersubjectivity 
which regards other agents as something more than a 'product' of an 'absolute I'. 
I will begin, in chapter 4, by providing an account of Fichte's notion of 
philosophy as a 'Wissenschaftslehre' and then proceed, in chapter 5, to a discussion of 
Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation, which contains Fichte's first serious 
treatment of intersubjectivity. In chapter 6, I shall provide, in opposition to the traditional 
'metaphysical' interpretation of the 1794-5 Foundations of the Entire 
Wissenschaftslehre, an interpretation that is compatible with Fichte's concern with 
intersubjectivity. Such a reading will allow us, in chapter 7, to examine Fichte's theory 
of natural right which seeks to provide a comprehensive theory of intersubjectivity. 
Particular emphasis will be placed on Fichte's claim that a relationship of mutual 
recognition is a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. 
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THE CONCEPT OF A WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE 
In order to appreciate the role of intersubjectivity within Fichte's transcendental 
idealism an understanding of Fichte's conception of philosophical inquiry is necessary. 
Philosophical inquiry must, Fichte claims, constitute a Wissenschaftslehre - a 
'doctrine' or 'theory' (Lehre) of 'science' or 'scientific knowledge' (Wissenschaft). 
Indeed, Fichte even goes so far as to suggest that philosophy should, insofar as it is to 
be a 'rigorous science', adopt the name Wissenschaftslehre. 1 
What, then, is a Wissenschaftslehre? The most obvious place to look for an 
answer to this question is the 1794 essay Concerning the Concept of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, or, of So-called Philosophy (hereafter, 'Concerning the Concept') 
and the two Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre of 1797. Concerning the Concept 
was written as a prospectus for, and an invitation to, Fichte's 'private' lectures at the 
University of Jena - the notes to which constitute the 1794-5 Foundations of the 
Entire Wissenschaftslehre (hereafter, '1794-5 Foundations'). Fichte was apparently 
pleased with this essay, and published a second edition in 1798. In the Preface to this 
edition Fichte claims that Concerning the Concept is, along with the two Introductions, 
a work of 'criticism': a work devoted to reflection upon the nature of philosophy. The 
significance that Fichte attached to the prospectus, and the fact that it provides an 
excellent prolegomena to the highly abstruse 1794-5 Foundations, would seem to 
make it an ideal starting point for a discussion of the idea of a Wissenschaftslehre. In 
what follows, I shall draw upon all three texts to provide an account of Fichte's 
philosophical project. Before providing this account, however, a few clarifications will 
be helpful. 
Firstly, the term Wissenschaftslehre is a neologism developed by Fichte to 
describe his systematic transcendental idealism. lt may be translated as 'Doctrine' or 
'Theory'- Lehre, of 'Science' or 'Scientific Knowledge'- Wissenschaft. it should not 
be translated as 'Science of Knowledge' (the title of the English translation of the 1794-
5 Foundations). The German term Wissenschaft does not mean 'natural science'. 
Rather, it means any body of rigorous, systematic knowledge, whether scientific or 
otherwise. Disciplines such as theology, right or aesthetics can all be 'scientific' -
wissenschaftlich- providing they are unified, systematic bodies of knowledge. 2 
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Secondly, it is crucial to make a distinction between the Wissenschaftslehre 
and its 'foundations' (Grundlage). 3 The foundational part of the Wissenschaftslehre 
articulates the fundamental principles underlying certain types of knowledge. These 
principles may serve as the first principles of particular philosophical 'theories' 
(Lehren), which are the sub-divisions of the Wissenschaftslehre. These theories are, 
Concerning the Concept tells us, ethics, right, aesthetics, theology, the study of nature 
and 'so-called common sense or the natural sense of truth'. 4 Fichte only provided 
comprehensive treatments of two of these theories - ethics and right, and spent most 
of his career reworking the foundations of his system. In what follows, we will be 
concerned primarily with Fichte's philosophy of right and with the first, foundational part 
of the Wissenschafts/ehre which seeks to provide the fundamental conditions for the 
special philosophical theories. 
Finally, it is important to note that Fichte continually and tirelessly revised his 
presentation of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre. The question of the 
relationship between these different presentations has been a source of considerable 
controversy. Here I shall be concerned only with the 1794-5 presentation, an extremely 
difficult and opaque text, which Fichte wrote as lecture notes for his students. My 
reason for focusing upon this text is that it was produced at the same time as Fichte's 
first serious discussion of intersubjectivity. lt may therefore reflect this discussion and 
may perhaps even provide the theoretical foundations for it. 
With these clarifications in mind, I shall now explain what a Wissenschaftslehre 
is. My explanation will focus upon six closely related themes, which are central to 
Fichte's conception of a Wissenschaftslehre. These themes are: the demand for a 
rigorous foundational philosophy; the conflict between dogmatism and idealism; the 
grounds for choosing a philosophy; the political implications of transcendental idealism; 
the notion of 'pragmatic history' and the need for a philosophical 'justification of doxa'. 
Philosophy as a 'Rigorous Science' 
In his introductions to the first Critique, Kant held that a true system of transcendental 
philosophy should be both rigorous and scientific. But although Kant claimed to have 
discovered the 'path to science' he did not, by his own admission, provide a truly 
unified system. 5 Kant's foremost disciple, K. L. Rein hold, sought to correct this. He 
claimed that a genuine transcendental philosophy must derive a// the conditions for the 
possibility of experience from a single first principle, and attempted to do this in his 
'Elementary Philosophy' (E/ementarphilosophie). There, he claimed to have discovered 
the 'common root' between sensibility and understanding that Kant postulated but 
claimed was unknown. 6 He found this 'root' in the 'principle of consciousness' (Satz 
des Bewu/3tseins) which states: 'in consciousness, the subject distinguishes the 
49 
representation from the subject and the object and relates it to them both'.7 Reinhold 
claimed that this first principle expressed a 'fact of consciousness', which could be 
immediately grasped in reflection. 8 No reasoning was required to demonstrate this fact. 
Indeed, if reasons could be given, the principle of consciousness would not be the first 
principle of philosophy. The fact, and the principle expressing it, both had to be self-
evident and self-justifying. Knowledge of this fact had to be immediate and, 
consequently, non-inferential. The immediate, non-inferential nature of this awareness 
led to it being described as an 'intuition' (Anschauung). Yet this intuition, insofar as it 
afforded knowledge of consciousness, was not sensible. Reinhold therefore referred to 
it as an 'intellectual intuition' (lntellektuel/e Anschauung). 9 
From the principle of consciousness, Reinhold tried to derive the conditions of 
the possibility of our representation of an objective, publicly accessible world. These 
conditions were located in the faculty of representation which actively structured 
experience. 
Fichte was greatly impressed by Reinhold's scientific conception of philosophy 
and wrote a series of 'meditations' upon Reinhold's system. 1° Fichte also provided a 
sophisticated defence of Reinhold in response to an anonymously published treatise 
(the author was later discovered to be G. E. Schulze) Aenesidemus, or concerning the 
Foundations of the Elementary Philosophy Propounded in Jena by Professor Reinhold, 
including a defense of Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason. 11 
Nevertheless, Fichte's allegiance to Reinhold's conception of transcendental 
philosophy was not unqualified. 
Fichte objected to the 'dogmatic' implications of Reinhold's claim that the first 
principle expressed a 'fact of consciousness'. The notion that this principle was 
somehow 'given' lent itself to a dogmatic interpretation, certain writers regarding this 
'fact' as an innate mechanism of the mind. Indeed, much of the scepticism of 
Aenesidemus was directed at the peculiar nature of this fact of consciousness. Fichte 
responded by claiming that Reinhold was wrong to suggest that the first principle was a 
fact of consciousness. Rather, underlying this 'fact' (Tatsache) was a fundamental, 
spontaneous 'deed-act' ( Tathandlung) which made it possible. 12 Fichte also objected to 
Reinhold's emphasis on our theoretical knowledge - our knowledge of an apparently 
mind-independent world. For whilst Reinhold repeatedly stressed that his Elementary 
Philosophy would provided a secure foundation for our moral and religious beliefs, he 
was largely concerned with justifying our 'theoretical' representations. 13 Fichte 
expresses his disappointment in a 1793 letter, in which he claims that Reinhold must 
know 'nothing of freedom and the practical [categorical] imperative'. 14 
Despite these objections, however, Fichte remained faithful to Reinhold's ideal 
of philosophy as a rigorous, foundational science whose task was to derive the 
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conditions of the possibility of representation from a single first principle. In the first 
Introduction of 1797, Fichte describes the goal of philosophy as follows: 
what is the basis of the system of those representations accompanied by a feeling of 
necessity, and what is the basis of this feeling of necessity itself? This is a question well 
worth pondering. it is the task of philosophy to answer this question; indeed, to my mind, 
nothing is philosophy except that science that discharges this task. Another name for the 
system of representations accompanied by the feeling of necessity is "experience" -
whether inner or outer. We could thus express the task of philosophy in different words 
as follows: Philosophy has to display the basis or foundation of all experience. 15 
This is the task of philosophy, and consequently the task of a Wissenschaftslehre. lt 
must articulate the conditions of the possibility of the 'system of representations 
accompanied by the feeling of necessity' or experience. 
Now a certain degree of caution is required here. For Fichte, this system of 
representations is not limited to our representations of an apparently mind-independent 
objective world. If this was all Fichte meant by 'experience', it would be hard to 
understand how he differed from Reinhold. Indeed, Fichte states that the 
representations in question are: 
not merely our representations of a world in which objects are determined by the 
subsumptive and reflective power of jud~ement, but also our representations of ourselves 
as free, practical beings subject to laws. 6 
In other words, philosophy must also articulate the fundamental conditions of our 
practical knowledge - our knowledge of what we ought to do. For moral obligation is 
also accompanied by a 'feeling of necessity'. And it should also, Fichte claims in 
Concerning the Concept, articulate the fundamental principles of aesthetic and 
theological judgement and 'so-called common sense'. 17 
lt would therefore be a mistake to think of Fichte as an epistemologist in the 
narrow sense, i.e. as being concerned with our knowledge of a mind-independent 
objective world. He is concerned with the conditions for the possibility of diverse kinds 
of knowledge. Indeed, as we shall shortly see, Fichte is concerned with our most 
prosaic everyday knowledge. 
What, then, are the conditions sought by the foundational part of the 
Wissenschaftslehre? Fichte claims that the foundation for all experience is 
spontaneous subjectivity, the 'absolute I' or 'pure I' (das reine /eh). In the first Critique 
Kant called this the 'transcendental unity of apperception (or self-consciousness)' and 
claimed that it was the 'supreme' principle in the whole of human cognition' .18 For 
Kant, the synthesizing activity of this 'subject' or 'I', which is facilitated by the 
categories, is a fundamental condition of the possibility of human experience. The 
synthesizing acts of the I 'constitute' the fundamental structures of experience. 
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Fichte seizes upon this notion and radically extends it, rejecting Kant's claim 
that there is a quasi-independent faculty of sensibility. For Fichte, a Wissenschaftslehre 
should seek to derive a// the conditions of the possibility of experience from the 
spontaneous activity of the pure I alone. lt does this by articulating a system of 
necessary 'acts of the mind', a system of acts that furnish the conditions of the 
possibility of experience. 19 These acts are constitutive of the entire system of 
representations accompanied by the feeling of necessity (which is not to say that they 
somehow 'produce reality'). The Wissenschaftslehre deduces these acts as conditions 
of the possibility of the first primordial act. The first primordial act is the act whereby the 
I posits itself as self-positing (i.e., actively becomes aware of itself as active). But in 
order for this to be possible, another act is required -the positing of an object or 'not-
1'. This act in turn requires another act as the condition of its possibility, which in turn 
requires another act, etc. At the end of this procedure, the entire a priori structure of 
experience has been derived. In the first Introduction to the Wissenschafstlehre Fichte 
describes this procedure as follows: 
1t shows that what is postulated as the first principle and immediately established within 
consciousness is not possible unless something else occurs as well, and that this second 
thing is not possible apart from the occurrence of some third thing. it continues in this 
manner until all of the conditions of the first principle have been completely exhausted 
and its possibility has become completely comprehensible. lt proceeds in an interrupted 
progression from what is conditioned to the condition of the same. Each condition 
becomes, in turn, something that is itself conditioned and whose condition has to be 
discovered. 20 
This strategy should be familiar: lt is precisely the strategy of Kant's 'Transcendental 
Deduction' in which the categories are deduced as the conditions of the possibility of 
the synthesizing activity of the transcendental unity of apperception. 
Fichte's claim that the first, unconditioned act itself has conditions may seem 
paradoxical. However, this apparent paradox can be resolved as follows. The original 
act is the fundamental condition of the possibility of all experience. Without its 
synthesizing activity no experience would be possible. lt therefore necessitates or 
demands that other conditions hold. lt is, in a fundamental sense, the condition of its 
conditions: without it, there would be no conditions, i.e., no other acts. Moreover, the 
paradox only really arises if we regard these conditioning acts as discrete activities that 
are foreign to the first fundamental act. There is, strictly speaking only one act, the act 
of the pure I, which provides its own conditions. The language of isolated acts is merely 
an heuristic device for philosophical inquiry, and should not be taken literally. 21 
This is how the foundations of Fichte's system of transcendental idealism, his 
Wissenschaftslehre, seeks to carry out the 'task of philosophy'. lt seeks to deduce a 
'system of acts' which constitutes the condition of the possibility of experience. 
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However, Fichte is aware that there might be an alternative approach to this task, an 
approach that appeals to different conditions of the possibility of experience. Fichte 
refers to this approach as 'dogmatism'. 
Idealism and Dogmatism 
According to Fichte, idealism and dogmatism are the only philosophical systems 
possible. 22 By 'idealism' Fichte means transcendental idealism and, in particular, his 
own transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism, at least in Fichte's version of it, 
appeals to the activity of the 'pure I' or 'I in itself' as the 'explanatory ground' of all 
experience. 23 Dogmatism, by contrast, appeals to the 'thing in itself' as the explanatory 
ground of all experience. lt seeks to explain both inner and outer experience in terms of 
the causal efficacy of objects. Fichte claims that these systems are mutually 
exclusive. 24 Any attempt to unite them in a 'hybrid' system is, Fichte opines, an 
'inconsistent enterprise'. 25 
There has been considerable controversy over what Fichte means by 
'dogmatism'. Commentators such as J. D. Rabb claim that he means realism. 26 But 
Fichte, as we will see later, does not deny realism absolutely. Wayne Martin has 
claimed that Fichte is referring to 'naturalism', understood as the attempt to explain 
experience and self-consciousness as the result of mechanistic causal processes. 27 
Fichte is certainly opposed to such a mode of explanation, yet the appellation 
'naturalism' seems oddly anachronistic. Furthermore, it is hardly plausible to suggest 
that Berkeley- who Fichte regards as a dogmatist- is an exponent of naturalism, at 
least as this term is normally understood. 28 There is, I would suggest, a simpler 
answer, an answer which should be familiar to readers of Kant. 
The answer is that Fichte is referring to what Kant calls transcendental realism, 
a philosophical approach that attempts to explain representation by appealing to a 
domain of objects which are constituted independently of us. 29 lt begins with a mind-
independent realm of being, and then asks how experience is possible. Having 
postulated a gap between our representations and objects, it is then faced with the 
onerous task of bridging this gap. And Fichte, like Kant, claims it cannot do this without 
being caught up in vicious circularity or entering into an infinite regress. 
This interpretation allows us to explain why Fichte classes Berkeley as a 
dogmatist. For Kant regards Berkeley's empirical idealism as an upshot of an 
underlying commitment to transcendental realism. 3° Fichte can therefore be seen to be 
adopting Kant's metaphilosophical distinction. Yet he also transforms this distinction in 
a way Kant did not anticipate. 
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Dogmatists and Idealists 
In the first Introduction of 1797 Fichte claims that the two opposing systems are 
internally consistent and mutually exclusive. it is impossible to refute either from the 
standpoint of the other, insofar as one would be guilty of petitio principii. There is 
simply no reason why either system should accept criticisms grounded upon principles 
which it refuses to accept. it is therefore impossible for either system to demonstrate its 
explanatory superiority over the other. As these are the only two philosophical systems 
conceivable no philosophical justification can be given as to why we should choose 
one system rather than another. Fichte therefore argues that the grounds for choosing 
a philosophical system are extra-philosophical. One's choice of philosophical system 
is, Fichte claims, motivated by inclination and interest - 'The kind of philosophy one 
chooses depends upon the kind of person one is'. 31 
This is perhaps one of Fichte's most famous, and lapidary, pronouncements. lt 
should, however, be interpreted with caution. For Fichte is not claiming that one's 
choice of philosophy is simply a matter of whim, fancy, or subjective perspective. He is 
not claiming that philosophy is, in Nietzsche's words, a 'desire of the heart sifted and 
made abstract'. 32 He is not advocating relativism or perspectivism. Fichte claims that 
the interests which motivate our choice of system are sub-species of a fundamental 
interest: 'One's supreme interest', he asserts, 'and the foundation of all one's other 
interests is one's interest in oneself. 33 
Now there are two fundamental ways in which one can be interested in oneself, 
ways which determine whether one is a dogmatist or an idealist. A dogmatic character, 
as Fichte presents him, is a person immersed in a world of objects, a person who is 
dependent upon things. He defines himself entirely in relation to things and regards his 
actions as determined by the objects around him. 34 Such a person, Fichte claims, only 
has a 'mediated' relation to himself insofar as his self-awareness is mediated by things. 
And, given that his whole sense of self depends upon his relation to objects, he is 
disposed to accept a philosophical system that asserts the primacy of things. A system 
in which this primacy was denied would offend his very being. 
The idealistic character, by contrast, values his freedom and autonomy. He is 
aware of himself as a potentially free agent, and regards his actions as, in principle, 
absolutely independent of objects. He is in an 'immediate' relation to himself. Such a 
person is inclined towards a system that asserts the primacy of autonomy and 
freedom. 
Fichte regards the dogmatist as situated at a 'lower' level of moral development 
than the idealist. He often refers to him in pejorative terms, describing him as someone 
whose character is 'naturally slack'. Nevertheless, Fichte does think that there can be a 
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transition between these two levels of development: that the dogmatist can become an 
idealist. Indeed, he asserts that 'One becomes an idealist only by passing through a 
disposition towards dogmatism-if not by passing through dogmatism itself'. 35 
We shall see how this transition might be brought about in the following 
chapters. Here, I simply wish to draw attention to Fichte's notion that our choice of 
philosophy is motivated by interest and, in particular, that the idealistic character's 
choice is motivated by an interest in freedom. For this claim reflects a fundamental 
concern of Fichte's transcendental idealism - a concern with human freedom. This 
concern is crucial to Fichte's philosophy; it provides the motivation for, and subject 
matter of, a Wissenschaftslehre. 
The First Philosophy of Freedom 
Fichte's concern with freedom is most famously expressed in a draft of a letter to Jens 
Baggesen of April or May 1795. There, Fichte expresses dissatisfaction with the 
'thoughtlessness and bad manners' of the students of Jena and petitions Baggesen to 
help secure him a pension from the French government. Fichte claims that the fact that 
France has undergone a revolution makes it an ideal sponsor, insofar as the 'first 
principles of his system' are 'incompatible with kings or princes'. 36 Fichte writes: 
I would accept a pension from the nation of France, which is just beginning to turn its 
attention towards the arts and sciences. This, I believe, would be appropriate for France. 
My system is the first system of freedom. Just as France has freed man from external 
shackles, so my system frees him from the fetters of things in themselves, which is to 
say, from those external influences with which all previous systems-including the 
Kantian-have more or less fettered man. Indeed, the first principle of my system 
presents man as an independent being. During the very years when France was using 
external force to win its political freedom I was engaged in an inner struggle with myself 
and all deeply rooted prejudices, and this is the struggle which gave birth to my system. 
Thus the French nation assisted in the creation of my system. Its valor encouraged me 
and gave me the energy I required for grasping my system. Indeed, it was while I was 
writing about the French revolution that I was rewarded by the first hints and intimations 
of this system. 37 
The last line refers to one of Fichte's earliest writings - the 1793 Contributions 
intended to Correct Public Opinion Concerning the French Revolution. In this work, 
Fichte attempts to defend the French revolution against the conservative critic 
Rehberg. Rehberg, who was greatly influenced by Burke, had written a monograph 
criticizing the revolution - Investigations on the French Revolution. Fichte's work is a 
point by point refutation of Rehberg's monograph. He argues, on the basis of 
Rousseau's social-contract theory, that the French people had a right to change its 
constitution. 38 This argument earned Fichte the reputation of a Jacobin sympathiser, a 
reputation that is underserved insofar as Fichte's arguments are not as 'revolutionary' 
as has often been supposed. 39 
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In the Contributions, Fichte argues that there is an intimate connection between 
the 'Copernican Revolution' in philosophy inaugurated by Kant and the revolution 
inaugurated by the 'nation of France' .4° Fichte considers the death of the Ancien 
Regime and the death of transcendent metaphysics to be intimately connected, both 
giving birth to a new era of humanity. He thinks that Kant's Copernican Revolution, 
properly understood, should provide the philosophical justification for the revolution in 
politics. 41 Insofar as Critical idealism stresses the involvement of spontaneity in 
experience it is potentially a philosophy of freedom. For insofar as it demonstrates that 
the world of experience is dependent upon our spontaneous cognitive capacities, it 
suggests that we may actively transform the world in accordance with freedom. The 
world is not an intractable, foreign environment; it is something that is, at least in 
principle, amenable to our projects. This conception of Critical idealism as a philosophy 
of freedom lies behind what Renaut has called Fichte's 'practical philosophy of 
history'. 42 For Fichte, history is not a blind play of impersonal forces nor a teleological 
process guided by Providence; it is an expression of human freedom. As Fichte puts it 
in the Preface to the Contributions 'we only ever find in the history of the world what we 
have first of all put there ourselves'.43 This 'practical' conception of history as the 
expression of human freedom may be opposed, following Renaut, to a 'theoretical' 
conception of history. Such a 'theoretical' conception of history is advocated, 
somewhat paradoxically, by Kant's notion- discussed above- that we should think 
of history as though it were guided by a 'definite plan' of nature. This conception of 
history (which is, it must be stressed, a 'regulative' idea) is 'theoretical' insofar as it 
encourages us to think of the history of the human species as governed by inflexible 
laws of nature. lt is, as Renaut puts it, a 'mechanistic and naturalistic conception of 
history' which considers man 'solely as a physical force subjected to general laws of 
the natural universe (attraction, repulsion= "unsocial sociability")'. 44 
If idealism is a philosophy of freedom and autonomy, dogmatism is a 
philosophy of unfreedom and heteronomy. With its insistence upon a mind-
independent reality to which our cognition must conform, it is the philosophical 
analogue of despotism. For Fichte, dogmatism is a philosophy that is compatible with 
'kings and princes' insofar as it stresses the permanence of a mind-independent 
order. 45 
Fichte's realization of the political implications of Kant's Copernican Revolution 
shows a concern with the relationship between philosophy and life. For Fichte, 
philosophy should be more than an abstract pursuit divorced from reality. Philosophy 
must have relevance for everyday life, and the philosopher himself must actively try to 
transform everyday life in accordance with reason. This emphasis on practical 
engagement with everyday life is neatly expressed in Fichte's famous avowal that- 'I 
56 
do not merely want to think, I want to act'. 46 And one might suggest that Fichte's 
conception of philosophy anticipates Karl Marx's infamous 'Thesis XI' which asserts 
that: 'philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to 
change it'. 47 
But how is the ordinary, non-philosophical person to become aware of this 
ethical vocation and of the autonomy and freedom which she should strive to achieve? 
Given Fichte's conviction that 'The majority of men could sooner be brought to believe 
themselves a piece of lava in the moon than to take themselves for an /'48 , the 
attainment of such awareness would seem unlikely. Is this awareness merely granted 
to those philosophers who have grasped the truth of Fichte's transcendental idealism? 
The answer to these questions is to be found in Fichte's conception of education. 
The Idea of a 'Pragmatic History' 
Philosophy can only change the world if it can be communicated to others. The 
transcendental philosopher must therefore be an educator who actively seeks to 
awaken humanity from its 'dogmatic slumber', and to raise it to an awareness of its 
spontaneity and freedom. She must seek to educate humanity to the standpoint of 
idealism. Fichte considers this education to be a crucial task of transcendental 
philosophy and seeks to discharge this task in two ways. The first way in which Fichte 
seeks to discharge this task is by writing a 'pragmatic history'. The second way will be 
touched upon in the next chapter. 
In Concerning the Concept Fichte, having provided a detailed account of the 
epistemological task of the Wissenschaftslehre, tells us that philosophers must not give 
laws to the human mind but must rather attempt to describe it, assuming the role of 
'writers of pragmatic history'. 49 Now, this declaration of the philosopher's task is of 
crucial importance, and is to be understood in relation to Kant. For Kant, the goal of a 
'pragmatic history' is the promotion of the happiness and welfare of the human race. lt 
achieves this goal by teaching humanity to avoid misfortune through 'prudence'. 5° For 
Fichte, the task of the Wissenschaftslehre is 'pragmatic' insofar as it serves an 
educative function, awakening humanity to its autonomy and spontaneity. He differs 
from Kant, however, insofar as the ultimate goal of this 'history' is not happiness, but 
morality - the activity of the agent in accordance with a rational, self-given moral law. 
As we shall see in Chapter 6, the notion of 'pragmatic history' plays a crucial role in the 
1794-5 Foundations. 
The 'Justification of Doxa' 
Fichte's concern with the relationship between philosophy and life and his concern with 
freedom both motivate one of his most radical transformations of transcendental 
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philosophy. This transformation is signalled by Fichte's puzzling claim, in Concerning 
the Concept, that a Wissenschaftslehre must provide, in addition to theories of 
morality, right, aesthetics and religion, a theory of 'so-called common sense or the 
natural sense of truth' (des sogenannten gemeinen Menschenverstandes, oder des 
natorlichen Warheitssinnes). 51 The foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre must 
therefore seek to justify our natural common sense view of the world. This clearly 
amounts to an extension of the justificatory task of transcendental philosophy. 
In the first Critique, Kant sought to provide an a priori justification of Newtonian 
science, thereby saving it from Humean scepticism. In the Groundwork, Kant sought to 
provide a justification of our ordinary conception of morality, our 'common rational 
moral cognition'. 52 Fichte broadens Kant's justificatory project. He argues that 
transcendental philosophy must not simply justify our scientific knowledge. Rather, it 
must justify our common sense view of the world. Now, such a view certainly involves 
belief in the existence of a mind-independent, publicly accessible world. Yet it also 
involves other beliefs, including the belief that we are embodied agents and the belief 
that there are other rational agents like ourselves. 
Such a common sense view of the world is the shared background against 
which we act and interact. Fichte thinks that providing a justification of this common 
sense view of the world is a crucial task of a philosophy of freedom. 'I consider it 
philosophy's task', Fichte asserts in the 1797 article Annals of Philosophical Tone, 'to 
provide a derivation of experience in its entirety as the necessary condition for self-
consciousness'.53 In the Foundations of Natural Right of 1796-7, Fichte goes so far as 
to argue that the philosopher's claim is: 
indeterminate and therefore partly incorrect as long as he has not shown how precisely 
common sense follows necessarily only from his claim and can be explained only if one 
presupposes that claim. Philosophy must deduce our belief in the existence of an 
external world. 54 
Philosophy must therefore provide a 'transcendental deduction' of the common sense 
view of the world. 
Philonenko has called this task the 'justification of doxa', insofar as it 
constitutes an attempt to justify our non-philosophical opinion about the nature of 
ourselves and the world. 55 Fichte has a deep respect for common conviction, and 
wishes to provide philosophical justification for this conviction. Philosophy arises from 
our everyday, unreflective beliefs and should, Fichte claims, end by vindicating these 
beliefs. 
The motivation for this extension of the justificatory task of transcendental 
idealism was undoubtedly inspired by F. H. Jacobi. Jacobi was a sworn opponent of 
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any rationalistic philosophy which sought to explain existence with abstract categories 
or principles. Such a philosophy, Jacobi argued, sought to reduce the rich and complex 
nature of reality to a few necessary conceptual determinations. Jacobi was also deeply 
opposed to Humean scepticism (which he refers to as 'idealism') and drew upon the 
influence of Reid to develop a form of common-sense direct realism. 56 Like Reid, 
Jacobi saw Humean scepticism as dependent upon the Lockean claim that the 
immediate objects of perception are 'ideas'. Given this claim, it was relatively easy to 
question the legitimacy of any inference from these representations to a mind-
independent reality. Jacobi realized, like Reid, that the way to defeat Humean 
scepticism was to adopt a form of direct realism in which the senses are in an 
immediate relation to reality. For Jacobi, as for Reid, our senses play a revelatory 
function, providing us with non-inferential knowledge about the world. Our senses 
furnish us with immediate belief, and it is this belief rather than the ratiocination of 
reason that is the source of genuine knowledge. 57 Jacobi departed from Reid, however, 
in the theological significance he assigned to the revelatory function of the senses, 
which reflected his pietistic commitment to a personal, individual God. He refers to our 
direct knowledge of the world as Glaube - which is both the German word for faith 
and the German term for Hume's 'belief'. 58 Jacobi was quick to link the epistemological 
and theological meanings of the term, claiming that faith (Giaube) affords us 
knowledge of both common sense truths and God. In his 1785 work Concerning the 
Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn, Jacobi makes the 
following claim about faith: 
Through faith we know that we have a body, and that there are other bodies and thinking 
beings outside us. A veritable and wondrous revelation! For in fact we only sense our 
body as constituted in this way or that; but in thus feeling it, we become aware not only of 
its alterations, but of something else as well, totally different from it, which is neither mere 
sensation nor thought; we become aware of other actual things, and, of that with the very 
same certainty with which we become aware of ourselves, for without the Thou, the I is 
impossible [denn ohne Du, ist das /eh unmoglich]. We obtain all representations 
therefore, simply through modifications that we acquire; there is no other way to real 
cognition, for whenever reason gives birth to objects, they are all just chimeras. 59 
Fichte will agree with Jacobi's claim that 'without the Thou, the I is impossible'. Yet he 
will reject Jacobi's claim, advanced in the supplement to Oavid Hume (entitled On 
Transcendental Idealism), that transcendental idealism necessarily entails 'speculative 
egoism' (spekulativen Egoismus) 60 He will refute Jacobi by seeking to provide a 
transcendental justification for his 'veritable and wondrous revelation'. 
Fichte therefore conceives of the Wissenschaftslehre as a thoroughly rigorous 
system of transcendental philosophy. Yet this system is not an exercise in 
conceptual gymnastics - it is motivated by profoundly political and ethical 
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concerns. Fichte's transcendental idealism is suffused with an interest in the 
promotion and realization of human freedom. This interest is closely related to a 
pedagogical concern. For Fichte wishes to educate his fellow beings to an 
awareness of their freedom and spontaneity, and he hopes that those he has 
educated will, in turn, educate others. This pedagogical concern is therefore 
intimately related to an interest in communication which is, at bottom, an interest in 
intersubjectivity. And this latter interest is intimately connected to the question of 
how we can recognize other rational beings; for it is clearly a condition of the 
possibility of intersubjectivity that subjects can identify one another as fellow beings. 
These concerns with freedom, pedagogy, intersubjectivity and recognition 
are all explored in Fichte's Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation of 
1794. lt is to a discussion of this work that we now turn. 
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5 
THE VOCATION OF THE SCHOLAR 
In 1794 Fichte accepted the post formerly held by Reinhold at Jena University. As part 
of his academic duties Fichte had to provide, in addition to his 'private' lectures on the 
foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre, a series of free 'public' lectures. Fichte chose a 
topic close to his heart - the obligations and duties of the academic. Fichte hoped that 
his lectures would inspire the students of Jena to direct their academic endeavours 
towards the moral development of humanity. He also hoped that they would seek 
further inspiration in his private lectures. 
Fichte chose 'Morality for Scholars' as the title of the lecture series. The 
lectures were, at least initially, a resounding success, and Fichte boasted to his wife 
that he was more popular than Reinhold had been. Nevertheless, Fichte's success 
offended his contemporaries. A rumour gradually spread that Fichte was promoting 
revolutionary, 'Jacobin' views. The rumour alleged that Fichte had claimed that (in the 
words of C. G. Voigt) 'in ten or twenty years there will be no more kings or princes'. 1 
Fichte was worried that the rumour would put him out of favour with the Court at 
Weimar. Despite assurances to the contrary from Goethe and Voigt, he decided to 
publish the relevant lecture notes verbatim. These notes, which consisted of the first 
five lectures delivered by Fichte, were published under the title Some Lectures 
Concerning the Scholar's Vocation (hereafter, the Lectures). 
The Lectures contain Fichte's first extensive discussion of intersubjectivity. For 
it is in these lectures that Fichte explicitly addresses the challenge set by Jacobi - the 
challenge of demonstrating that transcendental idealism does not entail 'speculative 
egoism'. In the course of this demonstration, Fichte first employs the verb anerkennen 
to refer to the act whereby we identify other rational beings like ourselves. Given the 
significance of these lectures for the development of Fichte's conception of 
intersubjectivity, they merit detailed and extensive discussion. 
'Popular Philosophy' 
Due to their exoteric nature, the Lectures are considered to be part of Fichte's so-
called 'popular philosophy'. As such, it is tempting to dismiss them as being of little real 
philosophical significance. However, Fichte's 'popular' writings play a distinctive role 
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within his philosophical project. A brief discussion of this role will help us to understand 
the Lectures. 
The popular works constitute almost all of the work that Fichte published during 
his lifetime. This is perhaps due to the fact that the poor reception of the 1794-5 
Foundations discouraged Fichte from publishing his abstruse theoretical texts. Yet 
there may perhaps be a philosophical reason for Fichte's decision to publish only 
'popular' texts. For as J. Ch. Goddard has rightly pointed out, these works are the 'very 
goal of speculative activity': 
The Fichtean works of popular philosophy, the exoteric texts, are in no way propaedeutic 
works, intended to provide the uninitiated with a distant foretaste of the bliss which the 
esoteric knowledge of the philosopher promises: they are the very goal of speculative 
activity, the end toward which it aims and in which its whole raison d'etre is exhausted; it 
is the only thought that deserves to be published because in it thought is made public, 
that is to say active 2 
The popular writings should therefore be regarded as the consequence of a philosophy 
of freedom rather than as a propaedeutic to the same. For it is these works that seek to 
transmit the philosophy of freedom to a wide audience and to elicit an awareness of 
freedom in this audience. Fichte's popular writings therefore reflect his pedagogical 
concern and complement the Wissenschafstlehre as 'pragmatic history'. In his popular 
writings Fichte attempts to make his philosophy readily accessible and widely 
comprehensible to the literary public. Yet this task is not to be discharged by 
vulgarizing the Wissenschaftslehre, by presenting it as a 'ready-reckoner' for practical 
deliberation. Fichte seeks, rather, to condense and distil the essentials of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, to communicate it intelligibly, whilst preserving its philosophical 
integrity. He seeks to present the 'spirit' of the Wissenschaftslehre through the popular 
'letter'. 
it would therefore be a mistake to regard the Lectures as a simplification of 
Fichte's philosophy, or as a compendium of rules for proper scholarly conduct. Both 
conceptions are bluntly dismissed by Fichte. Reading these lectures, he tells us, 
requires independent thought; a capacity to reason with the text. 3 The reader must 
be able to grasp the ideals that are propounded in the text and be prepared to 
shape and modify reality in accordance with these ideals. The reader must, in other 
words, be prepared to act in accordance with the ideals presented in the Lectures. 
The Title 
The first difficulty facing the Anglophone reader of the Lectures is its title. 4 The German 
term Gelehrter is standardly translated as 'scholar'. But this rendering is misleading 
insofar as it suggests a pedantic obsession with a particular topic or discipline. For the 
Fichtean Gelehrter is someone who devotes his or her entire life to the acquisition and 
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transmission of knowledge, in the hope that it will benefit humanity. Breazeale 
suggests 'educated person' or 'academic' as alternatives. 5 
The German term Bestimmung has two distinct meanings. Bestimmung can be 
translated as 'vocation'. Kant uses the term in the first and third Critiques to designate 
the ultimate goal of humanity. 6 Yet Bestimmung also means 'determination' in the 
sense of the specific or defining characteristic of something. This defining characteristic 
could also be understood as that which gives meaning to what it characterizes. This 
leads Breazeale to suggest an alternative rendering of Fichte's title - "Some Lectures 
on What lt Means to Be an Academic". 7 In what follows this suggestion should be 
borne in mind. 
The Plan of the Lectures 
Fichte opens the lectures with the following questions: 
What is the scholar's vocation? What is his relation to mankind as a whole, as well as to 
the individual classes of men? What are his surest means of fulfilling his lofty vocation?8 
In order to answer the question concerning the vocation of the scholar certain other 
questions must be answered. Fichte claims that the scholar is a scholar 'only insofar as 
he is distinguished from other men who are not scholars'. In other words, the scholar is 
defined in relation to society and his vocation is a social vocation. In order to grasp the 
specific nature of the scholar's vocation we must, Fichte claims, answer another 
question: 'What is the vocation of man within society?'9 But this question presupposes 
another, more fundamental question, the question concerning the vocation of man 'as 
such' or 'in itself' (an sich) - the 'vocation of man simply qua man'. Given that this 
question is presupposed by the other two, Fichte will address it first. He will devote the 
second lecture to a discussion of the vocation of man within society. Having 
established the nature of this vocation Fichte will turn, in the third lecture, to a 
discussion of the scholar's position within society. lt is only in the fourth lecture that 
Fichte will address the official topic of the lectures -the vocation of the scholar. In the 
fifth, and final, lecture Fichte will attempt to vindicate his conviction that the 'sciences' 
were not invented 'as an idle mental occupation to meet the demand for a refined type 
of luxury' .10 This attempt is made by way of a critique of a view that was commonly -
although perhaps erroneously - associated with Rousseau's first Discourse: the view 
that the growth of the arts and sciences has had pernicious effects on humanity's moral 
development. 
In what follows I shall follow the course of Fichte's first four lectures. My 
discussion will focus mainly upon Fichte's account of intersubjectivity. 
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The Vocation of Man as such (an sich) 
Fichte opens the first lecture with a brief discussion of the nature of his topic - the 
vocation of man as such. A full and comprehensive answer to the question concerning 
the vocation of man as such presupposes, Fichte claims, 'philosophy in its entirety-
and moreover a well-grounded and exhaustive philosophy'. 11 The 'last' task of 
philosophy is to answer the question 'What is the vocation of the scholar?'; the 'first'-
and most important - task of philosophy is to answer the question 'What is the 
vocation of man as such?' 12 Fichte tells his audience that he can only give a hint as to 
the answer to the latter question, but assures them that he will provide the answer in 
his 'private lectures' .13 This remark is significant insofar as it tells us that the 1794-5 
Foundations - which is based upon the notes to these private lectures - is 
concerned with the vocation of man as such. 
What is the question 'What is the vocation of man as such?' a question about? 
What is the object of this question? lt is, Fichte claims, 'man isolated and considered 
apart from all the associations which are not necessarily included in the concept of 
man' .14 Considering man 'apart from all the associations which are not necessarily 
included in the concept of man' involves considering man in isolation from 'all 
relationship to rational beings like himself'. 15 Now, this should not be taken as a claim 
that man is 'essentially' an asocial being. Fichte merely thinks that one can ask 
meaningful questions about the nature of man in abstraction from his social 
relationships. He asserts that we do not actually exist alone and (in a footnote to the 
Danish edition of 1796) that a 'real person, a person taken along with all of his specific 
characteristics' is necessarily a social being or (using a term that will be explained in 
chapter 7) an 'individual' (lndividuum). 16 
Fichte insists that considering man 'as such' does not involve considering him 
as a disembodied res cogitans. Fichte stresses that man 'as such' is not equivalent to 
the pure I. lt is impossible, Fichte asserts, to ascertain what the pure I is like 
independently of 'any relation to anything outside of itself' .17 The I can only be 
understood and attain self-consciousness insofar as it is 'empirically determined' -
which amounts to the claim that an object or 'not-1' is required as a condition of the 
possibility of self-consciousness. Now this not-1, Fichte claims, can be a 'body': 
Even a person's body (which he calls "his" body) is something apart from the I. Yet apart 
from this connection with a body he would not be a person at all, but would be something 
quite inconceivable (if one can still refer to a thing which is not even conceivable as 
"something"). 18 
66 
Man 'as such' is therefore the human being as an embodied agent, considered in 
isolation from other beings like itself. To discover the vocation of man as such, Fichte 
proposes to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of man as such. 
Fichte's analysis begins with the notion of the pure I. He informs his audience 
that he cannot begin with the proposition 'I am', but will begin with an 'hypothetical 
proposition' which will be strictly demonstrated in his 'private lectures'. 19 The 
hypothetical proposition is introduced and elaborated upon in the following paragraph: 
Just as certainly as man is rational, he is his own end [seine eigener Zweck], that is, he 
does not exist because something else should exist. Rather, he exists simply because he 
should exist. His mere existence is the ultimate purpose [letzte Zweck] of his existence, 
or (which amounts to the same thing) it is contradictory to inquire concerning the purpose 
of man's existence: he is because he is. This quality of absolute being [abso/uten Sein], 
of being for his own sake, is the characteristic feature, the determination or vocation of 
man, insofar as he is considered merely and solely as a rational being. 20 
Several things are worth noting about Fichte's definition of man considered as a 
rational being. Firstly, Fichte is clearly drawing upon Kant's claim, articulated in the 
Groundwork, that our 'humanity' - our capacity to freely set ends - possesses 
'unconditional value' or is an 'end in itself'. Fichte interprets Kant to be claiming that 
man qua rational being exists for his 'own sake', not for the sake of anything else. He 
can never be a mere means to an 'end'. His existence is, so to speak, 'self-justifying'. 
Secondly, Fichte presents the 'hypothetical proposition' as an alternative to the 
proposition 'I am' which is closely associated with the first fundamental proposition of 
the 1794-5 Foundations. 21 Fichte claims that this hypothetical proposition is 'indelibly 
etched in human feeling [MenschengefOhn'. This appeal to feeling - GefOhl - is 
significant insofar as Fichte seems to be suggesting that we have a direct awareness 
of ourselves as spontaneous agents. As we will see in the next chapter, this direct non-
conceptual awareness of our spontaneity is what Fichte refers to as 'intellectual 
intuition' (lntellektuel/e Anschauung). 
Thirdly, and finally, Fichte seems to be suggesting that the 'hypothetical 
proposition', which amounts to a restatement of Kant's claim that humanity is an end in 
itself, is a 'schematized' version of the fundamental proposition of the 1794-5 
Foundations. He seems to be saying, in other words, that the proposition is the intuitive 
presentation of the abstruse first principle of the 1794-5 Foundations. 
The defining characteristic of man qua rational being is therefore his existence 
as an end in itself - he exists for no other reason than that he should exist. His 
defining characteristic is 'absolute being'. Yet absolute being is not, Fichte points out, 
all that pertains to man - 'lt is not simply that he is; he also is something [etwas]. He 
does not say merely "I am"; he adds, "I am this or that'". 22 What Fichte means by this is 
that every human being possesses, in addition to the bare fact of her existence, other 
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defining characteristics. She is not simply a human, but a student, a teacher, a citizen, 
etc. She is weak or strong, handsome or ugly, etc. She is intelligent or slow-witted, 
amusing or dull, etc. Now these particular characteristics pertain to her by virtue of the 
fact that 'something else exists in addition to oneself (etwas ausser ihm ist). 23 This 
something is associated with the not-1, which is opposed to the I. This not-1 is 
characterized by 'multiplicity' or 'diversity' and corresponds, Fichte tells us in the third 
lecture, to what Kant calls 'nature'. 24 This not-1 exerts an influence upon us; it affects 
our 'passive faculty' which Fichte, following Kant, calls 'sensibility' ( Sinnlichkeit). And it 
is this influence which determines the specific characteristics we possess. Man is 
therefore the particular 'something' he is by virtue of the fact that he is a 'sensuous 
being' (sinnliches Wesen). 25 He is determined by what we might call his environment 
(both natural and social) or, to use Sartre's term, his 'facticity'. 
We are therefore sensible beings who are determined by our environment. Yet 
we are also rational beings who are capable of self-determination. Man's reason 
should not, Fichte asserts, 'be cancelled by his sensibility'. Rather, man's reason and 
sensibility should co-exist. This leads Fichte to transform the proposition 'man is simply 
because he is' into the proposition 'man ought to be what he is simply because he is'. 
In other words, man's sensibility should be in accordance with his reason, and he 
should be responsible for the 'something' he is. The fact that I am the type of person I 
am should be due to my freely and rationally choosing to be the person I am, not due 
to the dictates of circumstance. Or, as Fichte puts it: 
all that a person is ought to be related to his pure I, his mere being as an I. He ought to 
be all that he is simply because he is an I, and what he cannot be because he is an I, he 
ought not to be at ali. 26 
But what, precisely, is the pure I to which we should conform? Fichte tells us that 'the 
pure I can be represented only negatively [nur negativ vorstellen], as the opposite of 
the not-1 '. 27 As the defining characteristic of the latter is 'multiplicity' we may infer that 
the defining characteristic of the former is 'complete and absolute unity'. 28 
Now, as Vieillard-Baron has argued, it is crucial to distinguish between the form 
of the pure I and the pure I itself (or, the 'content' of the pure 1). 29 The content of the 
pure I is uncognizable- it can only be represented negatively. lt is the total agreement 
of man with himself and with his fellow men. This total agreement or 'harmony' - the 
German term is Obereinstimmung - is a regulative idea. lt is the unattainable goal 
towards which man must endlessly strive. The form of the pure I, on the other hand, is 
cognizable. Fichte provides at least two criteria with which to identify the form of the 
pure I. He tells us that the form of the pure I is revealed in the partial agreement of a 
subject with himself- 'any determination which can be conceived to endure forever is 
68 
in accordance with the pure form of the 1'. 30 The idea here seems to be that any 
characteristic of a subject which could, in principle, hold universally and eternally is in 
conformity with the form of the pure I. If the subject could, per impossibile, actually 
attain this universal and eternal identity he or she would really be the pure I. The 
second criterion is introduced when Fichte tells us that it is 'in the conceivability of 
identity [that] we cognize the expression of the pure form of the 1'.31 What Fichte means 
by 'conceivability of identity' (der Oenkbarkeit der ldentitat) is far from clear. He may 
mean logical identity- which would explain why, in the opening section of the 1794-5 
Foundations, he emphasises the formula 'A=A'. Yet he might also mean personal 
identity - our awareness of a numerically identical persisting subject of experience. 32 
Vieillard-Baron considers the latter reading to be preferable, insofar as it allows one to 
understand the formula - used in both the Lectures and the 1794-5 Foundations- 'I 
am because I am'. 33 
The characteristic feature of the pure I itself is therefore 'complete and absolute 
unity' -the total agreement of the human being with himself and his fellows. The pure 
I cannot 'contradict' itself as it contains no diversity. The empirical I, however, is 
determined by the not-1, the defining characteristic of which is multiplicity. Insofar as it 
is determined by the not-1, the empirical I can contradict itself. If such contradiction 
occurs, the empirical I is not in conformity with the form of the pure I. But the empirical I 
should be in conformity with the form of the pure I. lt should be determined by itself 
rather than by 'something foreign' (etwas fremdes). The empirical I should be 
determined 'in a manner in which it could be eternally determined' and this leads Fichte 
to a striking reformulation of Kant's Formula of Universal Law: 'Act so that you could 
consider the maxims of your willing to be eternal laws for yourself. '34 
Yet Fichte is not merely concerned with the consistency of our moral lives. He 
demands that all of our capacities be consistent, both internally and externally. All of 
our capacities should be 'internally' consistent - there should be no contradiction 
between the judgements 'within', or pertaining to, each capacity. And all of our 
capacities should be 'externally' consistent - the different capacities and their 
corresponding judgements should not contradict one other. As Fichte puts it: 
lt is not simply that the will ought always be one with itself (although this is all that moral 
theory is concerned with), but rather that all of man's powers, which in themselves 
constitute but one power and are distinguished from each other merely in their application 
to different objects, should coincide in a complete identity and harmonize with one 
another'. 35 
This demand certainly exceeds any made by Kant. But how can we possibly fulfil it? 
Given the fact that we are, qua empirical subjects, partly determined by 'something 
foreign' it would seem that any attempt to fulfil this demand is impossible. For 'feeling, 
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as well as representation (which presupposes feeling)' is determined by an alien not-
1.36 Our dependence upon an alien not-1 means that we are subject to diverse and 
potentially conflicting inclinations. And whilst we may manage to master or eradicate 
these inclinations, they will still continue to arise. How, then, can we ever hope to 
achieve harmony between our empirical I and the form of the pure I? 
Fichte's answer to this question rests upon his claim - discussed in the 
previous chapter - that Kant's Copernican Revolution has practical implications. As 
we noted, Fichte thinks that the transcendental idealist claim that we are somehow 
'responsible' for the fundamental features of the experiential world means that this 
world is, in principle, amenable to our projects. Fichte assumes that we can, having 
'constituted' the world, 'reconstitute' it. This assumption leads Fichte to claim that we 
can attempt to satisfy the demand for harmony by transforming the world, by rebuilding 
it in accordance with reason: 
Man must try to modify these things. He must attempt to bring them into harmony with the 
pure form of the I, in order that the representation of these things, to the extent that this 
depends upon the properties of the things, may harmonize with the form of the pure 1. 37 
The only way to ensure the harmony between our empirical selves and the form of our 
pure I, is to transform the very world upon which our empirical I depends. Fichte claims 
that it is only through such transformation that we can hope to achieve: 
man's ultimate and supreme goal [ ... ] complete harmony with himself and-so that he 
can be in harmony with himself-the harmony of all external things with his own 
necessary, practical concepts of them (i.e., with those concepts which determine how 
things ought to be) 38 
Now, although the will is certainly a necessary condition of this transformation, it is not 
a sufficient condition. We also require a technical capacity to transform the world -
'that skill which we acquire and sharpen through practice'. 39 Fichte calls the acquisition 
of this skill, as well as the degree of skill acquired, 'culture' (Ku/tur). Here the influence 
of Kant is evident, Fichte drawing upon Kant's discussion of culture in §83 of the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement. Fichte claims that the skill acquired through 
culture is twofold. lt is partly the skill to master and eradicate our inclinations, a skill 
which corresponds to Kant's 'culture of training (discipline)'. Yet it is also the skill to 
'modify and alter' external objects in accordance with our concepts of how they should 
be, a skill which corresponds to Kant's 'culture of skill'. The skill to master our 
inclinations refines and develops the way in which we are affected by objects, whilst 
the skill to modify alters the nature of the objects which affect us. This twofold skill 
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cultivates our sensibility so that we may bring our empirical I into conformity with the 
form of the pure I. 
Culture therefore serves as a means to our final end - complete harmony 
( Obereinstimmung) with ourselves and each other. Yet whilst we may progress towards 
this harmony, we can never hope to attain it. The absolute harmony in question -the 
pure I itself - is a merely regulative idea, an idea towards which we must strive 
without ever being able to realize it. Nevertheless, as finite rational beings we are 
obliged to follow an asymptotic path towards this goal. Indeed, it is this endless striving 
which is our vocation. Man's vocation 'qua man' lies in 'endless approximation 
[unendliche Annaherung] toward this goa/'. 40 And insofar as this goal might be 
described as 'perfection', man's vocation is to 'perfect himself without end'. This is 
Fichte's infamous doctrine of 'striving' (Streben) which receives its canonical 
formulation in the 1794-5 Foundations. 
Fichte's claim that the vocation of man 'as such' consists in an endless process 
of self-perfection might seem rather bleak. lt might seem that such a process of striving 
for an unattainable goal is both pointless and unfulfilling. Hegel was quick to criticize 
Fichte's notion of 'endless approximation' for precisely this reason. Fichte's notion of 
infinity as an endless and interminable series was, Hegel claimed, a 'bad' conception of 
infinity, a 'wearisome repetition which makes a limit vanish, reappear and then vanish 
again'. 41 A 'good' conception of infinity would regard the infinite as circular in structure. 
Once humanity (which is an expression of Geist) has attained 'absolute knowing' it has 
reached the endpoint of its development. In reaching this point humanity returns to the 
point from which it started which is now, by virtue of the laborious developmental 
process humanity has undergone, the highest cognitive standpoint possible. With this, 
the circle of development is closed. As no further development can occur, history -
understood as a process of cumulative development - has ended. All that humanity 
can do is to endlessly re-travel the circle. This re-travelling is not an endless, 
unsatisfactory striving, but a deepening of humanity's understanding of the 'Absolute'. 
Hegel therefore regards the development of humanity as reaching an end- as 
attaining a satisfactory conclusion. And he thinks that this is eminently more desirable 
than Fichte's conception of the vocation of man as an infinite striving. Yet it is far from 
clear that Hegel's conception of the end of history is desirable. There is no reason to 
think that the Hegelian end of history would be a state of satisfaction and plenitude. 
Indeed, as Feuerbach remarked, a world in which nothing fundamentally new could 
occur would be little more than an arid 'desert'. 42 
Fichte's vision of man's vocation as an endless striving for total harmony -
Obereinstimmung - stems from the recognition that the demands of morality can 
never be fully satisfied. There are always problems to be resolved and there can never 
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be a point at which obligation ceases. We can, of course, make progress: we can 
ensure that the rights of agents are respected and protected, we can ensure equality of 
opportunity. But ensuring that such rights are universally respected seems, prima facie, 
an infinite task. Furthermore, new ethical dilemmas are constantly emerging: how, for 
example, should we respond to ethical issues raised by advances in genetics? Fichte 
thinks that we can never simply stop improving morally. To claim otherwise would be 
mere hubris. 
Fichte's conception of man's vocation is closely related to his 'practical' 
conception of history. Insofar as human freedom is potentially infinite and 
inexhaustible, history is an 'open', infinite process. it should not be conceived as a 
teleological process governed by 'nature's plan' (Kant) or 'the ruse of reason' (Hegel). 
Such a 'closed' conception of history reduces humanity to the 'vehicle', to borrow 
Taylor's phrase43 , of a supra-individual agency such as Geist (Hegel) or Providence 
(Kant). In such conceptions of history, humanity is advanced by an essentially 
heteronomous process which takes place 'behind the back' of human agents. it is but a 
short step from this view to Hegel's notorious claim that history is an 'altar' upon which 
individuals are sacrificed for the sake of reason. 44 In Fichte's practical conception of 
history the only teloi or goals are those which are freely willed by human beings. The 
development of human history is, to be sure, governed by reason, but it is a reason 
which is discovered and developed by human agents themselves. 
The Vocation of Man in Society 
Fichte opens his second lecture with the claim that there are several questions 
philosophy must answer if it is to become a 'science and a Wissenschaftslehre'. Fichte 
tells us that two of these questions are of special significance: 
Among the questions which philosophy has to answer we find the following two in 
particular, which have to be answered before, among other things, a well-founded theory 
of natural rights is possible. First of all, by what right does a man call a particular portion 
of the physical world "his body"? How does he come to consider this to be his body, 
something which belongs to his I, since it is nevertheless something completely opposed 
to his I? And then the second question: how does a man come to assume [anzunehmen] 
that there are rational beings like himself apart from him? And how does he come to 
recognize [anzuerkennenj them, since they are certainly not immediately present to his 
pure self-consciousness? 5 
These two questions correspond to Jacobi's 'veritable and wondrous' revelation; the 
revelation that we possess a body and that there are other beings like ourselves. 
Fichte will answer the first question, the question concerning our justification for 
considering ourselves to be embodied, at a later date (in the 1796-7 Foundations of 
Natural Right). Here, he will focus upon the second question, which contains two parts: 
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one concerning our assumption that there are other rational beings like ourselves, and 
one concerning how we come to 'recognize' (anzuerkennen) these beings. 
An answer to this question is crucial for the development of a 
Wissenschaftslehre, and in, particular, its theory of right. Yet it is also crucial for an 
account of the vocation of man within society. For Fichte defines 'society' 
(Gesellschaft) as 'the relationship in which rational beings stand to each other', a 
definition which clearly presupposes that there are other rational beings and that we 
can recognize them. 46 
Fichte claims that an answer to the second part of the question - the part 
concerning our recognition of other rational beings - would amount to the discovery of 
'some characteristic features' (charakteristische Merkmale) which enable us to 
'distinguish these beings from those who are not rational and thus are not members of 
society'. 47 
In the first part of this study I claimed that Kant's definition of rational beings 
was so vague that its reference was indeterminate -there simply were no informative 
criteria with which to identify rational beings and to distinguish them from other beings. 
Here Fichte will attempt to provide such informative criteria. His attempt to do this will 
lead him to reject Kant's strict separation of phenomena and noumena. For it is 
precisely this separation that prohibited Kant from providing informative criteria: if our 
intelligible, rational natures are radically separate from our phenomenal being and we 
can only have knowledge of phenomena, then there can be no cognitively available 
criteria which would allow us to pick out other rational beings. 
Fichte's use of the verb 'anerkennen' to formulate the question concerning our 
capacity to recognize other rational beings is of considerable importance. For it marks 
Fichte's first use of the terminology which will be central to his account of 
intersubjectivity - the terminology of 'recognition' (Anerkennung). Now, in English 
there are two distinct senses of the verb 'recognize'. The first sense might be called a 
'cognitive' sense. To recognize something in this sense is to be able to pick it out and 
identify it as something of a certain kind; it is to recognize something as something, 
e.g., to recognize the object on the horizon as a tree. This cognitive sense 
presupposes the possession of criteria with which to identify the object in question as 
being an object of a certain kind. The second sense of the verb might be called an 
'honorific' sense. To recognize something in this sense is to acknowledge, respect or 
honour someone or something for possessing certain characteristics, e.g., to respect 
someone's capacity for autonomy. 48 This 'honorific' sense of recognize is the primary 
meaning of the German verb anerkennen. The activity of cognitively recognizing 
something (or, more simply, cognizing something) is referred to as erkennen. Honorific 
recognition clearly presupposes cognitive recognition; for I can respect something for 
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possessing certain characteristics only if I know what characteristics it possesses. Now 
I maintain, pace lnwood49 , that Fichte is concerned with cognitive recognition despite 
his use of the verb anerkennen. After all, the concern to discover informative criteria 
with which to pick out and identify rational beings is an epistemological concern. What 
Fichte is pointing to in his use of the verb anerkennen is, I would suggest, that the 
characteristics which allow us to pick out and cognitively recognize rational beings are 
characteristics which, if properly grasped, demand honorific recognition (we might refer 
to them as 'honorific' characteristics). 50 Such characteristics include autonomy and 
rationality. If one is a genuinely rational being one cannot, Fichte seems to be saying, 
cognize another rational being without also respecting her. 
Fichte takes it for granted that only rational beings can be recognized 
honorifically. To 'honorifically' recognize an animal or a natural object would be wholly 
inappropriate. Only rational beings can command respect, as they are the only beings 
which are ends in themselves. One origin of this honorific sense of recognition is to be 
found in the notion that human beings have a desire to be recognized or honoured by 
other human beings. As noted in chapter 3, this notion is to be found in Kant's notion of 
'Ehrsucht', Rousseau's notion of 'amour propre' and Hobbes' notion of 'Glory'. 
How, then, does Fichte answer the questions concerning the origin of the 
assumption that there are other rational beings and the nature of the criteria which 
allow us to recognize such beings? Before providing his answer, Fichte dismisses a 
possible approach to determining the answer. 'Persons still unaccustomed to strict 
philosophical inquiry', Fichte claims, might answer as follows: 
"Our knowledge that rational beings like ourselves exist apart from us, and our 
knowledge of the signs which distinguish rational beings from nonrational ones have both 
been derived from experience."51 
Fichte considers this answer to be 'superficial and unsatisfying'. According to Fichte, 
any appeal to the testimony of the senses does not demonstrate that there actually are 
other rational beings like ourselves and, consequently, doesn't prove that we are 
justified in our assumption. 
All that experience teaches us is that our consciousness contains the representation of 
rational beings outside of ourselves. No one disputes this and no egoist [Egoist] has ever 
denied it. What is in question is whether there is anything beyond this representation 
which corresponds to it, that is, whether rational beings exist independent~ of our 
representations of them and would exist even if we had no such representations. 2 
lt is possible to see Fichte's comments as constituting a tu quoque response to 
Jacobi's claim that transcendental idealism entails 'speculative egoism'. On this 
reading, Fichte would be implying that Jacobi is unjustified in appealing to the 
testimony of the senses as proof of the existence of other rational beings. Jacobi may 
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stress the immediacy and apparent necessity of our awareness of other rational beings 
- but these characteristics may simply be features of our representations. The bare 
fact that our representations of rational beings possess these properties does not 
justify the inference to the mind-independent existence of such beings. As Fichte points 
out, even the 'egoist' accepts the necessity of our representations of other rational 
beings. If Jacobi cannot justify the inference from representation to existence he is 
condemned to egoism. Now Jacobi might reply that he does not accept that we are 
constrained by 'representations' and that the senses put us in direct contact with 
reality. Yet unless Jacobi can provide support for his direct realism other than the 
necessity and vivacity of certain experiences, this response is unsatisfactory. lt seems 
clear that Jacobi is intended as one of those philosophers who is unaccustomed to 
'strict philosophical inquiry'. 
Having shown that Jacobi is himself open to the charge of egoism, Fichte now 
turns to consider whether transcendental idealism can resist this charge. Fichte 
presents Kant's position as follows: 
The most that experience can teach us is that there are effects which resemble the 
effects of rational causes. lt cannot, however, teach us that the causes in question 
actually exist as rational beings in themselves. For a being in itself is no object of 
0 53 expenence. 
As Fichte presents it, Kant's position is premised on a strict distinction between 
phenomena and noumena - between 'objects of experience' and 'beings in 
themselves'. Given this distinction we can never know whether rational beings exist 
independently of our representations. Yet, according to Fichte, Kant thinks that he can 
provide an account of the origin of our assumption that other rational beings exist and 
of the characteristics enabling us to recognize them. This account runs as follows: 
We ourselves introduce such beings into experience. lt is we who explain certain 
experiences by appealing to the existence of rational beings outside of ourselves 5 4 
The phrase 'we ourselves introduce such beings into experience' is reminiscent of 
Kant's claim, in the Paralogisms, that the objects I apprehend as other rational beings 
are 'nothing further' than the 'transference' ( Obertragung) of my self-consciousness 
onto 'other things'. 55 lt also evokes Kant's discussion, in §64 of the Critique of the 
Power of Judgement, of the hexagon traced in the sand. There, the traveller used 
reflective judgement to explain the phenomenon as the product of a rational being. 
Fichte considers Kant's answer to be unsatisfactory. For whilst Kant may be 
correct in claiming that we do explain certain experiences by appealing to the existence 
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of rational beings like ourselves, the bare fact that we engage in such an explanatory 
practice does not show that we are justified in doing so. Fichte asks: 
But with what right [mit welcher Befugnil3] do we offer this explanation? The justification 
[Befugni13] needs to be better demonstrated before we can use this explanation, for its 
validity depends upon such a justification and cannot be based simply upon the fact that 
we actually make use of such explanations. 56 
Fichte is levelling a very serious accusation at Kant: he is claiming that Kant has failed 
to answer the quid juris concerning our assumption that rational beings exist. He is, in 
other words, accusing Kant of being uncritical with respect to our knowledge of beings 
like ourselves. Fichte will seek to provide a critical account of this knowledge and 
thereby save Critical idealism from the charge of 'egoism'. 
Fichte opens his account by claiming that, since Critical philosophers have 
exhausted the domain of theoretical philosophy, his answer will rely upon practical 
principles. Fichte answers the first part of the question - the part concerning our 
assumption that there are other rational beings - by drawing upon his account of the 
vocation of man as such. This account has shown, Fichte claims, that man's highest 
and fundamental drive is the drive towards complete self-harmony and, in order to 
attain such harmony, toward the harmony of all external, foreign things with his 
practical concepts of them. Now, amongst these concepts man possesses the 
concepts of 'reason and of rational action and thought'. 57 Given man's fundamental 
drive towards harmony, it becomes a practical necessity that something corresponds to 
these concepts - 'One of the things that man requires is that rational beings like 
himself should exist outside of him'. 58 This requirement constitutes one of man's 
fundamental drives- the 'social drive' (gesellschaftliche Trieb). 59 Fichte's derivation of 
this drive provides an answer to the first part of the question, viz., how we arrive at the 
presupposition that there actually are other rational beings like ourselves. 
Fichte's answer to the second part of the question - the part concerning the 
'characteristic features' which enable us to recognize rational beings - is more 
complex. Although Fichte does not say so explicitly, he clearly takes as his starting 
point §64 of the Critique of the Power of Judgement. There, Kant claims that the most 
probable explanation for the hexagon is that a human being has constructed it in 
accordance with concepts. The hexagon thereby serves as a probable sign of the 
purposive activity of a human agent. Fichte agrees that 'purposive activity' or 'efficacy 
governed by concepts' serves as a 'distinguishing characteristic of rationality'. Yet it is 
merely a 'negative' characteristic: if it cannot be applied to the object in question, then 
the object cannot have a 'rational author'. 60 However, the presence of this 
characteristic does not entail that the object has a rational author. In other words, the 
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presence of this characteristic is a necessary but not sufficient condition of rational 
authorship. Indeed, as Fichte points out, certain natural phenomena may be seen to 
exhibit purposefulness: 
The distinguishing characteristic of purposefulness is the harmony of multiplicity in a 
unity. But many types of such harmony are explicable merely by natural laws-not 
mechanical laws, but organic ones certainly. 51 
The 'negative characteristic' is therefore inadequate; it must be supplemented with 
another characteristic - a characteristic that will guarantee that our inference is 
'certain' (sichere). 
Fichte points out that natural phenomena which exhibit purposiveness are 
characterized by the fact that they are governed by necessary laws - 'nature operates 
in accordance with necessary laws'. Reason, on the other hand, 'operates freely'. 
Consequently: 
The freely achieved harmony of multiplicity in a unity would thus be a certain and non-
deceptive distinguishing feature of rationality within appearances. The only question is 
how one can tell the difference between an effect one has experienced which occurs 
necessarily and one which occurs freely. 62 
In order to answer this question, Fichte develops a sophisticated argument from 
analogy. He begins by considering my knowledge of my own freedom, 'freedom within 
me'. My own freedom cannot be an object of consciousness, Fichte claims, because it 
is the 'ultimate explanatory basis for all consciousness'. 63 Freedom is presupposed by 
all consciousness and therefore any attempt to become conscious of freedom is 
pointless. However, I can attain what might be termed a 'negative' consciousness of 
my freedom: 
What I can become conscious of [ ... ] is that I am conscious of no cause for a certain 
voluntary determination of my empirical I other than my will itself. As long as one has 
explained oneself properly in advance, one might well say that this very lack of 
consciousness of a cause is itself a consciousness of freedom[ ... ].64 
This 'negative' awareness of freedom provides the basis for Fichte's argument from 
analogy. This argument from analogy differs from the standard version (typically 
associated with Mill) in two respects. Firstly, the analogy is not based on an 
experienced connection between my thoughts and behaviour. lt is based on an 
abductive inference from my behaviour to the cause of my behaviour (freedom is the 
best possible explanation for my action). Secondly, the analogical inference depends 
upon interaction between myself and the object. I freely act upon the object and its 
response indicates whether it is a being analogous to me. If its response is explicable 
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in accordance with natura/laws I cannot be certain that it is a rational being like myself. 
If it response cannot be explained by natural causes, but can only be explained by the 
law of freedom upon which I acted, I may infer with certainty that it is a rational being. 
Fichte presents the argument as follows: 
Suppose now that the manner of behavior of that substance which is presented to us 
through appearances is altered, altered by our free action (of which we were conscious in 
the sense just indicated), and altered so that it no longer remains explicable by that law in 
accordance with which it operated previously, but can only be explained by that law upon 
which we have based our own free action-a law which is quite opposed to the previous 
law. The only way in which we could account for the alteration in this case is by assuming 
that the cause of the effect in question was also rational and free. Thus there arises, to 
use the Kantian terminology, an interaction [or 'reciprocal action'-Wechselwirkung] 
governed by concepts, a purposeful community. And this is what I mean by "society"-
the concept of which is now completely determined.65 
Fichte's argument is rather abstract, and seems far removed from concrete 
intersubjective relationships. However, when shorn of its abstract terminology, it is 
readily intelligible. Fichte is describing an hypothetical original encounter in which I act 
upon the other being in a way which manifests my freedom. My action calls upon the 
other being to modify its behaviour and this modification affects me. If the other being's 
behaviour remains explicable in terms of natural necessity, I have no certain sign that it 
is a rational being. If, on the other hand, the behaviour of the other being 'can only be 
explained' by the law of freedom which motivated my action, I may legitimately infer 
that the other being is a rational being. I may also legitimately infer, although Fichte 
does not say so explicitly, that the other rational being recognizes me as a rational 
being. This is because his free response to my action presupposes that he grasps my 
action as free purposive action, viz., as the action of a rational being. In other words, 
the relationship of recognition is not one-sided; it is mutual. 
Fichte's argument breaks with Kant's approach in several ways. Firstly, Kant 
presented the traveller's inference as a merely reflective judgement which, as such, 
constituted a merely probable inference. lt permitted the traveller to think that another 
rational being produced the hexagon, but did not allow him to know this. Such 
knowledge would require 'determining' rather than reflective judgement - the 
subsumption of a corresponding intuition under a given concept, in this case, the 
concept 'rational being'. 66 For Kant, such judgement is impossible, as there can be no 
intuition of other rational beings. As he puts it in the Paralogisms - 'thinking beings, as 
such, can never come before us among outer appearances'. 67 In opposition to Kant, 
Fichte thinks that free activity can be presented in the phenomenal world. Admittedly, 
we can only apprehend this free activity by means of an abductive inference (which 
Fichte assumes, wrongly, to provide certain knowledge). Nevertheless, the fact that 
Fichte considers such an inferential move to be possible marks a significant step 
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beyond Kant: it means that we can have knowledge of something which Kant ascribes 
to the noumenal. Kant's strict separation between the phenomenal and the noumenal 
is therefore overcome. 
Secondly, as we noted at the end of Part I of this study, the traveller's reflective 
judgement afforded probable knowledge of man as a 'theoretical' being - a being 
capable of geometrical construction in accordance with the categories and forms of 
sensibility (space and time). The judgment presented by Fichte, on the other hand, 
affords 'certain' knowledge of man as a practical being; a being whose response to the 
influence exercised upon it can only be explained as the response of a free, rational 
being. 
Finally, Fichte's use of the 'Kantian terminology' is also worth noting. Fichte 
draws upon the categories of Relation as they are 'schematized' in the 'Analogies of 
Experience' of the first Critique. 68 Fichte's description of the other being with which we 
are initially confronted draws upon the First Analogy's schematism of the category of 
substance. The action we exercise on the other being and the action which the other 
being exercises on us, is described in terms of the Second Analogy's schematism of 
the category of cause and effect (the time-order in which the actions and their effects 
occur is irreversible), while the resultant intersubjective relationship of mutual 
recognition is described in terms of Kant's category of 'community' (Gemeinschaft). 69 
This use of Kant's categories to describe intersubjective relations amounts to what we 
might describe as a 'socialization' of Kant's categories: the concepts of theoretical 
reason are shown to determine social relations. 70 Indeed, society is now defined in 
terms of Kant's category of community. By transforming Kant's categories in this way 
Fichte is laying the foundations for what I shall term a 'logic of intersubjectivity'. This 
logic, which seeks to specify the different modes of interaction between agents, will 
receive further development in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. 
Having answered the question concerning our assumption that there are other 
rational beings and the characteristics which enable us to recognize them, Fichte 
returns to the topic of the lecture: the vocation of man within society. The positive 
distinguishing feature of society is unconstrained, 'free interaction' (Wechselwirkung 
durch Freiheit). This interaction is not a means to an end, it is not carried out for the 
sake of anything else. Nevertheless, this does not exclude the possibility that the way 
in which society 'operates' is 'governed by an additional, more specific law, which 
establishes a more specific goal for the operation of society'. 71 This further law is 
determined by the fundamental social drive with which Fichte explained the origin of 
our assumption that there are other rational beings. This drive is a drive to discover 
other 'men' external to oneself and presupposes that one has the concept of that for 
which one is looking. Now the concept of man is not simply a descriptive concept, it is 
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a normative concept. Fichte calls it an 'idealistic concept' (idealischer Begriff) due to 
the fact that the norm it represents is 'unachievable' - the idea of perfection is 
something to which we must 'endlessly approximate'. Each subject of experience has 
his own ideal of man, his own image of what man should be like. The content of all 
these ideals is the same - man as a rational, progressive being, although they may 
differ in complexity or 'degree' (my ideal of human perfection may be rather simpler 
and less refined than yours). The fundamental social drive urges each subject of 
experience to search for something that resembles his ideal of man. On encountering 
those whom he 'recognizes [anerkennt] as men' he judges them according to his ideal. 
Now, he may find that they fail to satisfy his concept. They may exhibit traits such as 
ignorance, greed or cruelty. However, as rational beings they are, in principle, capable 
of satisfying his ideal. He therefore seeks to 'raise' (heben) them to his ideal. This 
'raising' is an educative relationship of a special sort. lt is non-coercive and is founded 
upon free interaction. Fichte describes this relationship as a 'spiritual struggle' in which 
each seeks to convince the other of the truth of his conception of man. Fichte claims 
that the 'higher and better' man will always win this struggle, by rationally persuading 
the other to accept the higher ideal. Insofar as the higher men will always convince the 
lower men to adopt their ideals, 'the improvement of the species has its origin within 
society'. Such improvement, Fichte claims, is the 'vocation of all society as such'. 72 
Fichte's conviction that the better man will always win this struggle seems 
rather odd. For why shouldn't the 'lower' man simply ignore the higher man's 
entreaties? Why shouldn't he verbally or physically abuse his interlocutor, rather than 
listen to him? An answer to this question is suggested in the following paragraph: 
But on the whole the better person will certainly be victorious, and this is a source of 
reassurance and solace for the friend of mankind and truth when he witnesses the open 
war [offenen Krieg] between light and darkness. The light will certainly win in the end. 
Admittedly, we cannot say how long this will take, but when darkness is forced to engage 
in public battle [offentlichen Kamp~ this is already a guarantee of impendin~ victory. For 
darkness loves obscurity. When it is forced to reveal itself it has already lost. 
What is crucial in this paragraph is the use of the adjectives offenen and offentlichen. 
For Fichte is suggesting that the battle takes place in the public sphere- Qffentlichkeit 
- which is, quite literally, 'open' - offen. In this arena everything is open to scrutiny 
and there can be no dissimulation. Specious arguments will be revealed for what they 
are and the better argument will triumph. The 'lower man' will, to borrow Habermas' 
phrase, be motivated by the 'peculiarly unforced force of the better argument' (den 
eigentam/ich zwanglosen Zwang des besseren Argumentes).74 
Although man's vocation for society stems from the 'innermost and purest part 
of his nature', it is still a 'drive' (Trieb). lt must therefore be subordinated to the moral 
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law. A consideration of the way in which the social drive is determined by the moral law 
will, Fichte claims, reveal the vocation of man within society. Now this moral law 
determines the social drive, both 'negatively' and 'positively'. The moral law determines 
the social drive negatively by stipulating which actions are, by virtue of the fact that 
they contradict the social drive, prohibited. The moral law determines the social drive 
positively by stipulating which actions are, insofar as they are in harmony with the 
social drive, required. Fichte begins with the negative determination of the social drive. 
The goal of the social drive is 'interaction, reciprocal influence, mutual give and 
take, mutual passivity and activity'. 75 The social drive does not seek to unilaterally exert 
a causal influence upon the other, who would passively receive the effect of this 
influence. The social drive strives to find other rational beings and to enter into 
'community' with them. lt strives for 'co-ordination', not for the 'subordination' which 
characterizes the natural world. Fichte claims that anyone who doesn't allow the 
rational beings he discovers to be free, is 'taking into account only their theoretical 
ability, not their free practical rationality.' What Fichte means by this is that once we 
recognize another rational being we must treat him or her appropriately - as an end in 
itself. Treating the other as an end in itself involves entering into a reciprocal 
relationship in which each respects the other (this is recognition in its 'honorific' sense). 
lt does not involve treating the other as a mere 'thing' which can be manipulated for 
one's own pleasure. Now Fichte is not denying, any more than Kant does, that we 
sometimes use others as means to our ends. 76 What he is objecting to is the treatment 
of others as nothing more than means. To treat them in this way is to use them for their 
technical capacities, or 'theoretical ability' (which ability is all that is revealed by the 
reflective judgement of Kant's traveller). Thus, if I only took into account my postman's 
theoretical ability, I would regard him as a mere mail-delivery machine or, as Fichte 
puts it, a 'talented beast'. 77 I would not be concerned with his intrinsic value as a 
rational being, but would be acting as though I were his 'master' (Herr). 78 Fichte agrees 
with Rousseau's claim that anyone who thinks himself the master of others is more of a 
slave than they, but goes further: whoever thinks himself a master is a slave, or at least 
has 'a slavish soul and [ ... ] will grovel on his knees before the first strong man that 
subjugates him. '79 lt is not hard to see the basis here for Hegel's dialectic of mastery 
and servitude. 
Treating people as mere means to one's own ends contradicts the social drive 
and is prohibited by the moral law. Fichte is therefore in agreement with Kant's 
Formula of Humanity. Yet Fichte extends Kant's formula to exclude the possibility that 
we might seek to use others as means to their own ends. 'One may not', Fichte claims, 
'make any rational being virtuous, wise or happy against his own will'. 80 The notion that 
one may force others to be free is therefore excluded as are all paternalistic 
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conceptions of education. lt is simply unacceptable to try to coerce, persuade or 'dupe' 
the 'lower man' to give up his dogmatic disposition and attain an awareness of himself 
as a spontaneous, free agent. 
lt is with Fichte's discussion of the positive determination of the social drive by 
the moral law that we finally discover the vocation of man within society. All individuals 
differ from one another in the capacities that they possess and the beliefs that they 
hold. Nevertheless, there is one thing with which they are in 'complete agreement': 
perfection, the goal of man as such. 81 The proposition that the goal of man is perfection 
is therefore - using terminology introduced in the first part of this study - an 
'intersubjectively valid' proposition, viz., a proposition which everyone could, in 
principle, rationally agree upon. Fichte states that the defining characteristic of 
perfection is that it is 'totally self-identical'. Consequently, if all men could attain 
perfection they would all be identical to one another, or, 'totally equal'. They would, 
Fichte contends, 'constitute but one single subject'. Precisely what this one single 
subject would be like is hard to tell. The most obvious reference point is Rousseau's 
notion of the 'general will' and its Kantian counterpart - the 'Kingdom of Ends'. Yet, 
the precise nature of this subject is perhaps beside the point. For the highest goal of 
society is a regulative idea- an idea which we can strive for, but never hope to attain. 
Nevertheless, it is the vocation of man in society to 'endlessly approximate towards' 
this goal. Fichte calls this endless approximation to absolute unity 'unification' 
( Verneinigung). Since the only thing upon which men agree is the proposition that the 
goal of man is perfection, they can only realize their vocation by a 'process of 
communal perfection'. This communal perfection is man's social vocation. lt involves 
'perfecting ourselves by freely making use of the effect which others have on us and 
perfecting others by acting in turn upon them as upon free beings'. 82 
In order to realize our social vocation the skill of 'sociability' 
(Gesellschaftlichkeit) is required. 83 This skill is the skill to non-coercively 'raise' others 
to our 'ideal' of man. lt is, Fichte claims, acquired and developed through culture. Now, 
sociability is two-fold. lt is the 'skill of giving'- the skill to 'affect others as free beings'. 
Yet it is also the 'capacity for receiving'- the capacity to 'make the most of the effects 
which others have on us'. Fichte stresses that the latter is as important as the former 
- we should be prepared to listen to what others have to tell us. The assumption that 
we have nothing to learn from others is both arrogant and misguided. As Fichte rightly 
points out, 'rarely is anyone so perfect that he cannot be further educated by almost 
anyone'. 84 Sociability is therefore the ability to enter into free interaction with others-
a free interaction in which we mutually benefit one another. lt is through this ability that 
society will develop towards its unattainable goal- absolute unity. 
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Fichte's image of unconstrained dialogue as the motor of the moral progress of 
society is powerful. lt is also profoundly cosmopolitan. For insofar as any rational being 
may participate, the dialogue will include people of all societies, cultures and races. 
Fichte writes: 
No one whose face bears the stamp of reason, no matter how crude, exists for me in 
vain. But I am unacquainted with you, as you are with me! Still, just as it is certain that we 
share a common calling-to be good and to become better and better-it is equally 
certain that there will come a time (it may take millions or trillions of years-what is time!) 
when I will draw you into my sphere of influence, a time when I will benefit you too and 
receive benefit from you, a time when my heart will be joined with yours in the loveliest 
bond of all-the bond of free mutual give and take. 85 
In our capacity as rational beings we are therefore all members of what K.-0. Apel has 
called an 'unlimited communication community', a community which transcends 
national, cultural and racial differences. 86 
The Vocation of the Scholarly Class 
The scholar is a member of society. More specifically, she is a member of a specific 
social 'class' - the 'scholarly class' (Gelehrtenstand). Fichte's third lecture seeks to 
provide a philosophical justification for the 'inequality' of social classes. The class 
inequality in question is not economic- the German Stand is closer in meaning to the 
French 'etat' or English 'estate', i.e., a social group devoted to a particular 
occupation. 87 Fichte's aim is perhaps best expressed as that of justifying the different 
functional roles of such groups within society. 
As we saw in our discussion of the first lecture the not-1, or nature, determines 
the specific nature of the subject of experience. Given the diversity and multiplicity of 
the not-1, no two human beings or 'individuals' (lndividuen) are determined in the same 
way. 88 We might say that nature individuates human beings. Now, nature is 
responsible for the particular capacities or talents which each individual possesses. 
These talents serve to satisfy natural needs. Insofar as nature determines each subject 
of experience differently, each individual possesses a different set of talents. Insofar as 
no two subjects of experience possess the same talents, there is a natural inequality 
between individuals. 
Now the supreme law of self-harmony demands that each individual cultivate all 
of his talents equally and to the greatest degree of perfection possible. lt also demands 
that all of the various members of society be 'cultivated or educated equally'. lt is 
through such cultivation that society can approximate towards total harmony. 
Such equality is to be achieved through the two drives contained within the 
social-drive - the 'drive to communicate' (Mittheilungstrieb) and the 'drive to receive' 
(Trieb zu empfangen). 89 By means of these drives, each subject can pass on his 
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capacities to those who lack them and receive the capacities he lacks from those who 
possess them. This interpersonal activity of 'giving' and 'receiving' allows each 
individual to share their particular capacities with the whole of society. By joining 
together in this way, individuals form a 'united front' against the multiplicity of nature. 
This joining together takes place, rather paradoxically, through the division of 
society into classes. The need for specific classes arises from the fact that it would be 
pointless for the individual to attempt to develop a// possible talents. Such an attempt 
would require an infinite amount of time and would contribute nothing to the 
development of the human species. 90 The individual should therefore choose to 
develop one of the set of capacities he possesses, entrusting the development of his 
other capacities to society. 
By choosing to develop a specific capacity the individual has also chosen to 
enter a class, for 'My class is determined by the particular skill to the development of 
which I freely dedicate myself'. 91 Through this division of humanity into classes all 
talents are developed equally as the common property of humanity. Natural inequalities 
or differences are therefore remedied through the social 'inequality' of a class system. 
The development of talents which the class system facilitates is also the 
development of culture qua the progressive mastery of inner and outer nature. And it is 
through culture that society can fulfil its ultimate vocation - the endless approximation 
towards complete harmony (both intrasubjective and intersubjective). The apparent 
divisiveness of the class system is therefore illusory - the individual classes all strive 
towards a common goal- complete harmony. 
Within this common project, one class in particular plays a crucial role. The 
'scholarly class' is charged with the supervision of the progressive development of 
humanity. The vocation of the scholarly class is the 'supreme supervision of the actual 
progress of the human race in general and the unceasing promotion of this progress'. 92 
Membership of this class requires the possession of specific types of cognition. In 
order to fulfil his class vocation, the scholar must possess three types of cognition -
'philosophical' knowledge, 'philosophical-historical' knowledge and 'historical' 
knowledge. 93 Philosophical knowledge is knowledge of man's talents and needs. 
Philosophical-historical knowledge is knowledge of these needs and the means for the 
satisfaction of these needs. Historical knowledge is knowledge of the particular 
developmental stage humanity has reached and of the means required to reach the 
next developmental stage. All three types of knowledge are required. The scholar must 
also, if he is to guide humanity, be ethically good; indeed, he must be the 'ethically best 
man of his time'. Finally, the scholar must have developed the social talents of giving 
and receiving to a particularly high degree. He must be capable of transmitting his 
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knowledge and be open to the knowledge of others. Only in this way can he hope to 
fulfil the vocation of his class. 94 
Fichte's image of the scholar's vocation is edifying. Yet one could be forgiven for 
regarding it as somewhat unrealistic and naive. Indeed, one might think that the same 
could be said of Fichte's notion of society as an open society in which everyone is 
united by the intersubjective 'bond of free mutual give and take'. Real societies, one 
might object, are driven mainly by cupidity and selfish egoism. Indeed, it is often the 
case that the 'lower man' simply ignores the rational entreaties of the 'higher and 
better' man. Why, one might ask, does Fichte think that positive intersubjective 
relationships will prevail over negative ones. In order to answer this question a brief 
discussion of the role of the concept of the 'state' ( Staat) in the Lectures will be helpful. 
The State as a Means 
Fichte's account of society as an open-ended dialogue between individuals may seem 
somewhat unrealistic. For much of our interaction is not unconstrained dialogue in 
which everyone may participate, but coercive and distorted communication in which we 
seek to manipulate one another. Borrowing Apel's terminology, we might claim that 
Fichte confuses 'the real communication community' with the 'ideal communication 
community'. 
In order to respond to this objection it is important to note that Fichte stresses 
that he is not describing how things actually are. The notions of society and social 
classes are 'practical' or normative concepts - concepts which specify how things 
ought to be. 95 How human society actually is, is a rather different matter. In order for 
the normative concept of society to be realized, it would seem that certain institutional 
arrangements are required to regulate and govern intersubjective relationships. In the 
Lectures Fichte says little about such arrangements. Nevertheless, he does suggest -
in the second lecture - that it is the state ( Staat) which regulates intersubjective 
relationships, constraining those who seek to treat their fellow men as mere means. In 
other words, positive intersubjective relationships triumph over their negative 
counterparts, because the latter are prohibited by the state. 
According to Fichte, the state serves a mediating function: 'The state is [ ... ] only 
a means for establishing a perfect society, a means which exists only under specific 
circumstances'. 96 The state therefore provides the conditions of the possibility of free 
interaction between agents and it is such free interaction which allows humanity to 
endlessly approximate towards its ultimate goal- complete perfection and unity. This 
notion of the state as a means for the fulfilment of humanity's vocation will be fully 
explored in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right in which the domain of right 
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mediates between theoretical and practical reason. In the present context, the notion 
of the state as a 'means' motivates Fichte's infamous claim that the state will be 
abolished. lt is this claim that reinforced Fichte's reputation as a Jacobin who believed, 
in the words of Voigt, that 'in ten or twenty years there will be no more kings or 
princes'. Given the gravity of the charge, it is worth comparing Voigt's phrasing with 
Fichte's actual argument. Fichte writes: 
Like all those human institutions which are mere means, the state aims at abolishing 
itself. The goal of all government is to make government superfluous. Though the time 
has certainly not yet come, nor do I know how many myriads or myriads of myriads of 
years it may take (here we are not at all concerned with applicability in life, but only with 
justifying a speculative proposition) there will certainly be a point in the foreordained 
career of the human species when all civic bonds will be superfluous. This is the point 
when reason, rather than strength or cunning, will be universally recognized as the 
highest court of appeal. I say "be recognized" [Anerkannt seyn sage /eh] because even 
then men will still make mistakes and injure their fellow men thereby. All they will then 
require is the goodwill to allow themselves to be convinced that they have erred and, 
when they are convinced of this, to recant their errors and make amends for the 
damages. Until we have reached this point we are, speaking quite generally, not even 
true men.97 
Fichte's own view is in stark contrast to Voigt's phrasing, which suggests that Fichte is 
offering an empirical prognosis. For Fichte clearly regards the point at which the state 
will be abolished as a very distant point in the future. At such a stage in the 
development of humanity, the state will no longer be required to ensure that human 
beings mutually recognize one another (recognition in the honorific sense). For the 
norms of interaction which the state upholds will be universally recognized as binding; 
they will not need to be imposed 'from outside'. Now, such a stage in human 
development would be very different from human society as we know it - it would be 
similar to the 'ideal communication community' envisaged by K.-0. Apel. In such a 
community everyone would recognize one another as 'ends in themselves' and would 
interact accordingly. Such a community would be very close to the unattainable ideal of 
a perfect, totally equal community in which everyone would 'constitute but one single 
subject'. 
Regardless of whether this community is attainable or not it is, Fichte claims, 
incumbent upon us to strive towards it. lt serves as a goal towards which we can and 
must work. Such a goal cannot be achieved by violent and bloody rebellion, but can 
only be achieved by free interaction. And it is the function of the state, Fichte claims, to 
secure and guarantee the conditions of the possibility of such interaction. 
This concludes our discussion of the Lectures. We have seen that Fichte's 
arguments are motivated by a profound concern with intersubjectivity. And we have 
seen that this concern is expressed in three ways: as a concern with justifying our 
claim that other rational beings exist, as a concern with the role that intersubjective 
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relationships play in human development and, finally, as a concern with the institutional 
conditions which guarantee positive, non-coercive intersubjective relationships. 
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Lectures were delivered at the same 
time as the 1794-5 Foundations. This chronological fact poses problems for the 
traditional interpretation of the latter work. For it is hard to see how the alleged concern 
of the 1794-5 Foundations with an absolute subject as the author of reality is 
compatible with the concern of the Lectures with intersubjective relationships. Indeed, 
as Gueroult has pointed out, there seems to be a manifest inconsistency between 
Fichte's 'subjective idealism' and his commitment to 'practical realism'. In order to save 
Fichte from the charge of inconsistency, an alternative reading of the 1794-5 
Foundations must be developed. lt is to this task that we now turn. 
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6 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE 
Origins of the 1794-5 Foundations of the Entire Wissenschafts/ehre 
The 1794-5 Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre is a notoriously obscure and 
difficult text. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, as Fichte notes in the 1795 
Preface, the manuscript was intended for his students, and was to be expanded upon 
in the actual lectures. 1 lt was written in a hurry, Fichte frequently completing sections 
just prior to the lectures. He therefore never intended it for the general philosophical 
public, although he did consent to its publication. Secondly, as Fichte again explains in 
the 1795 Preface, he did not tell the reader everything, because he wished to 
'encourage independent thought'. 2 Fichte therefore wanted to encourage his readers to 
engage with the text, to actively think it, and this may explain his abstruse, neologistic 
terminology. Finally, Fichte was extremely hostile to certain attempts to 'popularize' 
Kant's philosophy, and he may have developed the new vocabulary to distance his 
'presentation' (Darstellung) of transcendental idealism from those attempted by the 
'Kantians'. In this way he would avoid using a terminology that had been distorted by 
misinterpretation and fulfil his task of presenting the 'spirit' rather than the 'letter' of 
Kant's transcendental idealism. Unfortunately, Fichte's innovative terminology and style 
created considerable confusion, leading him to attempt a new, more intelligible 
'presentation' of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre - the 1796-99 
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. This new presentation is sometimes taken to be 
markedly different in content from that of the 1794-5 Foundations (Druet claims that it 
represents a turn towards a 'dogmatic' conception of philosophy). 3 Nevertheless, whilst 
there are certain differences, I feel that the only truly significant change is the one that 
Fichte himself indicates - the change in presentation. And this change is significant 
insofar as the new presentation greatly clarifies Fichte's thought, often providing insight 
into earlier writings of the Jena period. I shall therefore often draw upon the texts 
associated with this new presentation (including the two Introductions) to clarify the 
arguments of the 1794-5 Foundations. 
As mentioned previously, the 1794-5 Foundations is intended to provide the 
foundation for the system and is not the system itself. This foundational status was not, 
as Fichte himself partially acknowledges in the 1795 Preface4 , made sufficiently clear 
in the 1794 Concerning the Concept essay. We must therefore bear in mind that the 
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1794-5 Foundations does not provide the system itself, but merely the foundational 
elements from which it may be derived. 
An Overview of the 1794-5 Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre 
The 1794-5 Foundations is composed of three parts. The first part is entitled 
'Fundamental Principles of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre' (Grundsatze der gesamten 
Wissenschaftslehre). In this part, Fichte articulates the threefold fundamental 'positing'5 
activity of the I. This threefold activity is expressed in the three foundational principles 
from which the two other parts of the work will be derived. The first 'absolutely 
unconditioned' principle is: 
the I posits originally absolutely its own being (Oas /eh setzt ursprOng/ieh sehleehthin sein 
eigenes Seyn). 6 
The second principle states that: 
Opposition in general is posited through the absolute I' (Oas Entgegengesetztseyn ist 
Oberhaupt sehlechthin dureh das /eh gesetzt ). 7 
The third, and final, foundational principle is intended to resolve the apparent conflict 
between the absolute self-positing of the I and its absolute positing of a not-1. For, as 
Fichte points out, if one term is posited absolutely, then the other will be destroyed. But 
as both terms are to be posited they will mutually eliminate each other. To avoid such 
conflict, they must be posited in part only, each term being partially limited so as to 
allow the other term to be posited. They must therefore both be posited as 'divisible' 
(theilbar), that is, as capable of being divided into parts. 8 The third principle therefore 
states that: 
In the I, I oppose a divisible not-1 to the divisible 1. 9 
These principles, Fichte claims, each express an 'act of the mind', or, an act of 
transcendental subjectivity. The first principle expresses an absolutely unconditioned 
act of self-positing in which the I asserts itself absolutely. The second and third 
principles are each partly determined or conditioned by the first act. Now the third 
foundational principle implicitly contains two opposed principles: 'The I posits itself as 
limited by the not-/' and 'The I posits the not-/ as limited by the I'. 10 The former provides 
the founding principle of the second part of the 1794-5 Foundations- the 'Foundation 
of Theoretical Knowledge', whilst the latter provides the founding principle of the third 
part- the 'Foundation of Knowledge of the Practical'. 
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The second part of the 1794-5 Foundations, the Foundation of Theoretical 
Knowledge, seeks to articulate the foundations of our representation of an apparently 
mind-independent, publicly accessible world. The third and final part, the Foundation of 
Knowledge of the Practical, seeks to articulate the foundations of our knowledge of 
what we ought to do, i.e., the foundations of moral obligation. Now, it is crucial to note 
that Fichte establishes a relation of asymmetrical dependence between the theoretical 
and practical parts. He endorses Kant's thesis concerning the 'primacy' of practical 
reason, and therefore privileges the second, practical part over the first. Indeed, Fichte 
argues that the conditions of the possibility of representation (our knowledge of an 
apparently mind-independent world) are conditioned by the conditions of the possibility 
of practical knowledge (our knowledge of what we ought to do). 11 Nevertheless, there 
is a sense in which the practical part is dependent upon the theoretical part. For, 
unless we found the possibility of our cognition of the world, we cannot hope to found 
the possibility of our moral action within the world. Indeed, our knowledge of what we 
ought to do is acquired by means of representations accompanied by a 'feeling of 
necessity'. As Fichte puts it: 'The thinkability of the practical principle depends upon 
that of the theoretical' .12 The first part is therefore, as Renaut notes, 'first in the order of 
reasons', although it depends for the possibility of its 'existence' upon the practical 
part.13 
Interpreting the 1794-5 Foundations 
Admittedly, the preceding sketch of the 1794-5 Foundations may not appear very 
helpful. For it fails to explain what Fichte's talk of the 'absolute I' and its 'positing' 
activity means. If such an explanation could be provided, it would provide a clearer 
insight into the nature of Fichte's transcendental idealism. In what follows I shall 
provide such an explanation. And I shall use this explanation to provide an 
interpretation of Fichte's idealism. However, prior to attempting this, I first wish to 
consider two rival interpretations of the 1794-5 Foundations, both of which place 
considerable emphasis upon the first part of the text. The first interpretation originates 
in the work of Schelling, and is developed by Hegel and his followers. I shall refer to it 
as the 'metaphysical' interpretation, insofar as it provides a distinctly non-Critical 
reading of Fichte's idealism which seeks to reconcile it with Spinozist metaphysics. The 
second interpretation originates in the work of Alexis Philonenko and has been 
developed by P-P. Druet, Alain Renaut and Luc Ferry. lt is explicitly opposed to the first 
interpretation, and seeks to provide a Critical reading of Fichte's idealism which places 
intersubjectivity at the centre of his project. In order to distinguish this 'non-
metaphysical' reading from other non-metaphysical approaches 14, I shall refer to it as 
the 'Antinomical Interpretation'. 
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The Metaphysical Interpretation 
As I noted, the obscure style of the 1794-5 Foundations partly reflects Fichte's concern 
to encourage his readers to think it for themselves. Now, the difficulty of the text 
certainly had the desired effect - many of its readers did think Fichte's idealism for 
themselves. But the conclusions they reached caused Fichte great consternation, 
leading him to complain, rather petulantly, that his work had been misunderstood due 
to the incapacity of its audience. Nevertheless, the interpretation of one of its readers 
-the young Schelling -was taken to be the definitive reading of Fichte's idealism. 
This is perhaps not surprising. For Schelling was a disciple of Fichte, and enjoyed, for 
a period, Fichte's endorsement. Yet the 'metaphysical' reading developed by Schelling 
has been taken by recent commentators to be a crass misinterpretation of Fichte's 
idealism, a misinterpretation that fails to grasp the true nature of the first part of the 
1794-5 Foundations. 
Perhaps the clearest example of Schelling's interpretation of Fichte is provided 
in the 1795 essay Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy or on the Unconditioned in 
Human Knowledge. 15 Whilst the essay makes no explicit reference to Fichte, it is quite 
obviously intended to be an exposition of Fichte's 1794-5 Foundations. Indeed, most of 
the essay is devoted to a discussion of the absolute I and its positing activity. What is 
immediately striking about the essay is Schelling's repeated references to Spinoza, 
whose system he describes (following Fichte) as 'perfect dogmatism', the complete 
opposite of Fichte's 'perfect criticism' .16 Schelling's references to Spinoza are almost 
entirely positive, Schelling often praising Spinoza for his sophisticated conception of 
substance. His only criticism is that Spinoza conceived of the absolute substance, 
Oeus sive Natura (God or Nature), as an absolute object, when he should have 
presented it as pure subjective activity - as an absolute I. Schelling suggests that 
Fichte's contribution was to transform Spinoza's absolute object into an absolute 
subject, a divine power whose positing activity quite literally creates reality in its 
entirety. Schelling therefore presents the absolute I as an inversion of Spinoza's Deus 
sive Natura, and describes the 'forms of this I' and its positing activity in Spinozistic 
terms. 17 
In developing his interpretation, Schelling also draws upon the notion of 
'intellectual intuition' (intellektuelle Anschauung), a term which is to be found in Fichte's 
Review of Aenesidemus. 18 Given the complex history and development of this term, it 
may be useful to remind ourselves of Kant's conception of an 'intellectual intuition' or 
'intuitive intellect'. For Kant, the notion of an 'intuitive intellect' is merely a 'regulative 
idea', something we can think but never cognize. Intellectual intuition is defined solely 
in contradistinction to our sensible mode of intuition, and serves, heuristically, to throw 
into relief our finite epistemic status. 19 This finite epistemic status is based upon the 
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fact that human knowledge requires the conjunction of two apparently20 discrete 
faculties - understanding and sensibility, the first of which actively synthesizes the 
passively received contributions of the latter. The passivity of our mode of intuition -
the fact that it receives its content through 'affection' - marks it as sensible. A 
(hypothetical) being characterized by 'intellectual intuition' or 'intuitive understanding' 
would not, by contrast, possess two discrete faculties - understanding and intuition 
would be perfectly conjoined. Such an absolute subject of experience would actively 
produce the objects of its thought, which would consequently be noumena, not 
phenomena. 21 Fichte's concept of intellectual intuition is far removed from Kant's 
understanding of the term. Indeed, as we shall see, the Fichtean conception of 
intellectual intuition is rather 'modest'. 
Schelling's Spinozist reading of Fichte is far more accessible than the 1794-5 
Foundations, and this perhaps contributed to its popularity. Nevertheless, it is 
demonstrably inaccurate. For Schelling's conception of the absolute I as a Divine 
power which actively creates the world of experience, is explicitly rejected by Fichte in 
the 1794-5 Foundations. As we shall see in our discussion of the theoretical part of that 
work, Fichte provides a penetrating critique of 'dogmatic idealism' (which he considers 
to be the obverse of Spinozistic 'materialism' or dogmatic realism) which conceives the 
objects of experience as entirely created by an omnipotent subject. 22 
The Antinomical Interpretation 
This 'non-metaphysical' interpretation was first developed by Alexis Philonenko in his 
path-breaking study La liberte humaine dans la philosophie de Fichte. Drawing upon 
the work of R. Lauth23 , Philonenko placed the concept of intersubjectivity at the heart of 
Fichte's project. He sought to provide an interpretation of the 1794-5 Foundations that 
would escape the charge of inconsistency often levelled against Fichte's practical 
philosophy by the metaphysical interpretation. Philonenko's approach has been further 
developed by Fichte scholars such as Druet, Radrizzani, Ferry and Renaut. Renaut's 
Systeme du droit: Philosophie et droit dans la pensee de Fichte provides a remarkably 
clear account of the antinomical interpretation of the 1794-5 Foundations. 24 I shall 
therefore draw upon it in the following account. 
Both Philonenko and Renaut introduce their interpretation with critical reference 
to Martial Gueroult's Hegelian interpretation of Fichte. In L'evolution et la structure de 
la Doctrine de la Science chez Fichte, Gueroult claims that there is a fundamental 
inconsistency between the theoretical and practical parts of the 1794-5 Foundations. 
Following the metaphysical interpretation, Gueroult claims that the theoretical part 
provides an account of the creation of reality by the activity of the absolute I. He then 
proceeds to claim that it is hard to see how, in the practical part, one could assert the 
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existence of a mind-independent external world (a world inhabited by subjects and 
objects of action) in which to act. Gueroult concludes from this that the second and 
third parts of the 1794-5 Foundations are thoroughly incompatible and mutually 
exclusive: if one accepts the theoretical part, one must reject the practical part, and 
vice versa. We are therefore faced with an apparent dilemma. 25 
For Philonenko and Renaut, however, this is a false dilemma, which rests upon 
a misguided interpretation of the 1794-5 Foundations. They claim that the notion that 
the I 'creates' reality results from a flawed reading of the first two parts of the 1794-5 
Foundations. And as this reading proceeds from the notion that the foundational 
principles begin with an act of intellectual intuition, in which a Divine subject actively 
intuits itself, both Philonenko and Renaut focus their attention upon the first part of the 
1794-5 Foundations. Philonenko repeatedly points out that the notion of intellectual 
intuition is never mentioned in the first section of the 1794-5 Foundations and claims 
that it plays an insignificant role in Fichte's idealism. According to Philonenko, Fichte 
would never have discussed intellectual intuition in the works relating to the 'new 
presentation', had he not wished to undermine Schelling's mystical treatment of the 
notion. 26 Philonenko is therefore keen to reject the notion that the threefold positing 
activity of the I presented in the first part of the 1794-5 Foundations is to be understood 
as the Promethean power of an 'intuitive intellect'. But if we reject this notion, how are 
we to understand the opening moments of the text? Philonenko's response to this 
question is both ingenious and fascinating. 
In La liberte humaine dans la phi/osophie de Fichte Philonenko points to the 
fact that Fichte copied out Kant's 'certain and useful warning' (in the Critique of Pure 
Reason) that 'general logic, considered as an organon, is always a logic of illusion, 
i.e., is dialectical.m Fichte was therefore clearly aware of Kant's 'warning', and this, 
Philonenko claims, throws a new light on the three foundational principles of the 1794-
5 Foundations. For Fichte derives each principle by considering logical laws, beginning 
with the principle of identity. If Fichte had Kant's warning in mind when writing the 
1794-5 Foundations, he would have known that such a procedure would result in a 
dialectic. Philonenko therefore argues that Fichte clearly intended to derive a dialectic 
from the laws of formal logic. Consequently, the 1794-5 Foundations does not begin 
with the true, but proceeds from the false to the true. lt therefore constitutes an 
inversion of the Kantian procedure, insofar as it proceeds from the 'Transcendental 
Dialectic' to the 'Transcendental Analytic'. Philonenko provides further textual support 
for these claims by citing two passages, both of which refer to the process of the 
Wissenschaftslehre as the emergence of truth from error. 28 
On the basis of such evidence, Philonenko and Renaut argue that the 
foundational principles constitute a 'dialectic' in Kant's sense of the term: a 'logic of 
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illusion'. They claim that the foundational principles of the 1794-5 Foundations are 
ideas of reason, merely regulative, heuristic concepts which cannot be applied to 
sensible intuition. 29 According to Renaut, the first principle -which expresses the l's 
absolute self-positing - 'belongs to the paralogisms [ ... ], to the metaphysical illusions 
that can be committed regarding the human subject.' The second principle 
'corresponds to the cosmological idea, to the idea of the world as a thing in itself or, 
which amounts to the same thing, as an object that is by definition external to 
representation.' The third, and final, principle (the synthesis between absolute I and 
absolute not-1) corresponds, Renaut claims, to the theological idea, insofar as it 
conceives of an absolute subject which is the 'substrate' and guarantor of the synthesis 
between I and not-1. 3° For Renaut and Philonenko, then, the three foundational 
principles are illusory, and it would be a grave mistake to construe them as substantive 
claims about the 'nature' of the I. Yet whilst these principles are illusory, Philonenko 
and Renaut both claim that they contain a kernel of truth. This kernel of truth will be 
extracted by the dialectical development of the second part of the 1794-5 Foundations. 
During this development the categories will gradually emerge, and we will finally reach 
a philosophically modest (non-metaphysical) conception of the relation between I and 
not-1 which facilitates representation. This synthesis will also constitute a synthesis 
between realism and idealism, a synthesis that will found the recognition of other 
rational agents and the possibility of the intersubjective relation. 
Such a reading of the 1794-5 Foundations is clearly far removed from the 
metaphysical reading. lt seems to offer a plausible interpretation which secures the 
possibility of our recognition of, and interaction with, other rational agents. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that this interpretation of the foundational principles is 
highly questionable. My reasons for claiming this are as follows. 
Firstly, the fact that Fichte copied a phrase by Kant hardly seems to warrant the 
claim that he intended the three foundational principles to be dialectical. He might, 
alternatively, simply have been following what Kant refers to (in the Prolegomena) as 
the 'analytic' or 'regressive' method - which proceeds from known facts to their a 
priori conditions of possibility. 31 He might, to use Reinholdian language, simply be 
regressing from 'facts of consciousness' to the conditions of the possibility of such 
facts. And indeed, just before introducing the principle of identity, Fichte says that he 
starts his reflection from a 'fact of empirical consciousness' (eine Tatsache des 
empirischen Bewuf3tseins) which is 'accepted by everyone' and 'admitted to be 
perfectly certain and established. '32 lt is therefore far from evident that Fichte has 
Kant's 'warning' in mind. 
Secondly, the quotations in which Fichte refers to the emergence of truth from 
error prove nothing with respect to the foundational principles. For they could equally 
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well refer to the theoretical part which is concerned to eliminate those philosophical 
positions which threaten to destroy the 'unity of consciousness' (die Einheit des 
Bewuf3tseins) established by the foundational principles. 33 The result of the theoretical 
part is a philosophically tenable construal of the relation between I and not-1. In this 
sense truth may be said to 'emerge from error'. 
Thirdly, Fichte repeatedly asserts that the foundational principles are the 
absolutely certain, foundational principles of his system, and never explicitly relates 
them to Kant's Dialectic. Fichte does tell us, however, that the first foundational 
principle is 'the absolutely basic principle of all knowledge' and relates it to Kant's 
'transcendental unity of apperception'. 34 
Finally, we should be wary of Philonenko's claim that intellectual intuition had 
little philosophical significance for Fichte prior to the 'new presentation' writings. For 
whilst Philonenko provides a list of the occurrence of the term prior to the 1794-5 
Foundations, this list is far from exhaustive. 35 As Thomas-Fogiel has pointed out, the 
term 'intellectual intuition' plays a central role in the Meditations on Elementary 
Philosophy of 1793, a work which many regard as the preliminary study for the 1794-5 
Foundations. 36 lt would therefore seem that the concept does have some significance 
for Fichte. 
Despite these criticisms, however, the non-metaphysical reading of Philonenko 
and Renaut contains much of interest. For whilst their interpretation of the foundational 
principles is questionable, their interpretation of the theoretical part provides much 
insight into Fichte's destruction of competing philosophical positions. I shall therefore 
draw upon certain aspects of Philonenko and Renaut's interpretation in my own 
reading of the text. lt is to this reading that I now turn. 
The 1794-5 Foundations as a Theory of Intentionality 
The interpretation of the 1794-5 Foundations I wish to advance turns on the claim that 
Fichte is attempting to provide an account of the conditions of the possibility of 
intentionality. 37 By 'intentionality' I mean the directedness which is a characteristic 
feature of consciousness; the fact that all consciousness 'is consciousness of 
something'. Following the 'phenomenological' conception of intentionality38, the 
'something' intended here, or 'intentional object' (noema), refers to whatever is the 
correlate of an act of consciousness. This correlate may be an abstract entity such as 
a proposition (disregarding Quine's claim that propositions are entia non grata39), yet it 
may also be a concrete entity, an entity located in space and time. This 
'phenomenological' conception of the intentional object is therefore far broader than the 
standard 'analytic' conception of the something intended as a 'proposition'. 
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As an interpretative hypothesis, this might strike the reader as hopelessly 
anachronistic. After all, a concern with intentionality as a philosophical issue is 
commonly held to emerge with Brentano and Husserl. Furthermore, the objection might 
continue, Fichte does not employ the term or its cognates. In defense, it should be 
noted that whilst the term is not used by Fichte, he is clearly concerned with 
'directedness' as an essential characteristic of consciousness. Fichte's I and not-1 play 
a similar role to Husserl's noesis and noema, and the frequently mentioned 'unity of 
consciousness' clearly stands for the intentional relationship. Fichte's concern with the 
directedness of consciousness is evinced by the fact that the 'crisis points' of the 
theoretical part of the 1794-5 Wissenschafts/ehre all involve the threat of the unity of 
consciousness collapsing or of there being a 'hiatus' (ein Hiatus) between I and not-1.40 
The 1794-5 Foundations seeks to discover the fundamental conditions of the possibility 
of all human knowledge, from our most rarefied reflections to our most prosaic 
common sense beliefs. Underpinning all these types of cognition is intentionality- the 
directedness of consciousness to an object. Given the fundamental role of intentionality 
in all experience, Fichte considers it to be the proper object of the foundations of a 
Wissenschafts/ehre. 
The first part of the Foundations, in which the three fundamental principles are 
introduced and developed, may be seen as a reflection upon the conditions of the 
possibility of intentionality. For Fichte, as for Husserl, intentionality involves three 
elements: a subject, an object and the relationship between them. In order for 
'consciousness to be consciousness of something' there must necessarily be a subject 
of experience - an 'I'. There must also, Fichte claims, be an intentional object towards 
which this I is directed - a 'not-1'. Now, if either of these conditions is asserted 
'absolutely' - which really amounts to saying that it is asserted exclusively - the 
possibility of intentionality is foreclosed. Thus, it is a condition of the possibility of 
intentionality that subject and object are both posited. I and not-1 are therefore both 
posited in opposition to each other. Now, this opposition is not sufficient for 
intentionality. For there must be a relationship between I and not-1. The possibility of 
this relationship is secured by the notion of limitation - I and not-1 relate to each other 
by partially negating or 'limiting' each other. Fichte claims that there are two 
fundamental ways in which this limitation may take place, corresponding to two 
fundamental types of intentionality. The I may posit the 'not-/ as limited by the /', in 
which case we are dealing with 'practical' intentionality - an intentionality which seeks 
to transform and shape the world. This practical intentionality is considered in the third, 
practical, part of the 1794-5 Foundations. Alternatively, the I may posit 'itself as limited 
by the not-/', in which case we are dealing with 'theoretical' intentionality - an 
intentionality which provides cognitive access to a publicly accessible, mind-
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independent world. 41 Fichte refers to this theoretical intentionality as 'representation' 
( Vorstel/ung) and tells us that the 'explanation of representation' is 'speculative [i.e. 
'theoretical'] philosophy in its entirety'. 42 'Representation' is involved in our reflective 
'theoretical knowledge' about ourselves and our world. Yet it is also involved in our 
commonsense, everyday view of the world. This commonsense, pre-philosophical view 
of the world, or 'doxa', is presupposed by, and serves as the starting point for, our 
theorizing about the world. Fichte's philosophical reflection on the conditions of the 
possibility of representation can therefore be seen as providing what we described (in 
Chapter 4) as a 'justification of doxa'. 
Representation, or theoretical intentionality, is examined in the second part of 
the 1794-5 Foundations - the Foundation of Theoretical Knowledge. This part is the 
part that is most relevant to the problem of intersubjectivity. For insofar as other 
subjects of experience are first of all objects of experience, the solution to the problem 
of how we come to recognize rational beings outside of us presupposes an answer to 
the question of how we come to know anything outside of us. As Philonenko notes: 
if no object exists outside of me, then it will not be possible to think that other subjects 
exist outside of me. Others are first of all not-1. One therefore cannot avoid the problem of 
the object: this problem must be resolved in a way that will allow the subsequent 
assertion of the existence of others. 43 
The following discussion will therefore focus on the Foundation of Theoretical 
Knowledge. 
The Foundation of Theoretical Knowledge presents a detailed exploration of 
what we might call the 'principle of representation' - 'the I posits itself as determined 
by the not-1'. Fichte claims that two contradictory readings of this proposition are 
possible. The first interpretation emphasizes the apodosis of the proposition and thus 
interprets the proposition as stating that the I must be determined. This interpretation is 
presented in the proposition -'the (active) not-/ determines the I (which to this extent 
is passive)'.44 Insofar as this interpretation emphasises the passivity of the I and the 
activity of the not-1, it may be described as a 'realist' interpretation. The second 
interpretation emphasizes the protasis of the proposition and thus interprets the 
proposition as stating that the I determines itself. This interpretation is presented in the 
proposition- 'The I determines itself (through an absolute activity)'.45 Insofar as this 
interpretation emphasizes the activity of the I, it may be described as an 'idealist' 
interpretation. 
These two competing interpretations provide the basis for the development of 
the Foundation of Theoretical Knowledge. Fichte will repeatedly attempt to reconcile 
the conflict between the idealist and realist conceptions of the theoretical relationship 
between the I and not-1. Each attempt at synthesis will generate a new category and 
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new, more sophisticated versions of idealism and realism. Beginning with the crudest, 
most dogmatic forms of realism and idealism, Fichte gradually progresses towards a 
critical 'real-idealism or ideal-realism'. 46 In what follows, I shall not follow Fichte's 
convoluted dialectic (which is considerably more complex than its Hegelian successor 
insofar as it involves five 'moments'), but shall simply consider Fichte's critical account 
of the realist and idealist positions and his attempt to provide an alternative position. 
Against Realism 
Fichte characterizes realism as being committed to the existence of a mind-
independent not-1 - a thing in itself- which actively determines the I. For the realist, 
the representation of a mind-independent world results from the impress of the not-1 
upon a purely receptive I. Fichte associates realism with the category of 'efficacy' 
(Wirksamkeit) or 'causality' (Kausa/itat). 47 This category is defined as follows: 
The not-/ only has reality for the I insofar as the I is affected. 48 
This may seem a very unsatisfactory definition of causality, insofar as it is supposed to 
be related to realism. Indeed, it seems to beg the question in favour of idealism. 
Nevertheless, Fichte's point is that an affection or a passivity in the I is the ratio 
cognoscendi of the cause. In other words, the existence of the cause is inferred on the 
basis of the experienced affection. Or, to use Fichte's terminology, a passivity or 
affection in the I is the 'ideal ground' (ldea/-Grund) of an activity of the not-1.49 This is 
by no means inconsistent with the more obviously realist claim that the 'independent 
activity' of a mind-independent not-1 is the ratio essendi of the effect. 50 lt is by virtue of 
the influence of a mind-independent not-1 that a passivity or affection occurs in the I. As 
Fichte puts it, 'an activity of the not-1 that is independent of the relation and 
presupposed by the possibility of the latter is the real ground [Reai-Grund] of the 
passivity'. 51 Regardless of the peculiarity of Fichte's definition of causality, he clearly 
thinks that the realist is committed to the notion that representation is explained by the 
causal influence of a mind-independent object upon the self. And the realist thinks that 
no appeal need be made to the activity of a self-conscious I. For the realist, the Kantian 
'I think' is redundant. 
Fichte's response to the realist consists in an 'immanent' or 'internal' critique of 
the realist position, i.e., a critique which demonstrates that the realist cannot satisfy his 
own explanatory criteria. What Fichte shows is that the realist cannot 'explain what he 
wants to explain' on realist grounds alone. In order to give a satisfactory explanation of 
representation, the realist is forced to acknowledge the central assumption of the very 
system he rejects. He is forced, in other words, to acknowledge the necessity of a self-
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conscious subject of experience in explaining our representation of an apparently 
mind-independent world. How does Fichte show this? 
Fichte begins with the realist assumption that the only explanation of 
representation is the causal influence of an active not-1 upon a passive subject of 
experience. The subject of experience is a mere tabula rasa upon which the not-1 
leaves an imprint. Fichte then asks us to imagine the relation between the not-1 and the 
I at two different times- A and B. At moment A the not-1 does not act upon the I. The I 
contains only reality; there is no negation in it. Consequently, in accordance with the 
principle of causality, no reality is ascribed to the not-1. At moment B the not-1 acts 
upon the I with three degrees of activity. Three degrees of reality are abolished in the I 
and three degrees of negation are posited in their place. According to the realist this 
state of affairs should be sufficient for the subject to experience the not-1. Nevertheless, 
Fichte claims that the realist is quite mistaken: 
However, the I is purely passive here. The degrees of negation are doubtless really 
posited -but for an intelligent being external to the I, who would observe and judge the 
I and not-1 in this action according to the rule of reciprocal determination - not at all for 
the I itself. In order for this to occur, the I would have to be able to compare its state at 
moment A with its state at moment B and distinguish the different quanta of its activity: 
and how this is possible has not yet been shown. In the present case the I would 
undoubtedly be limited, but it would not be conscious of its limitation. Or, to express this 
in the terms of our proposition, the I would indeed be determined; but it would not posit 
itself as determined. Only a being external to it could posit it as determined. 52 
Fichte's point here can be explained as follows. According to the realist, the causal 
influence of a mind-independent not-1 or thing in itself upon a passive I is sufficient to 
explain the representation of an apparently mind-independent object. However, Fichte 
claims that the realist's account is deeply flawed. For if the I is really passive it may 
indeed be determined by the not-1, the not-1 may indeed exert an influence upon it, but 
it will not be aware of this influence as an influence. lt could only be aware of being 
determined or influenced by something external, if it could self-consciously compare its 
state prior to the influence (its state at moment A) with its state after the influence (its 
state at moment B). Yet such a self-conscious act of comparison would imply an 
activity on the part of the I. lt would require that an active self-relation or, an 'I think', 
could accompany all the l's representations. Yet this is precisely what the realist 
rejects. 
Fichte is aware that the realist could respond that he observes the fact that the 
causal impact of the not-1 creates a representation in the I. Nevertheless, Fichte would 
ask the realist, qua 'external observer', to explain how he acquired this representation. 
The realist, if consistent, would presumably reply that he experienced it by virtue of the 
causal impact of a not-1 (the observed state of affairs) upon his totally passive cognitive 
faculties. However, Fichte would simply repeat his argument tha,tif the I does not 
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possess the capacity to compare its mental states prior to and after the causal impact, 
it cannot be aware of itself as affected. Unless the realist can refute Fichte's argument, 
he is faced with the following dilemma: he can either accept Fichte's claim that self-
consciousness is a necessary condition of representation or call upon another observer 
to testify that his representation was caused by a mind-independent not-1. If he 
chooses the former, he is forced to relinquish his realism. If he chooses the latter, 
infinite regress looms. Luc Ferry summarizes as follows: 
Here, we clearly enter into a process of infinite regress: if it is true that the activity of the 
not-1 can only be posited through a consciousness the I has of its affection, it is 
necessary that this affection is perceived by the affected I itself: because if it is perceived 
by an external observer, the same question is immediately raised for him: how was he 
able to perceive himself as affected by what he observed?53 
Now this active self-relation, this capacity to be aware of oneself as the identical 
subject of diverse mental states, is all that Fichte means by 'intellectual intuition' 
(intellektuelle Anschauung). By intellectual intuition Fichte does not mean, as Schelling 
and Hegel maintain, Kant's hypothetical Intuitive Intellect which produces reality in its 
entirety. What Fichte means by intellectual intuition is a direct non-conceptual 
awareness of oneself as an active or spontaneous subject of experience. Such an 
awareness is close to Kant's transcendental unity of apperception -the 'I think' which 
must be able to 'accompany all my representations'. In order to get a clear idea of what 
Fichte means by intellectual intuition, a brief discussion of its Kantian counterpart will 
be helpful. 
Following Pippin54 , we can distinguish between three interpretations of Kant's 
claim that 'it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations' 55 : 
the 'Cartesian Interpretation', the 'Necessity of a Possibility Interpretation' and the 
'Implicit Reflexivity Interpretation'. The 'Cartesian Interpretation' holds that Kant is 
claiming that all consciousness actually is self-consciousness, that to be conscious is 
to be explicitly aware of one's mental states. On this reading, all my representations 
are, as a matter of fact, accompanied by an explicit self-consciousness- an explicit 'I 
think'. The 'Necessity of a Possibility Interpretation' is advanced by Henry Allison, 
amongst others. 56 Allison holds that Kant is claiming that a necessary condition of 
experience is the possibility of my being explicitly aware of my ownership of my 
representations. lt is therefore not necessary that I am actually self-consciously aware 
that my representations are mine, it is simply necessary that I can be so aware. The 
third interpretation, the 'Implicit Reflexivity Interpretation', is advocated by Pippin 
himself. This interpretation holds that Kant is maintaining that the 'I think' accompanies 
all my representations. lt differs from the 'Cartesian Interpretation', however, in 
claiming that this self-awareness is not explicit. lt is rather an implicit reflexivity, an 
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implicit awareness that I am doing such and such. Pippin claims that such an implicit 
reflexivity is a condition of all conscious intending, because without it I would not be 
intending anything at all. In order to intend something in a certain way, I must implicitly 
construe myself to be intending it in a certain way. As Pippin puts it: 
My judging that-P is not a judging of mine, unless I [implicitly] take myself to be judging, 
and not, say, entertaining the possibility that-Ps7 
In perceiving something, e.g. a tree, I am implicitly aware that I am perceiving, not 
imagining a tree; and I am also implicitly aware that my intentional act (perceiving) can 
be veridical or non-veridical. Pippin also provides the example of rule-following: 
I can "consciously follow" a rule without "always consciously applying" a rule. This must 
be possible if any rule following that is not an explicit constant application is to be 
distinguished, as it should, from behavior that ought to be explained by reference to 
natural lawss8 
Pippin's notion of implicit reflexivity may be further clarified with the example (adapted 
from Sartre59) of writing a letter. Writing a letter is not accompanied by second-order 
judgements such as 'I am writing a letter, now I am using a metaphor, now I am writing 
a full stop'. But it does seem that I must, at some level, be aware that I am following the 
rules and conventions of letter writing. If not, I would not be engaged in the practice of 
letter writing at all, my action would - as Kant puts it- be 'nothing for me.' Now, this 
awareness is immediate, non-conceptual and non-inferential60 and is, most importantly, 
implicit. Yet it can provide the basis for an explicit awareness. If a friend entered the 
room and asked: 'What are you doing?' I would be immediately able to say 'I am writing 
a letter', and if he asked exactly what I am writing, I could say 'a polite letter of 
acceptance'. In this way my implicit awareness or self-construal of what I am doing is 
made explicit. But, and this is important, my reply to my friend is also accompanied by 
an implicit awareness of what I am doing, i.e., an awareness that I am providing an 
explanation (as opposed to telling a joke). And this implicit awareness of what I am 
doing, as well as the implicit rules I am following, can in turn be made explicit. If a third 
person walks into the room and asks me what I am doing I can say 'explaining myself 
to Jack.' 
lt seems that my implicitly taking a stand on what I am doing, or my implicit self-
construal, cannot be explained in realist terms, as caused by the objects of cognition. lt 
would be hard, for example, to explain it in terms of the way in which objects affect us. 
They would simply cause us to act in a certain way, rather than causing us to be 
implicitly aware that we are acting in a certain way. This activity therefore cannot be 
explained by the causal efficacy of objects on a passive agent. Insofar as it is the 
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condition of the possibility of my having any representations, it cannot be caused by 
these representations. Kant therefore describes it as 'spontaneous'. 
How, then, does all this relate to Fichte's conception of intellectual intuition? 
The answer to this question is that Fichte's talk of intellectual intuition should be read 
as an extension of the implicit reflexivity thesis, an extension which places 
considerable emphasis on the spontaneous, uncaused nature of this reflexivity. By 
describing this spontaneous implicit reflexivity as 'intellectual intuition', Fichte is 
highlighting two of its essential characteristics: firstly, that it is intuitive, by which Fichte 
means that it is immediate, non-conceptual and non-inferential and, secondly, that it is 
an awareness of an intellectual activity rather than of a sensible object. This 
understanding of Fichte's conception of intellectual intuition is supported by the second 
Introduction of 1797. There, Fichte says that intellectual intuition is immediate and non-
conceptual (in contrast with explicit second-order judgements), and is involved in all 
conscious intending: 
To be sure, anyone can be shown, within his own acknowledged experience, that this 
intellectual intuition is present in every moment of his consciousness. I cannot take a 
single step, I cannot move my hand or foot, without the intellectual intuition of my self-
consciousness in these actions. lt is only through such an intuition that I know that I do 
this. Only in this way am I able to distinguish my own acting (and, within this acting, my 
own self) from the encountered object of this acting. Every person who ascribes an 
activity to himself appeals to this intuition. 51 
In the 1794 essay Concerning the Concept ofthe Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte makes a 
similar claim about the first principle with which the Wissenschaftslehre begins - a 
principle which expresses the absolute, spontaneous self-positing activity of the I: 
lt provides the foundation for all certainty; that is, everything that is certain is so because 
it is certain, and if it is not certain, then nothing is. lt provides the foundation for all 
knowledge; that is, if one has any knowledge at all then one knows what this principle 
asserts. One knows it immediately as soon as one knows anything at all. lt accompanies 
all knowledge. lt is contained within all knowledge. lt is presupposed by all knowledge. 62 
Fichte's notion of intellectual intuition is therefore relatively 'modest' and does not refer 
to the Promethean activity of an 'Absolute Subject'. Indeed, as Neuhouser has pointed 
out63 , it is closer to Sartre's conception of a 'non-thetic' self-consciousness which is 
presupposed by, and serves as the condition of the possibility for, explicit 'thetic' self-
consciousness. 64 
Fichte's immanent critique of realism therefore establishes the necessity of self-
consciousness, qua implicit reflexivity, in all representation. If the causal affection of a 
thing in itself is to be cognitively relevant to the affected subject, she must implicitly 
construe herself as being affected. Otherwise, the affection would be 'nothing' for her. 
With this point in mind, let us now turn to Fichte's critique of idealism. 
104 
Against Idealism 
The fact that Fichte provides a critique of idealism may strike the reader as odd. For as 
we saw in our discussion of the concept of a Wissenschaftslehre (chapter 4), Fichte 
defends idealism in opposition to dogmatism. Why, then, does Fichte attack idealism in 
the 1794-5 Foundations? The answer to this question is that Fichte is attacking 
idealism insofar as it is a form of transcendental realism or dogmatism, i.e., a sort of 
idealism which conceives of the subject as a transcendent entity which exists beyond 
the bounds of possible experience. Such an idealism regards the I as a substance and 
experience as an accident of this substance. The I, for this idealism, is all there is and 
reality is merely a manifestation of the l's activity. This idealism is, in other words, the 
very 'subjective idealism' of which Fichte has so often been accused. As we will see, 
Fichte rejects this idealism in favour of two alternatives. In the theoretical part of the 
1794-5 Foundations, he rejects it in favour of a modest critical idealism or 'real-idealism 
or ideal-realism'. In the practical part of the 1794-5 Foundations, he rejects it in favour 
of a practical idealism which presents the absolute I as the focus imaginarius of action. 
it is this practical 'idealism' which Fichte opposes to dogmatism in the 1797 
Introductions. 
Fichte characterizes idealism as being committed to the existence of a 
transcendent I which actively produces experience in its entirety. The idealist accepts 
that representation involves a 'feeling of necessity', a feeling of being constrained by 
the way things are. The idealist therefore accepts that representation involves a certain 
'passivity' in the I. Yet she flatly refuses to explain this passivity as the result of the 
causal influence of a mind-independent not-1. Instead, she seeks to explain this 
passivity as the result of the l's activity: passivity arises because the I freely limits or 
cancels its own activity. Here passivity is not, as it is for the realist, qualitatively 
opposed to the l's activity. Passivity is simply quantitatively opposed to the l's activity 
-it is, Fichte tells us, a 'lesser quantum' of the l's activity. The I actively produces this 
lesser quantum by limiting its own activity.65 Fichte associates idealism with the 
category of substantiality because in this category 'passivity is determined by activity'. 66 
The idealist explains representation by claiming that the active I is substance and 
representation is its accident. 67 
Fichte's characterization of the idealist position presupposes familiarity with a 
solution to a problem which plagued post-Kantian idealism - the problem of the thing 
in itself. 68 For Fichte's discussion makes tacit reference to Solomon Maimon's rejection 
of the thing in itself. 69 Maimon had sought to overcome Kant's problematic dualism of 
sensibility and understanding with the notion of an infinite spontaneous intellect. 70 This 
intellect, Maimon claimed, - although he was not always consistent on this poinf1 -
constituted experience in its entirety. Having postulated this infinite intellect, Maimon 
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had to deal with the problem that the passivity of experience - the fact that we are 
constrained to represent things in a certain way - seems to point to the influence of a 
mind-independent thing in itself. Maimon sought to resolve this problem by drawing 
upon Leibniz's Law (or Principle) of Continuity (Lex Continuitatis, principe de 
continuite).72 This law, which is a corollary of the Principle of Perfection, states that 
there are no discontinuities or 'leaps' in the order of things. 73 By this Leibniz means that 
there are no discrete states but merely an infinite series of states, each of which differs 
infinitesimally from its neighbour. Whilst applications of this law are to be found 
throughout Leibniz's philosophy, two are particularly relevant to Maimon's project. The 
first is Leibniz's psychological doctrine of petites perceptions, which seeks to secure 
the continuity of mental life by postulating infinitesimally small perceptions below the 
threshold of consciousness. 74 lt is on the basis of this doctrine that Leibniz can claim 
that joy is an infinitesimally small amount of sorrow.75 The second application is to be 
found in Leibniz's dynamics in which he claims that rest is an infinitesimally small 
amount of motion. 76 
Leibniz's Law of Continuity provided Maimon with the means to eliminate the 
thing in itself. For in order to do this he had to explain the passivity experienced in 
representation without recourse to a mind-independent thing in itself. 77 Indeed, given 
Maimon's commitment to an infinite understanding, he had to explain this passivity as a 
product of this very understanding. Leibniz's Law of Continuity allowed him to do just 
this. Maimon first reduced the notion of a thing in itself or noumenon to the passivity 
experienced in representation. Then, drawing upon the terminology of infinitesimal 
calculus, he claimed that passivity is a 'differential' - an infinitely small quantity of the 
infinite activity of the understanding. 78 Maimon claimed that, insofar as it is meaningful 
to talk of things in themselves or noumena, they are simply 'differentials' of sensible 
objects - the infinitely small quanta of activity from which objects (the 'integrals') are 
composed: 
These differentials of objects are what we call noumena, but the objects themselves 
which result from them are phenomena [ ... ]These noumena are ideas of reason which 
serve as principles of the explanation of the genesis of objects according to certain rules 
of the understandingl9 
Noumena are, to borrow Leibniz's simile, like the noises of individual waves which, 
although barely audible severally, together contribute to the 'roaring noise of the 
sea'. 80 
Maimon's elimination of the thing in itself underlies Fichte's model of 
idealism. Fichte's critique of idealism will therefore undermine Maimon's Leibnizian 
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solution to the problem of the thing in itself. The essentials of Fichte's critique of 
idealism are provided in the following paragraph: 
Or posit, as in the second case, according to the simple concept of substantiality, that the 
I should have the faculty of arbitrarily and absolutely positing in itself a lesser quantum of 
reality, independently of any action of the not-1; this presupposition is that of transcendent 
idealism and, in particular, the idealism of the pre-established harmony, which is an 
idealism of this type. Let us abstract from the fact that such a presupposition already 
contradicts the absolute first principle [i.e., the principle established in §1]. Also grant the 
I the power of comparing this lesser quantity with the absolute totality and of measuring 
the lesser quantity in relation to the absolute totality. Posit, in accordance with this 
presupposition, the I at moment A with a reduced activity of two degrees and at moment 
B with a reduced activity of three degrees. We can understand very well how the I can 
judge itself to be limited at each of the two moments and as more limited at moment B 
than at moment A; but we do not at all see how it could relate this limitation to something 
in the not-1 as its cause. The I should instead consider itself as the cause of this 
limitation. Or, to express this in the very terms of our proposition: the I undoubtedly really 
posits itself as determined, but not as determined by the not-/ (The dogmatic idealist 
doubtless denies that one has the right to carry out this relating to a not-1 and to this 
extent he is consistent: however, he cannot deny that this relating is a fact, and it has not 
yet occurred to anyone to do so. Consequently, he must at the very least explain this fact 
which he acknowledges, irrespective of its well-foundedness. Nevertheless, he cannot 
provide this explanation, given his presupposition, and his philosophy is therefore 
incomplete. Moreover, if he accepts the existence of things outside us, as the system of 
pre-established harmony does, amongst some Leibniziens, he is even more 
inconsistent.)81 
Fichte's criticism can be explained as follows. The starting point for explanations of 
representation is the 'phenomenology' (in the sense of the term prevalent within 
'analytic' philosophy) or the 'what it is like' of representation. This phenomenology has 
two aspects. Firstly, it involves a feeling of passivity, a feeling of constraint. Secondly, it 
involves the relating of this feeling to something 'outside' of us. In other words, we don't 
simply experience passivity; we also relate this passivity to something 'independent' of 
us, something 'not-1'. Now, the idealist rejects the realist's appeal to a mind-
independent reality and seeks to explain representation by appealing to the I alone. 
She therefore explains the feeling of passivity as a product of the I self-consciously 
limiting its activity and comparing the activity after the limitation (the activity at moment 
B) with the activity prior to the limitation (the activity at moment A). /fthis explanation is 
successful, the idealist has a clear advantage over the realist who cannot explain the 
fact that we experience this passivity. Yet whilst the idealist can apparently explain our 
experience of passivity she cannot, Fichte insists, explain the fact that we relate this 
passivity to something 'not-1'. The idealist needs to provide an account of why we 
ascribe this passivity to something apparently mind-independent and, absenting such 
an account, her explanation is inadequate. Fichte points out that the idealist cannot 
provide such an account in idealist terms - given her 'own presuppositions'. She is 
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therefore faced with the following dilemma: she must either admit defeat or appeal to 
the realist's mind-independent thing in itself as the cause of the limitation. 
Fichte's criticism does not stop there, however. For he thinks that the idealist 
cannot even provide a satisfactory explanation of the passivity experienced in 
representation. This is because the hypothesized self-limitation of the I seems, as 
Fichte puts it, 'arbitrary' (willkurlich) and inexplicable. For why, indeed, would an 
absolute, infinite I 'choose' to diminish its activity? And why should it limit itself in such 
a way as to give rise to this world of phenomena?82 As Fichte puts it, 'In this system 
one cannot give any ground for the limitation of reality in the I (i.e., of the affection 
whereby a representation arises). Every inquiry into this topic is made radically 
impossible'. Idealism is therefore 'incomplete' 'because it does not explain everything 
which ought to be explained'. 83 
Idealism cannot satisfactorily explain, in idealistic terms, why the l's self-
limitation is related to something outside the I. lt presupposes this relating to something 
external as a fact. But, insofar as the only ground for this relation could be the causal 
impact of a mind-independent not-1, the idealist presupposes, and tacitly accepts, the 
truth of realism. Realism is incomplete because it cannot explain, in realist terms, the 
l's capacity to accompany all its representations and to compare them. Yet, if the I is to 
grasp its activity as limited by the causal impact of a not-1, it must possess this 
capacity. The realist therefore presupposes, and tacitly accepts, the truth of idealism. 
Idealism and realism presuppose one another and are, Fichte claims, locked in a circle. 
There is therefore a complementarity between these two ostensibly opposed modes of 
explanation. 
Both idealism and realism contain a kernel of truth, but present it one-sidedly as 
the whole truth. Idealism starts with what Fichte calls the 'infinitude' ( Unendlichkeit) of 
the I, the fact that the I is the spontaneous, active subject of experience. Realism starts 
with what Fichte calls the 'finitude' (Endlichkeit) of the I, the fact that the I is limited and 
constrained by something 'external' to it. The conflict between realist and idealist 
explanations of representation can therefore be glossed as a conflict between accounts 
of the relationship between the infinitude and finitude of the 1. 84 lt can also, following 
our interpretation, be glossed as a conflict between competing accounts of 
intentionality. Realism, as Fichte understands it, regards noesis and noema as discrete 
independently existing entities that are linked by a causal relation. For the realist, the 
noesis is dependent upon, and caused by, the noema. For idealism, the noema is 
entirely constituted by the noetic acts of consciousness. All there is, for the idealist, is 
consciousness and its 'accomplishments' (Leistungen). 
Fichte claims that this conflict of complementary positions is irreconcilable and 
interminable. Realism and idealism are locked in a futile struggle in which each 
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fervently rejects the other whilst surreptitiously appealing to the other's principle of 
explanation. Nevertheless, there are two possible ways of handling this conflict. 
The first way tries to resolve the conflict in favour of idealism and therefore 
asserts the primacy of the I. But it only asserts the primacy of the I as a regulative idea 
- as an unattainable goal towards which the finite I must endlessly strive. This 
idealism is therefore a 'practical idealism' which 'does not determine what is, but what 
ought to be'. And what ought to be the case is that the I 'contain in itself the foundation 
of the existence of the not-1 which diminishes the activity of the intellective 1'. As this 
'infinite idea' cannot be realized, or even fully grasped, the 'knot of contradiction is not 
so much untied as projected into infinity'. 85 This practical idealism is closely related to 
Fichte's infamous doctrine of 'striving' (Streben), mentioned in our discussion of the 
Lectures, which claims that the finite, empirical subject of experience must endlessly 
strive to become the absolute, pure I. This doctrine - and hence the 'solution' to the 
conflict between realism and idealism- is fully articulated in the third, 'practical' part of 
the 1794-5 Foundations (which treats the proposition 'The I posits the not-1 as limited 
by the 1'). Insofar as our concern is with the theoretical part, we shall leave this solution 
to one side. 
The second way to resolve the conflict between realism and idealism is to 
attempt to unite them in a third position which Fichte refers to as 'a real-idealism or an 
ideal-realism' or, more simply, 'critical idealism'. 86 Given the significance of this 
'solution' for Fichte's account of intersubjectivity, a brief discussion of it is necessary. 
Real-Idealism or Ideal-Realism 
Fichte formulates his solution in response to the law of the 'mediacy of positing' 
(Mittelbarkeit des Setzens), the law that the I can only posit itself in relation to what is 
posited in opposition to an I- a not-1, and that the I can only posit a not-1 in relation to 
an I. Fichte expresses this law with the chiasmus 'no subject, no object; no object, no 
subject'. 87 Given this law, if the I is to posit itself (which, according to §1 of the 1794-5 
Foundations, it must), it must posit itself as limited or finite, as constrained by 
something not-1 (which must be posited in relation to an 1). The I therefore posits itself 
as finite, as constrained. But what is the ground of this constraint? Fichte rejects the 
notion, characteristic of an advanced form of realism ('quantitative realism'), that this 
limitation is to be explained by a real limitation that is present in the I 'without any 
contribution on the part of the I as such'. 88 Such a realism, Fichte claims, fails to 
explain how this real limitation is ideal, is for the 1. 89 Fichte also rejects the notion, 
characteristic of an advanced form of idealism ('quantitative idealism'), that this 
constraint is a law of the mind. For this advanced idealism suffers from the same flaw 
as the primitive form of idealism discussed earlier, namely, it fails to explain why an 
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infinite I would choose to limit itself. Indeed why, Fichte asks, would the I posit 
something objective?9° Fichte's answer to this question, which is crucial to his real-
idealism or ideal-realism, is provided as follows: 
The objective to be excluded has no need at all to be present; all that is required-if I 
may so put it-is the presence of a check [Ansto/3] on the I. That is, for some reason that 
lies merely outside the l's activity, the subjective must be extensible no further. Such an 
impossibility of further extension would then delimit-the mere interplay we have 
described, or the mere incursion; it would not set bounds to the activity of the I; but would 
give it the task [Aufgabe] of setting bounds to itself. But all delimitation occurs through an 
opposite; hence the I, simply to do justice to this task, would have to oppose something 
objective to the subjective that calls for limitation, and then synthetically unite them both, 
as has just been shown; and thus the entire representation could then be derivedB1 
As this passage indicates, the notion of a 'check' or Ansto!S to the l's activity is at the 
heart of Fichte's solution to the conflict between realism and idealism. lt is therefore 
crucial to understand what the term AnstofS means. 
As Breazeale has pointed out92, the term Ansto!S had a variety of meanings in 
late 18th century German. lt was an ambiguous term. In one of its senses, Ansto!S 
designated an 'obstacle' or 'hindrance' (Hindernis or Hemmung). This sense of 
limitation is captured by the standard English translation of Ansto!S as 'check'. But this 
translation does not capture the full sense of the term. For Ansto!S also designated an 
'impulse', 'impetus' or 'stimulus' (Anla!S, /mpu/s, Antrieb, or Anregung). lt was in this 
latter sense that Ansto!S was used in the rational mechanics of the period to designate 
the original impulse that set a physical system in motion. 93 Now Fichte was 
undoubtedly familiar with all these senses of the term, and intended it to suggest both 
limitation and stimulation. lt would therefore be wise to drop the English translation and 
use the German term instead. 
The Ansto!S serves to define the 'realistic' aspect of Fichte's real-idealism or 
ideal-realism. lt accounts for the l's self-limitation, its positing of itself as opposed to an 
objective realm, a not-1. The AnstofS is a shock, a hindrance to the l's activity. lt is an 
unintelligible check, which is neither explained by, nor reducible to, the l's activity. lt 
signifies an 'impossibility of further extension' of the l's activity. However, this is not to 
say that the I passively receives the Anstors as a limit. Fichte claims that the Ansto!S 
does not limit the I so much as give 'it the task [Aufgabe] of limiting itself'. The Ansto!S 
must be posited by the I as a limit, which is to say that the I must limit its own infinite 
activity upon encountering the AnstofS. Upon encountering this unintelligible shock, the 
I is led to limit its activity by positing an objective realm, a not-1, and by positing itself as 
engaged in this realm. In this way the I is led to represent an external world. To put it 
metaphorically, the I attempts to 'explain' this unintelligible shock to its activity by 
positing itself as limited by an objective sphere. 
110 
This is the Anstof!, as presented in the 1794-5 Foundations. lt designates a 
contingent and inexplicable shock to the l's activity, and to that extent may be 
described as 'realistic'. Fichte's Critical idealism consists in combining this realistic 
element of total alterity with the idealist emphasis on the role of subjectivity in 
experience. Fichte claims that the Anstof!, could not be a check or hindrance to the I, 
unless the I strove to extend its spontaneous activity to infinity. 94 lt must be the case, 
Fichte argues, that 'the activity concerned, in and by itself, and left to its own devices, 
reaches out into the unbounded, the indeterminate and indeterminable, that is, into the 
infinite'. As Fichte points out, if this were not the case, it would be impossible to tell 
whether limits to the l's activity were provoked by an Anstof!, or were merely its own 
natural limits. 95 lt is in this sense, and in this sense alone, that the Anstof!, is 
'conditional upon the activity of the 1'. 96 Yet if the Anstof!, is conditional upon the infinite 
activity of the I, it is also, Fichte claims, the condition of the l's infinite activity. This 
claim turns upon the notion that the concepts of infinitude ( Unendlichkeit) and finitude 
(Endlichkeit) are defined in terms of one another. Finitude, Fichte suggests, is only 
meaningful in relation to the notion of infinitude. Finitude or boundedness is, quite 
literally, the non-infinite. Conversely, the notion of infinitude or unboundedness is only 
meaningful if one can conceive of finitude or boundedness. Infinitude is, quite literally, 
the absence of bounds or the non-finite. Consequently, the infinitude of the I is 
conditional upon its limitation or finitude, which is conditional upon the presence of an 
Anstof3. But the presence of an Anstof!, is, as we have seen, conditional upon the l's 
infinite activity. The l's infinite activity and the Anstof!, therefore mutually condition one 
other- without the infinitude of the I there would be no Anstof3. Yet without the Anstof3 
there would be no infinitude (because the Anstof3 is the ground of the l's self-limitation). 
Now the I continually oscillates between the assertion of itself as infinite and, in 
response to an unintelligible Anstof!,, the assertion of itself as finite. This oscillation is 
performed by the 'productive imagination' (produktive Einbildungskraft) which 'hovers' 
or 'oscillates' (schwebt) between the l's infinitude and its finitude - between the 'ideal' 
and 'real' moments of consciousness. 97 
Fichte's real-idealism or ideal-realism embraces this interminable oscillation 
between the infinitude of the I and its finitude. lt accepts that representation involves an 
'ideal' moment in which the I asserts its 'spontaneity'. Yet it also accepts that 
representation involves a 'real' moment in which the I limits itself in response to an 
encounter with something radically other than itself, an unintelligible, foreign Anstof!, lt 
further accepts that the I, thanks to the power of the imagination, endlessly oscillates 
between these two moments. Realism and idealism both seek to halt the oscillation 
between these moments and to assert one of them as the foundation of representation. 
In so doing, they encounter insuperable difficulties. Real-idealism or ideal-realism, by 
111 
contrast, realizes that this oscillation itself is the condition of the possibility of 
representation or theoretical intentionalityB8 For without it, we would have 'no 
representations at all'. 99 
This then, is Fichte's 'solution' to the conflict between realism and idealism. lt 
introduces the notion of an Ansto/3 to the l's infinite activity which causes the I to limit 
itself by positing an objective realm, a not-1. And it also introduces the notion of the 
productive imagination as the power which endlessly oscillates between the l's infinite 
and finite activities. 
Now it must be admitted that the theoretical part of the 1794-5 Foundations tells 
us very little about the Ansto/3. lt tells us what its function is - its role in the genesis of 
representation - and that it is something that is unintelligible and foreign to 
consciousness. Yet it does not provide us with any concrete examples of what this 
'check' is like. The only help provided in the 1794-5 text is provided in the practical 
part, where the Ansto/3 is described as an original 'feeling' (Gefilhl) encountered by the 
I. Here, the I infinitely strives to overcome this feeling and to attain genuine autonomy. 
lt is within this context that Fichte provides concrete examples of what the content of 
the Ansto/3 might be. This content is characterized as 'sensible impressions', 'sweet 
[ ... ] bitter, red [ ... ] yellow, etc.' 100 A similar characterization is provided in the second 
Introduction of 1797. 101 These characterizations remain strictly within the bounds of 
theoretical philosophy - they are simply the qualitative aspects of experience which 
we would today refer to as 'qualia' or 'raw feels'. Nevertheless, Fichte does note that 
we experience other 'immediate feelings' of a more 'practical' nature, feelings of 
obligation and an awareness of the freedom of others. We are, Fichte claims, 
immediately aware of what we must do, and of what we must respect. Other rational 
beings are given to us in experience, and their freedom 'checks' our activity. lt is this 
insight that will provide the basis for Fichte's discussion of intersubjectivity in the 1796-
7 Foundations of Natural Right. However, before turning to a discussion of this work 
two further aspects of the 1794-5 Foundations merit consideration. 
The Foundations as Pragmatic History 
In chapter 4 we saw that Fichte intended the Wissenschaftslehre to provide a 
'pragmatic history' - an account of the genesis and development of humanity's 
capacity for autonomy. Such an account was to serve an educative function. lt was to 
instruct humanity how to become rational and autonomous. 
The notion of a pragmatic history reappears in the 1794-5 Foundations, Fichte 
telling us, towards the end of the theoretical part, that 'the Wissenschaftslehre is to be 
a pragmatic history of the human mind', and that the preceding discussion has merely 
facilitated access to this history. 102 This history is provided in the brief, yet crucial, 
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'Deduction of Representation' (Deduktion der Vorstel/ung) which completes the 
theoretical part of the 1794-5 Foundations. 103 Having derived the productive 
imagination and the Anstof3 from an exploration of the proposition 'The I posits itself as 
limited by the not-1', Fichte now proceeds to consider the way in which this account 
might be transmitted to the non-philosophical or ordinary consciousness. Fichte argues 
that the non-philosophical consciousness is, under the supervision of the philosopher, 
to traverse the series in reverse, proceeding from sensation to reason. Through 
repeated reflection upon its initial encounter with the Anstof3 it is to construct its world, 
and, having done so, grasp its own autonomy and spontaneity - realizing that its 
activity underlies its representation of an apparently mind-independent world. The 
transcendental philosopher does not direct this process, nor coerce the non-
philosophical consciousness into accepting the truths of transcendental idealism. She 
is merely a silent guide, pointing out the activity that occurs. 
Now this process is significant in several respects. lt is the means whereby the 
non-philosophical consciousness gains access to the standpoint of transcendental 
philosophy. For having attained reason, it can now begin to study the 1794-5 
Foundations, grasping the abstract foundational principles with which it begins and its 
complex discussion of theoretical knowledge. lt can therefore explore the foundations 
and limits of theoretical reason. Yet it can also - and this is the crucial point -
proceed to the practical part of the work, the exploration of the foundations of practical 
knowledge. lt can, in other words, grasp the necessity of acting in accordance with a 
self-given rational law - the necessity of acting in accordance with reason. The 
Deduction of Representation is therefore the means whereby the natural 
consciousness realizes its moral vocation. This is its truly 'pragmatic' aspect. 
But what of the relation between the non-philosophical consciousness and the 
transcendental philosopher who 'calmly follow[s] the course of events'?104 The role of 
the philosopher calls to mind works such as Dante's Divine Comedy (in which Virgil 
guides Dante through hell) and Condillac's Treatise on Sensations (in which the 
philosopher observes the development of the statue). 105 Yet most importantly it evokes 
Rousseau's Emile, the transcendental philosopher's unobtrusive supervision of the 
non-philosophical consciousness constituting a type of 'negative education'. The 
philosopher has initiated the process (by pointing out the Anstof3), and observes this 
process. Yet the non-philosophical consciousness is unaware of any education taking 
place. 
An interesting implication of this process is that the non-philosophical 
consciousness may, having reached the standpoint of transcendental philosophy, 
communicate this knowledge to another non-philosophical consciousness. In other 
words the tutee can become the tutor, training another tutee. And this new tutee can, in 
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turn, become tutor, training another tutee to take her place, who can in turn train 
another tutee, ad infinitum. The Deduction of Representation therefore suggests an 
infinite educative process. This, of course, implies that the tutee must become aware 
that she has been educated. She must, in other words, be able to recognize that 
another free being has educated her. Now, whilst I do not think that such a relationship 
is actually present in the Deduction of Representation, the conditions of the possibility 
of such a relation are established. For towards the end of the process the non-
philosophical consciousness comes to think the 'inner activity of the object>1°6 an 
activity that could be the free activity of another rational being. 107 
Against Jacobi 
The 1794-5 Foundations therefore provides the conditions of the possibility of 
recognizing other rational beings. Fichte himself indicates this by providing an 
alternative formulation of the law of the mediacy of positing (no subject, no object; no 
object, no subject) in 'more common language' (gemeinerer Sprache) - 'No Thou, no 
I; No I, no Thou' (Kein Du, kein /eh; kein /eh, kein Ou). 108 
Now this formulation is of considerable interest. For it seems to refer to Jacobi's 
claim that 'without the Thou, the I is impossible'. This suggests that Fichte's formulation 
can be interpreted as a response to Jacobi's claim that transcendental idealism is 
condemned to speculative egoism. So interpreted, Fichte is pointing to the fact that he 
has provided a transcendental justification of the common-sense view of the world (or 
doxa). This justification consists in the 'deduction' of a radical alterity (the Anstof3) as a 
condition of the possibility of subjectivity. Fichte can therefore agree, on transcendental 
idealist grounds, with Jacobi's claim that the Thou is a condition of the possibility of the 
I. Yet, as the chiasmatic construction of his formulation indicates, Fichte thinks that 
Jacobi's direct realism is inadequate; it must be supplemented with an idealist 
emphasis on the active role of the I in experience- 'no I, no Thou'. If this reading is 
correct, Fichte takes himself to have given a definitive response to Jacobi's objection. 
This concludes our discussion of the 1794-5 Foundations of the Entire 
Wissenschaftslehre. We have seen that the conception of idealism developed in this 
work is not, as the 'metaphysical' interpretation would have us believe, a 'subjective 
idealism' premised upon the claim that a Promethean 'absolute subject' produces 
reality in its entirety. The conception of idealism advocated is, rather, a thoroughly 
critical conception of idealism as 'real idealism or ideal realism', the realistic aspect of 
which is the doctrine of an unintelligible Anstof3 to the l's activity. The irreducible 
'alterity' or 'otherness' of this Anstof3 secures a space, so to speak, for the existence of 
another rational being and consequently lays the foundations for a theory of 
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intersubjectivity. This theory receives its fullest expression in the 1796-7 Foundations 
of Natural Right. The rest of this thesis is devoted to a discussion of this work. 
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THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL RIGHT 
The Foundations of Natural Right According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre 
was published in two parts, the first in March 1796 and the second in September 
1797. 1 lt presents a systematic theory of natural right which is path-breaking in several 
respects. Firstly, it is in this text that Fichte argues that right is an autonomous 
discipline which is, in principle, independent of moral philosophy. This argument had a 
profound impact on political and legal philosophy, anticipating Kelsen's notion of a 
'pure theory of right'. 2 Secondly, the Foundations of Natural Right marks a crucial step 
in the development of Fichte's philosophical system or 'Wissenschaftslehre'. For Fichte 
argues that it is the philosophy of right, not aesthetics, which 'mediates' between 
theoretical and practical reason. Thirdly, and finally, the Foundations of Natural Right 
presents the seminal claim that intersubjectivity is a condition of the possibility of self-
consciousness. This claim, which rests upon the notion of mutual recognition 
(Anerkennung), was the inspiration for Hegel's dialectic of mastery and servitude in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. The arguments in support of this claim represent Fichte's 
most extensive treatment of the notion of intersubjectivity - a treatment which builds 
upon and extends the treatment provided in the Lectures. 
In what follows I shall largely be concerned with Fichte's discussion of 
intersubjectivity. However, I shall also discuss Fichte's claims that the philosophy of 
right is an autonomous discipline, and that it 'mediates' between theoretical and 
practical reason. For, insofar as the domain of right might be described as the 
intersubjective domain par excellence3 , these claims emphasize the philosophical and 
political significance of intersubjectivity. 
The following account will focus mainly upon the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural 
Right. However, I shall occasionally draw upon Fichte's 1796 review of Kant's Toward 
Perpetual Peace, which complements and reinforces the arguments of the 1796-7 
text. 4 
The Title 
The full title of Fichte's systematic treatise on right is The Foundations of Natural Right 
According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre. The title tells us that the work is 
based upon the principles articulated in Fichte's 1794-5 Foundations. lt also tells us 
that the work will establish the 'foundations' (Grundlage) of the theory of natural right. 
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Now, the notion of a philosophy of 'right' (Recht) is largely unfamiliar to Anglophone 
readers. For the German Recht- like the French droit- is not easily translated into 
English. As Neuhouser points out, it covers all of what we mean by 'right', 'law' and 
'justice', and we possess no single discipline which would correspond to the German 
Rechtsphi/osophie (nor, for that matter, to the French Phi/osophie du Droit). 5 In 
Anglophone philosophy the domain covered by Rechtsphilosophie is shared between 
political and legal philosophy. In what follows I shall opt for the simplest and least 
confusing translation option, viz., translating the abstract noun Recht as 'right'. 
The Autonomy of Right 
In the Introduction to the Foundations of Natural Right Fichte opposes 'those who 
attempt to derive the theory of right from the moral law' by arguing that the 
'philosophical theory of right[ ... ] ought to be a separate science standing on its own'. 6 
Fichte has two arguments in support of this claim; one concerning the sui generis 
nature of concepts and principles of right, the other concerning the specific nature of 
the domain of right. Before discussing these arguments, however, a brief discussion of 
the political and philosophical motivations behind them will be helpful. For Fichte's 
arguments for the autonomy of right emerge from his attempts to defend the legitimacy 
of the French Revolution. 
Following Christian Wolff, the German tradition of philosophy of right sought to 
derive right from morality. 7 lt defined principles of right in terms of moral principles and 
defined inalienable rights as those which safeguarded one's capacity to do one's duty. 
Morality was therefore considered to be the foundation of right. Kant's Critical 
philosophy inspired a new wave of legal theorists who sought to develop a Critical 
philosophy of right. The extraordinary proliferation of Kantian philosophy of right was 
perhaps due to the fact that Kant's Critical philosophy explicitly drew upon juridical and 
legal terminology. 8 Indeed, the very notion of a transcendental deduction is explicated 
in terms of the legal distinction between quid juris and quid facti, and the term antinomy 
had a legal use, referring to the conflict between laws. 9 Now, whilst Kantian 
philosophers of right sought to develop a Critical philosophy of right, they were 
decidedly uncritical in their acceptance of the traditional conception of the relationship 
between morality and right. Thus Hufeland's Principles of Natural Right (Lehrsatze des 
Naturrechts) of 1790 and Schmid's Outline of Natural Right ( Grundri/3 des Naturrechts) 
of 1795 both defined right in terms of morality and moral obligation. 10 Right is defined 
as whatever is not prohibited by the moral law and the sphere of right, for these writers, 
is the sphere of what we are morally permitted to do. 11 Within the sphere of right, the 
distinction between alienable rights and inalienable rights is drawn in terms of morality 
-it is morally permissible for the former to be relinquished in civil society, whereas it is 
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morally impermissible for the latter to be relinquished. These inalienable rights are 
'directly' derived from the moral law insofar as they are the conditions of the possibility 
of my doing my moral duty. This is because inalienable rights prevent others from 
interfering with those freedoms which are necessary for me to do my duty. Thus, I have 
a right to the freedom to develop my rationality, because rationality is a necessary 
condition of acting morally. 
In the Contributions intended to Correct Public Opinion Concerning the French 
Revolution of 1793, Fichte endorses this conception of the relationship between right 
and morality. He defines what we have a right to do as what is morally permissible -
'Everything that the law does not forbid, we are permitted to do. Everything we are 
permitted to do, we have the right to do, since this permission is legitimate'12 ; and 
derives inalienable rights directly from the moral law -we have the inalienable right to 
be free because 'we have the right to do our duty' and doing our duty presupposes 
freedom. 13 Fichte also claims that moral consciousness is the supreme judge of all 
political relations and institutions: 
Man in the state can be considered under various relations. First of all he is considered 
as an isolated being, alone with his conscience and the supreme executor of the 
decisions of his conscience. This is the highest jurisdiction (lnstanz]: all other relations 
are subordinate to it. 14 
Fichte therefore follows Hufeland and Schmid in defining right in terms of moral duty. 
Nevertheless, he differs from them insofar as he endorses the French Revolution and 
seeks to defend it against its conservative critics. 
As noted previously, the Contributions is a point by point refutation of Rehberg's 
condemnation of the French Revolution. Rehberg's argument rested upon the notion 
that there is a profound split between theory and praxis - between the moral ideals of 
the revolution (theory) and the irremediably corrupt nature of humanity (praxis). Given 
the innate wickedness of humanity, the notion that the volonte de taus and the volonte 
generate could coincide was, Rehberg contended, an unrealizable utopian fantasy. The 
only form of government which could ensure the unity of theory and practice, was an 
authoritarian absolute state. Now, members of the Kantian school (such as Hufeland) 
were in full agreement with Rehberg's demand for an authoritarian state. 15 This was 
because, whilst they defined right as being that which morality demanded, they 
accepted Rehberg's claim that humanity, being innately wicked, couldn't satisfy this 
demand. Realizing that this claim rested upon a Hobbesean conception of the state of 
nature as a 'war of all against all', Fichte advocated an alternative conception of the 
state of nature as an essentially neutral state. 16 Fichte claims that he cannot convince 
himself of the 'original wickedness of man' (ursprung/iche 86sartigkeit der Menschen) 
to which his opponents continually appeal, and declares the 'old' idea of a state of 
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nature' as a 'war of all against all' (Krieg Aller gegen A/le) to be simply 'false'n 
According to Fichte, 'the only true thing' is: 
that an infinite manifold is given, which is in itself neither good nor evil, but only becomes 
one or the other by the free application of human beings, and that will, indeed, not 
become better until we have become better. 18 
By asserting the neutrality of the state of nature, Fichte is attempting to undermine 
Rehberg's justification for a coercive, authoritarian state. For Rehberg's justification of 
such a state rests upon the claim that human nature is innately wicked. By describing 
the state of nature as an undetermined, 'infinite manifold' Fichte is also attempting to 
secure a possibility denied by Rehberg- the possibility of communal life without state 
constraint. Fichte's neutral state of nature secures the possibility of a pre-political state 
of right founded upon the moral law. 19 In claiming that this 'infinite manifold' of the state 
of nature can be determined by the free, spontaneous activity of human beings, Fichte 
is also asserting his 'Copernican' conception of history (which we discussed earlier, in 
chapter 4) as something which is actively produced by free agents. Fichte therefore 
provides a response to both Rehberg and the Kantians who support Rehberg. For the 
Fichte of 1793, right is derived from morality and human agents are capable of acting 
morally. 
Nevertheless, the very position which allowed Fichte to respond to Rehberg 
created insuperable problems for his political philosophy, problems which forced him to 
modify his conception of the relationship between right and morality. The first problem, 
as Ferry and Renaut have both pointed out, arose from his conception of the state of 
nature as a neutral state which could be determined solely by human freedom. 20 This 
conception secured the possibility that humanity could develop morally, but- and this 
was the problem - not that it necessarily would. Given the complete indeterminacy of 
the state of nature, there was no reason why the 'infinite manifold' of the state of nature 
should develop in one way rather than another. As Renaut notes, 'as the good will only 
depends upon freedom, relations of right between men could just as well arise as 
remain forever absent from the sensible world'. 21 
Had Fichte provided reasons why 'positive' moral relations should emerge, he 
would have risked suggesting that the development was predetermined (e.g., by 
Providence or Nature), and would consequently have risked undermining his 
'Copernican' conception of history as the product of autonomous action. However, 
Fichte's failure to guarantee the realization of a state of right, raises the very problem 
which his solution seeks to overcome, viz., the problem of the unity of theory and 
practice. For it could be argued that, whilst Fichte guarantees the possibility of such a 
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state in theory, he provides no guarantee that it will be established in practice. 
Consequently, Fichte is laid open to the charge of na"lve utopianism. 22 
As Ferry has suggested, it is perhaps for such reasons that Fichte sought to 
abandon the position advanced in the Contributions. 23 Indeed, Fichte came to realize 
that another reply to Rehberg's argument was possible, a reply which rejected the 
assimilation of right to morality advocated by the Kantian school. This reply was 
articulated, somewhat ironically, by Kant himself (in the 1794 Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Aim and the 1795 Toward Perpetual Peace). Whereas 
Fichte's solution consisted in denying the premise of Rehberg's argument - that 
humanity was innately wicked, Kant's solution consisted in accepting Rehberg's 
premise whilst denying his conclusion- that an authoritarian state was necessary. For 
Kant, all that was needed was an 'enclosure' in which the 'crookedness' of human 
beings would gradually be transformed into rectitude. The establishment of such an 
enclosure would require rules guaranteeing the protection of the freedom of all. These 
rules would regulate intersubjective relations in such a way that agents driven by self-
seeking interest would each come to restrict their freedom. In Toward Perpetual Peace 
Kant claims that it is merely a question of: 
arranging those forces of nature (i.e., the self-seeking inclinations of agents] in opposition 
to one another in such a way that one checks the destructive effect of the other or 
cancels it, so that the result for reason turns out as if neither of them existed at all and the 
human being is constrained to become a good citizen even if not a morally good human 
being. The problem of establishing a state, no matter how hard it may sound, is soluble 
even for a nation of devils (if only they have understanding) [ ... f 4 
As this passage makes clear, Rehberg's authoritarian state is unnecessary, even for a 
people of 'devils'. Kant's 'enclosure' exerts a minimum of constraint upon its members; 
it simply arranges things so that they will, by virtue of their 'unsocial sociability', 
discipline themselves. As Renaut has argued, with reference, to the Idea essay, the 
state constituted by such an enclosure would be a 'fundamentally liberal' state. 25 Kant 
therefore accepts Rehberg's premise whilst denying his conclusion. Now, a crucial 
upshot of Kant's strategy is a clear separation between right and morality. For right is 
not that which permits me to do my duty - it is that which guarantees the co-existence 
of free agents irrespective of their moral dispositions. 26 By insisting that right may be 
realized independently of morality, Kant's strategy therefore breaks with the 'Kantian' 
school of right. 
Fichte was greatly impressed with Kant's separation between right and morality, 
although he had certain misgivings about Kant's 'theoretical' or 'naturalistic' (Renaut) 
conception of the mechanism whereby the citizens would attain rectitude - 'unsocial 
sociability'. Nevertheless, it is perhaps not incorrect to speak, with Druet, of Fichte's 
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'conversion' to Kant's political philosophy. 27 For Fichte is convinced, with Kant, that it 
must be possible for right to be realized independently of morality ('Right must be 
enforceable, even if there is not a single human being with a good will') and it is this 
conviction that motivates the two arguments for the autonomy of right in the 
Foundations of Natural Right of 1796-7. 28 
The first of these arguments turns on the notion that there is a fundamental 
difference between laws of right and laws of morality, where 'laws of morality' are to be 
understood as formulations of the categorical imperative. The difference lies in the fact 
that laws of morality are unconditionally applicable, they apply unconditionally and 
without exception to all human deliberations and actions. By contrast, laws and 
principles of right only have conditional and restricted applicability. Their applicability is 
conditional because they only apply if certain conditions are met. As these conditions 
are, by necessity, not met by all human deliberations and actions, the applicability of 
these laws is restricted - they only apply to a restricted domain of human 
deliberations and actions. In order to explain this special status of a law of right, Fichte 
draws upon Kant's discussion of a 'permissive law' (Erlaubnisgesetz or lex permissiva) 
in Toward Perpetual Peace. There, Kant outlines a distinction between 'prohibitive 
laws' and 'permissive laws', in relation to the second 'preliminary article' for perpetual 
peace: 'No independently existing state (whether small or large) shall be acquired by 
another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation'. 29 This law is 
'prohibitive' insofar as it prohibits the modes of acquisition mentioned. However, the 
prohibition is restricted to future acquisitions, past acquisitions are exempt. This 
exemption from the prohibition is the 'permissive part' of the law which specifies the 
'limiting conditions' on the applicability of the law. Whilst these limiting conditions 
usually take the form of a series of clauses appended to the law, they should, Kant 
maintains, be included within the prohibitive law. Such a law would then 'become at the 
same time' a permissive law. 30 
In the third part of the Introduction to the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte 
gives the following account of laws of right as permissive laws: 
A right is clearly something that one can avail oneself of or not. Thus a right follows from 
a merely permissive law, and it is a permissive law because it is limited only to a certain 
sphere, from which it can be inferred that outside the sphere of the law one is free from it, 
and if there is no other law concerning this object, one is generally left solely to one's own 
arbitrary choice [WillkUr]. This permission is not explicitly contained in the law; it is merely 
inferred from an interpretation of the law, from its limited character. The limited character 
of a law manifests itself in the fact that it is conditioned. it is absolutely impossible to see 
how a permissive law should be derivable from the moral law, which commands 
unconditionally and thereby extends its reach to everything 31 
The law of right is therefore conditioned and restricted, in opposition to the moral law 
which is unconditioned and unrestricted. Now, insofar as Kant conceives of the class of 
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permissive laws as a class of disparate, heterogeneous laws, the conditions pertaining 
to them could be of varying sorts. As regards the second 'preliminary article' for 
perpetual peace, the conditions are 'temporal': the law is applicable on the condition 
that the acquisitions occur after a certain time. Yet the conditions could be of a different 
type. They could, for example, be 'physical': the application of a law stating that 
everyone must be prepared to defend their country would be restricted to those agents 
who are 'able-bodied'. For Fichte, laws of right all have conditions of the same type, a 
type which we might call 'volitional': they are all conditioned by the 'free' or 'arbitrary 
choice' (Wi/lkOr) of rational agents. This means that agents are only obligated by these 
laws, if they have voluntarily undertaken a commitment to the state of affairs these 
laws secure and promote. If an agent has not voluntarily undertaken this commitment, 
then she is not, ipso facto, bound by the laws securing and promoting it. Thus the 'law 
of right' - 'Limit your freedom through the concept of the freedom of all other persons 
with whom you come into contact' - aims to secure and promote a 'community of free 
beings'. 32 If living in a community of free beings were an unconditional command of 
morality, the law of right would be a categorical imperative. However, living in a 
community is a matter of free, arbitrary choice - it is up to the rational agent if she 
wants to live with other rational beings. Consequently, the sphere of application of the 
law of right is restricted to just those rational agents who have chosen to live in a 
community. Those rational agents who have chosen to live alone, e.g., the proverbial 
hermit, fall outside the purview of the law of right. As Fichte puts it: 
Now in the doctrine of right there is no talk of moral obligation; each is bound only by the 
free, arbitrary [willkilrklichen] decision to live in community with others, and if someone 
does not at all want to limit his free choice [Wi/lkilr], then within the field of the doctrine of 
right, one can say nothing further against him, other than that he must then remove 
himself from all human community. 33 
The law of right is thus a permissive law, a law with restricted application. Insofar as its 
application is dependent upon the agent having 'arbitrarily' chosen the end it promotes, 
it might also be described as an 'hypothetical' or 'technical-practical' imperative.34 
Now it is Fichte's contention that it is impossible to derive a conditionally 
applicable law from a law that is unconditionally applicable. His reason for claiming this 
seems to be the plausible notion that it is impossible to conceive of the relevant 
conditions as being somehow 'intrinsic' to the unconditional law. Unless these 
conditions can be created ex nihilo from the unconditional law, it seems that they must 
be extrinsic to it and thus introduced 'from outside'. Consequently, a conditionally 
applicable law cannot be derived from an unconditionally applicable law. Given the 
impossibility of such a derivation, Fichte claims that laws of right cannot be derived 
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from laws of morality and therefore claims to have refuted those theorists who 'attempt 
to derive the theory of right from the moral law'. 
Fichte has another argument for insisting on a separation between right and 
morality; an argument that turns upon the differing natures of their respective domains. 
Fichte regards morality as legislating over the purely private deliberations of 
individuals. The moral law applies to the individual's conscience and this is a private, 
inner realm. The law of right, by contrast, applies to the publicly observable interaction 
between rational agents. Fichte writes: 
Rational beings enter into reciprocal interaction with one another only through actions, 
expressions of their freedom, in the sensible world: thus the concept of right concerns 
only what is expressed in the sensible world: whatever has no causality in the sensible 
world - but remains inside the mind instead - belongs before another tribunal 
[Richterstuh~, the tribunal of morality.35 
Morality therefore legislates over the 'inner' domain of conscience, whereas right 
legislates over the 'outer' domain of interaction. Using terminology introduced in 
chapter 2, we could say that the domain of morality is 'monological', insofar as it is 
concerned with the deliberations of an isolated agent. The domain of right, by contrast, 
is the domain of interaction between rational beings. As Fichte puts it in his review of 
Kant's Toward Perpetual Peace: 
One can talk about right only to the extent that human beings are considered in 
relationship to one another, and a right is nothing outside of a relationship of this sort[ ... ]. 
How can free beings, as such, continue to co-exist with one another? This is the supreme 
question concerning right [ ... ]a6 
The domain of right is therefore the domain of relationships between rational beings or 
the domain of intersubjectivity. lt could also be described as 'society' (Geseffschaft) 
insofar as this term is defined, in the Lectures, as 'the relationship in which rational 
beings stand to each other'. 
This conception of the domain of right is radically opposed to the conception 
advanced in the 1793 Contributions. There, Fichte endorsed a conception of political 
society as an aggregate of individuals, each of whom could, in principle, exist 
independently of his fellow citizens. What mattered, in the 1793 Contributions, was the 
'isolated being, alone with his conscience' - social relations were of secondary 
importance. To this extent, the Fichte of 1793 endorsed the social atomism which, 
according to Taylor, is characteristic of classical liberal 'primacy-of-right theories' (the 
chief representative of which is Locke). 37 In the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right, 
by contrast, what matters are the relations between rational beings - individuals are 
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not considered independently of their relations to one another. Any such consideration 
now falls within the province of moral philosophy. 
Having discussed Fichte's arguments for the autonomy of right, let us now turn 
to his claim that right serves a 'mediating' function. 
The Mediating Function of Right 
We have already noted (in chapter 4) that Fichte's interest in political philosophy plays 
a crucial role in his transcendental idealism. However, we have not yet discussed the 
role that the philosophy of right plays within Fichte's conception of transcendental 
idealism as a complete system - a Wissenschaftslehre. In order to grasp the 
significance of Fichte's 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right a discussion of this role is 
crucial. 
In the first edition of the 1794 programmatic essay Concerning the Concept of a 
Wissenschaftslehre or, of So-called "Philosophy", Fichte presents an 'Hypothetical 
Division of the Wissenschaftslehre'. In this brief precis of his proposed system he tells 
us that the second part of the Wissenschaftslehre will provide the foundations for: 
new and thoroughly elaborated theories of the pleasant, the beautiful, the sublime, the 
free obedience of nature to its own laws, God, so-called common sense or the natural 
sense of truth, and finally, for new theories of natural law and morality, the principles of 
which are material as well as formal. 38 
We have already discussed the inclusion of 'common sense' in this enumeration of the 
theories to be included in a complete Wissenschaftslehre. What is of interest here is 
the order of the enumeration. For, assuming, with Renaue9, that the order indicates 
priority, one would expect the theories of natural right and morality to be at the head of 
this list, given Fichte's emphasis on practical reason. Instead, Fichte seems to place 
greater emphasis on theories which are clearly intended to be systematic 
developments of elements of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement. 40 
Nevertheless, this prevalence of 'aesthetic' disciplines is not surprising at all. For 
Fichte's engagement with the third Critique, and the role of this engagement in the 
genesis of his system, has been well documented.41 Fichte felt the third Critique to be 
of such significance, that he undertook, in 1790, to write a commentary intended for 
publication.42 This commentary was never completed, but Fichte continued to pursue 
his interest in the third Critique in the manuscript Practical Philosophy (Praktische 
Philosophie) which has been attributed to early 1794. 
Fichte's interest in the third Critique was largely focused on Kant's attempt to 
cross the 'abyss' separating theoretical and practical reason. In the Preface to the first 
edition of Concerning the Concept Fichte tells us that he: 
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remains convinced that no human understanding can advance further than that boundary 
on which Kant, especially in the Critique of Judgement, stood, and which he declared to 
be the final boundary of finite knowing-but without ever telling us specifically where it 
lies.43 
Given Fichte's fascination with the mediating role of the third Critique, it is perhaps 
understandable that he should draw upon aspects of it to develop his system. 
However, Fichte never carried out the proposed plan, and failed to construct any of the 
projected theories. In the second edition of Concerning the Concept, published in 1798, 
the Hypothetical Division of the Wissenschaftslehre is entirely absent. In the 
accompanying Preface, Fichte explains this absence by noting that the contents of the 
section have 'received much clearer and more ample expression in the Foundations of 
the Entire Wissenschaftslehre'. 44 Now, this explanation is far from convincing. 45 For 
whilst the foundations of morality are clearly treated in the second part of the 1794-5 
Foundations, it not at all evident that the foundations for theories drawn from the third 
Critique are to be found there. There is simply no account of anything which could be 
construed as providing the foundations of aesthetics or teleology. Whatever receives 
'much clearer and more ample expression' in the 1794-5 Foundations, it cannot be the 
specific theories associated with the third Critique. We are therefore faced with the 
following question: Did Fichte become disenchanted with the third Critique? 
The answer to this question is complex. Fichte always felt that the specific task 
of the third Critique - crossing the 'abyss' between theoretical and practical reason -
was crucial to the completion of the Critical philosophy. Yet, whilst he consistently 
endorsed the task of the third Critique, Fichte came to the realization that aesthetic and 
teleological judgement are inadequate for this task. This is due to the fact that these 
types of judgement are modes of reflecting - as opposed to determining -
judgement, and consequently only allow us to make 'problematical' judgements about 
their objects, judgements the truth or falsity of which is merely possible. In other words, 
we can never know whether natural phenomena actually have a purpose, or whether 
beauty is the 'symbol' of morality; we can only judge 'as if (als ob) this were the case. 
Such judgements therefore do not provide genuine cognition of the supersensible 
realm of freedom, they merely allow us to suppose that it exists. Now this is clearly 
unsatisfactory as regards the mediating role assigned to the third Critique. In terms of 
Kant's metaphor, the transcendental philosopher would be engaged in the absurd 
project of building a bridge without knowing if there was another side to cross to. 
Fichte gradually came to realize, between 1794 and 1798, that another 
discipline was far more suitable than aesthetics to mediate between theoretical and 
practical judgement: the philosophy of right. During this period Fichte had constructed 
and taught his Foundations of Natural Right and his System of Ethical Theory (System 
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der Sittenlehre). He had also attempted a new 'presentation' (Darstellung) of the 
foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre - the Foundations of Transcendental 
Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova Methodo. At the end of this work Fichte 
provides a 'Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre'46 , which presents 
a retrospective overview of the Jena system. A comparison of this overview with the 
programmatic 'Hypothetical Division' of 1794 is illuminating.47 For whereas the 
'Hypothetical Division' assigned a mediating function to 'aesthetic' theories, the 
'Deduction of the Subdivisions' assigns this function to the theory of right. lt is now the 
theory of right which is at the centre of the Wissenschaftslehre. According to Fichte: 
The nature of this science has been misunderstood for a very long time. lt occupies the 
middle ground between theoretical and practical philosophy; it is theoretical and practical 
philosophy at the same time. 48 
lt is therefore right, not aesthetics, which provides the sought-for bridge between 
theoretical and practical philosophy, insofar as it is both 'theoretical and practical 
philosophy at the same time'. The theory of right is 'theoretical' insofar as its domain is 
a world which, like the natural world, can be 'discovered'. In this domain, the action and 
interaction of a community of 'bodies' (human agents) is governed by discernible, 
'mechanical' laws (the laws of right). Nevertheless - and this is where Fichte 
distances himself from Kant's 'theoretical' or 'naturalistic' conception of right - the 
ultimate origin of these laws is not to be imputed, however 'regulatively', to the hidden 
influence of Providence or Nature. For these laws are freely created by human agents 
in order to secure and promote the possibility of morality. They are freely created in 
order to secure and promote the possibility of freedom in its fullest, 'Kantian' sense, 
viz., governing oneself in accordance with a self-given rational law (the moral law). In 
this sense, the theory which studies these laws is 'practical'. 
The laws which mechanically regulate the domain of right - the domain of 
intersubjective relations -therefore have a practical purpose. They seek to secure a 
sphere of non-interference or 'negative freedom', within which agents may develop 
genuine moral freedom. Such a sphere provides a condition of the possibility of the 
moral improvement of humanity. Through positive intersubjective relations, relations 
which enable agents to act in accordance with practical reason, the possibility of 
human beings gradually coming to treat one another as ends in themselves is secured. 
As we saw in chapter 5, this emphasis on the mediating role of right was already 
present in Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation which presents the state 
as the means for the realization of the 'vocation of man in itself'. Nevertheless, it is only 
in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right that the sphere of right is explicitly assigned 
this role. 
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Now, it might be objected that Fichte's conception of right as a means for the 
realization of morality is not that different from his position in the 1793 Contributions, in 
which inalienable rights were the condition of the possibility of doing one's duty. To 
counter such an objection one simply needs to note that in the Contributions rights 
were defined solely in terms of the moral law, and their sole function was to enable one 
to act morally. The position of 1796 is somewhat different. Here rights guarantee the 
co-existence of individuals and fulfil this function independently of morality. They would 
fulfil this function even for a 'people of devils'. Nevertheless, rights derive their ultimate 
value from the fact that they secure the possibility of moral development, a possibility 
that will be promoted by the educational and cultural institutions of the state. lt is only 
within a state in accordance with right that humanity may fulfil its moral vocation. As 
Renaut puts it: 
Totally autonomous in relation to morality as to its functioning, as to its value, right 
remains - and this, ~uite obviously, without any contradiction - subordinated to the 
categorical imperative.4 
Right therefore only has value insofar as it secures a sphere in which humanity may 
realize its moral vocation. Nevertheless, the sphere of right and the subjects of right 
can be discussed independently of this moral purpose, and this is the point behind 
Fichte's claim that the theory of right is an autonomous discipline. 
Fichte's insistence upon the autonomy of right means that his argument in the 
Foundations of Natural Right for the legitimacy and necessity of rights is not couched in 
moral terms. Fichte does not justify rights by arguing, as he did in the Contributions, 
that they are required for man to realize the moral possibility inherent in the manifold 
that constitutes his 'nature'. Rather, Fichte provides a justification of rights that is 
independent of morality. Rights, Fichte argues, are conditions of the possibility of 
intersubjectivity which is, in turn, the condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. lt 
is this argument that will have a decisive, if indirect, influence on the history of 
philosophy. 
The Deduction of the Concept of Right 
This argument, which represents a crucial development in Fichte's theorizing about 
intersubjectivity, is presented in the first division of the Foundations of Natural Right, 
the 'Deduction of the Concept of Right'. Now, the term 'deduction' is to be understood 
in its Kantian sense as a transcendental argument which seeks to justify a belief or 
proposition. Following Stern, a transcendental argument can be broadly characterized 
as involving: 
a transcendental claim of the form 'X is a necessary condition for the possibility of 
experience, language, thought, etc.', where the rationes cognoscendi of this claim is non-
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empirical, and the rationes essendi is not that it is analytically true or true by virtue of the 
laws of nature50 
Thus, Kant's argument in the 'Refutation of Idealism' involves the claim that the 
existence of persisting 'outer objects' is a necessary condition of self-consciousness. 
For I can only apprehend myself as a self, the argument runs, if I can discriminate 
myself from something that is not me. In a similar way, Fichte's 'deduction' seeks to 
show that a certain 'X' - the concept of right - is a condition of the possibility of a 
certain mode of experience - self-consciousness. Given that the concept of a right is 
defined as 'the concept of a relationship between rational beings', an argument 
demonstrating that the concept of right is a necessary condition of self-consciousness 
is tantamount to an argument demonstrating that the concept of a certain 
intersubjective relationship is a necessary condition of self-consciousness. 51 
Fichte's argument is ambitious. lt seeks to provide a definitive reply to Jacobi's 
charge that transcendental idealism is condemned to transcendental solipsism by 
providing a 'deduction' of a specific intersubjective relationship as a condition of the 
possibility of self-consciousness. Yet it also seeks to provide a powerful riposte to the 
sceptic about rights. Such a sceptic regards the notion that there are natural, 
imprescriptible rights as, to use Bentham's infamous phrase, 'nonsense upon stilts'. 52 
The claim that rights are universally valid, context-transcendent norms is regarded by 
the sceptic about rights as utterly meaningless. Insofar as such a sceptic offers an 
account of what rights are, they are simply conventions or 'positive laws' (laws that 
actually exist or have existed). Fichte's argument attempts to demonstrate that, if the 
sceptic regards herself as self-conscious, she must, on pain of inconsistency, accept 
that there are natural rights. For rights are the necessary conditions of the possibility of 
self-consciousness. Fichte's argument therefore moves from the uncontroversial claim 
that we possess self-consciousness, to the philosophically substantive claim that there 
are human rights. The sceptic must accept the claim that she is self-conscious, insofar 
as her denying this claim would constitute a pragmatic contradiction ('I am not self-
conscious' is pragmatically inconsistent because the very act of uttering the statement 
presupposes the very state of affairs denied by its locutionary content, i.e., self-
consciousness).53 And if she accepts that she is self-conscious she must accept that 
there are certain necessary conditions of self-consciousness- namely, rights. Fichte's 
whole problem is to show that rights in the relevant sense - universal, imprescriptible 
rights - are necessary conditions of the possibility of self-consciousness. 
Fichte's argument is therefore ambitious. Yet a closer look at the argument 
reveals the scope of Fichte's ambition. For the transcendental argument for the 
existence of natural rights is composed of three transcendental arguments, each of 
which addresses a specific sceptical issue and seeks to establish the condition of the 
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possibility of the conclusion of its predecessor. The first argument argues that the 
subject of experience can only be self-conscious if it possesses the belief in the 
existence of an external world. The second argument argues that the subject can only 
possess this belief, and thus be self-conscious, if it enters into a relationship with 
another rational being. The third, and final argument, argues that this relationship must 
be a relationship of mutual recognition protected by rights. In what follows, I shall 
discuss each of these arguments in turn. 
The Deduction of the Belief in an External World 
The 'first theorem' of the Foundations of Natural Right states that: 
A finite rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing a free efficacy to itself. 54 
Fichte opens his commentary on this theorem by stating that 'the mark of a rational 
being' is 'Activity that reverts into itself in general' (In sich selbst zuruckgehende 
Tatigkeit uberhaupt), which activity is identical with '1-hood' (lchheit) or 'subjectivity' 
(Subjektivitat). Now an act of this activity, Fichte claims, is self-consciously grasping 
oneself in thought, which he describes as 'positing oneself (reflecting upon oneself)'. 55 
Fichte's thought here is that the act of self-consciousness is a 'bending back' (the 
meaning of the Latin reflexio56 ) of the I towards itself. lt is a 'turning away' of 
consciousness from the world towards itself. Now human beings are, the 1794-5 
Foundations has shown, finite rational beings, beings which can 'reflect only upon 
something limited'. In self-consciousness the I must therefore grasp itself as a limited 
or finite activity. But the I must also grasp itself as a rational being. The l's finite activity, 
which is the object of reflection, must therefore be an activity that 'reverts into itself'. 
This activity must not be an activity which is directed towards the world, but an activity 
which is directed towards the I. Such a finite, self-directed activity is described by 
Fichte as 'practical activity' or 'willing' (Wollen). This practical activity is a 'free self-
determination to exercise efficacy [Wirksamkeit]' and is, Fichte claims, what we are 
aware of in self-consciousness: 'the practical I is the I of original self-consciousness'. 57 
To be aware of this activity is to ascribe a capacity for 'free efficacy' to oneself- a 
capacity to rationally set ends and to will to realize them. The existence of such a 
'practical I' is therefore a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. Yet the 
existence of this 'practical I' presupposes, as its condition of possibility, the existence 
of a 'theoretical I' for, as Fichte puts it, 'I must represent whatever I will'. 58 This 
'theoretical I' is the l's 'world-intuiting activity' (die Tatigkeit in der Weltanschauung) or 
'representing' (Vorstellen). 59 This world-intuiting activity represents a seemingly mind-
independent, external world - a 'system of objects' - which stands opposed to, and 
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limits, the l's practical activity. 60 Yet, whilst this system of objects opposes and limits 
the l's practical activity, it also constitutes a domain in relation to which the I can set 
ends and within which it can attempt to realize them. Without the representation of 
such a domain, the I would not be able to set ends, let alone realize them, and it would 
therefore not be able to ascribe free efficacy to itself (free efficacy being the capacity to 
set ends and to will to realize them). Representation of an external world - the l's 
'theoretical activity' - is therefore the condition of the possibility of the l's practical 
activity which is, in turn, the condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. With this, 
Fichte has 'deduced' the representation or belief in the existence of the external world 
as a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. This transcendental argument is 
therefore complete. 
This transcendental argument pertains to Fichte's project of justifying doxa. For 
a central component of the common sense view of the world is the belief in the 
existence of a mind-independent external world. By showing that this belief is a 
necessary condition of self-consciousness Fichte has provided a transcendental 
justification of this belief. Fichte writes: 
Philosophy must deduce our belief in the existence of an external world. Now this has 
been accomplished here on the basis of the possibility of self-consciousness, and our 
belief in the existence of an external world has been shown to be a condition of this self-
consciousness. Since the I can posit itself in self-consciousness only practically, but in 
general can posit only what is finite, and hence must also posit a limit to its practical 
activity, it follows that the I must posit a world outside itself. Every rational being proceeds 
originally in this way, and so, too, undoubtedly the philosopher. 51 
Fichte's transcendental argument for the belief in the existence of the external world 
may seem reminiscent of Kant's 'Refutation of Idealism' in the second edition of the 
first Critique. 62 For Fichte's argument essentially rests upon the claim that the belief in 
the existence of a mind-independent external world is a necessary condition of the 
possibility of self-consciousness. Fichte certainly has Kant in mind here, yet his real 
target is Jacobi. For the prototype of this argument is first provided by Jacobi in 
Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn and David 
Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism, A Dialogue. In these works, Jacobi claims 
that a mind-independent 'Thou' (Du) is a condition of the possibility of self-
consciousness, that I can only be aware of myself as a being that is opposed to a 
realm of persisting mind-independent objects. 63 
Now the fact that Fichte only claims to provide a deduction of 'our belief in the 
existence of an external world' is of considerable significance. For the phrasing 
indicates that Fichte does not think that this argument can serve as a 'refutation of 
idealism', at least not as Jacobi understands it. All the argument can show, Fichte 
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suggests, is that 'our belief in a mind·-independent world is a condition of the possibility 
of self-consciousness. The difference Fichte is getting at here can be expressed as a 
difference between two types of transcendental argument. Following Stern, we can 
distinguish between 'truth-directed' (or 'world-directed') transcendental arguments and 
'belief-directed' transcendental arguments. Truth-directed transcendental arguments 
seek to demonstrate that the sought-for necessary condition 'X is a mind-independent 
state of affairs. They represent a strong claim which is difficult to vindicate against the 
sceptic and are vulnerable to Stroud's verificationism objection. 64 Belief-directed 
transcendental arguments, on the other hand, avoid Stroud's objection by seeking to 
demonstrate that the required 'X is a belief. They represent a weaker claim which, 
insofar as it is not committed to the existence of a mind-independent reality, is easier to 
vindicate. 
Following Strawson, the argument of Kant's Refutation of Idealism has 
standardly been interpreted as a truth-directed transcendental argument. 65 And Jacobi 
clearly thinks that his own argument is truth-directed. Nevertheless, Fichte presents his 
deduction as belief-directed. All such arguments can show, Fichte seems to be saying, 
is that the belief in the existence of the external world is a necessary condition of the 
possibility of self-consciousness. Yet, if Fichte's argument only establishes the 
necessity of our belief in the existence of the external world how, one might ask, can it 
possibly be construed as anti-sceptical? The answer to this question is that the 
argument shows that the sceptic's goal of getting us to relinquish or disavow such a 
belief is unachievable. For even though this belief may turn out not to be veridical, it is, 
so the transcendental argument has shown, unavoidable. 56 lt is not a belief that we can 
relinquish, such as a belief in the tooth fairy or a belief in ghosts. 
Having argued that belief in the existence of the external world is a condition of 
the possibility of self-consciousness, Fichte now proceeds to argue that this necessary 
belief itself has conditions. 
The Deduction of lntersubjectivity 
Belief in the existence of the external world is therefore a condition of the possibility of 
self-consciousness. If the subject is to attain self-consciousness, it must grasp itself as 
practical activity and it can only do this in opposition to a sensible world. The subject 
must therefore posit the existence of a sensible world. Now Fichte claims that it must 
be possible to conceive of an original moment in which this takes place. There must be 
a primordial situation in which the subject simultaneously grasps itself as a free, 
practical being in opposition to a sensible world: 
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self-consciousness is possible if the rational being can - in one and the same undivided 
moment - ascribe an efficacy to itself and posit something in opposition to that 
ff. 67 e 1cacy. 
In order to be self-conscious, the subject must be able to ascribe a capacity for free 
efficacy to itself. To do this it must posit an object in opposition to itself. Yet the subject 
can only posit the object as a limit to its activity if it has already ascribed a capacity for 
free efficacy to itself. lt must, in other words, already be aware of itself as an active, 
free being if the object is to be opposed to it. Yet it can only be aware of itself as an 
active, free being if it has already posited an object in opposition to itself. lt is therefore 
impossible to think of both of these activities as taking place in one and the same 
moment; we are constantly referred to a prior moment in which either the subject has 
ascribed free efficacy to itself or has posited an object in opposition to itself. Yet it must 
be possible, Fichte claims, for these two actions to be united in one and the same 
moment. lt must, at least in principle, be possible to think of the eo-emergence of self-
consciousness and the world. Fichte provides the following account of what such a 
'synthesis' would be like: 
The reason for the impossibility of explaining self-consciousness must be canceled. But it 
can be canceled only if it is assumed that the subject's efficacy is synthetically unified 
with the object in one and the same moment, that the subject's efficacy is itself the object 
that is perceived and comprehended, and that the object is nothing other than the 
subject's efficacy (and thus that the two are the same). Only with such a synthesis can 
we avoid being driven to a preceding one; this synthesis alone contains within itself 
everything that conditions self-consciousness and provides a point at which the thread of 
self-consciousness can be attached. it is only under this condition that self-
consciousness is possible. 68 
This 'synthesis' only seems to deepen the problem. For as Fichte points out, an object 
is something which stands over and against the subject and constrains its activity. 
How, then, could an object 'be' the subject's free efficacy, the nature of which is to be 
'absolutely free and self-determining'?69 Fichte's answer to this question is that the 
object in question limits or determines the subject in such a way that the subject 
realizes its efficacy. Both the object and the subject are completely united if: 
we think of the subject's being-determined as its being-determined to be self-determining, 
i.e. as a summons [eine Aufforderung] to the subject, calling upon it to resolve to exercise 
its efficacy. 70 
The influence the object exercises upon the subject must therefore be a 'request' or 
'summons' (Aufforderung) that the subject manifest its free efficacy, that it act: 'the 
object is not comprehended, and cannot be comprehended in any other way, than as a 
bare summons calling upon the subject to act'. 71 The object therefore does not present 
the subject's free efficacy as something which actually exists, 'for that would be a 
135 
genuine contradiction', but as 'something that ought to exist in the future'. 72 In other 
words, the object presents the subject's free efficacy to it 'proleptically', as something 
to be realized. 
The subject understands that the summoning object is another rational being, 
and understands that this being is demanding that it realize its capacity for free 
efficacy. Now the summoned subject can respond to this demand in one of two ways. lt 
can respond by 'actually acting', in which case it chooses to realize one action from a 
set of possible actions available to it. By freely and rationally choosing to perform an 
action, the rational being has realized its capacity for free efficacy. As such, 'it is a 
rational being and also posits itself as such'. 73 Alternatively, the subject can respond to 
the summons by simply ignoring it, by refusing to respond. Yet its decision to ignore 
the summons is a decision based upon an understanding of what is required of it, viz., 
free efficacy. By refusing to answer the summons the subject has exercised its 
capacity for free efficacy. lt has chosen freely, and understands itself to be the author 
of this free choice. Thus, regardless of how it chooses to respond, the subject - by 
virtue of this choice - attains self-consciousness, i.e., ascribes a capacity for free 
efficacy to itself. The summons and the response elicited by the summons are 
therefore conditions of the possibility of the subject attaining self-consciousness. Now, 
summons and response, 'effect' (Wirkung) and 'counter-effect' (Gegenwirkung) must 
be necessarily related so that it is impossible for one to occur without the other also 
occurring. This necessary union of effect and counter-effect is the concept of 'free 
reciprocal efficacy' (freien Wechselwirksamkeit), which has been deduced as the 
condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. 74 The summoned subject and the 
summoning 'object' must therefore stand in the relationship specified by this concept, if 
self-consciousness is to be possible. The relationship satisfying the concept of 'free 
reciprocal efficacy' is obviously an intersubjective relationship, and Fichte has therefore 
argued that intersubjectivity is a condition of the possibility of the subject's self-
ascription of free efficacy to itself. If this condition is satisfied, then the subject must 
ascribe free efficacy to itself. Yet if it does this, so the first transcendental argument 
claimed, then it must posit an external world in opposition to itself. lt is by virtue of the 
opposition between the subject's activity in intuiting this world and its free activity that 
the subject can grasp itself as a practical being and become self-conscious. 
lntersubjectivity is therefore a condition of the possibility of positing of a sensible world 
which is itself a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. The conclusion of the 
second argument therefore articulates the condition of the possibility of the conclusion 
of the first argument. Fichte summarizes as follows: 
Our proof has shown that under this condition the subject can and must posit itself as a 
freely efficacious being. If the subject posits itself as such a being, then it can and must 
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posit a sensible world; and it can and must posit itself in opposition to this sensible world. 
- And now that the main task is resolved, all the activities of the human mind can 
proceed without further ado, in accordance with the mind's own laws75 
With this, the second transcendental argument is complete. 
lt is important to note that Fichte also expresses the result of this argument as 
establishing that 'individuality' is a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness -
that the subject can only posit itself as self-conscious if it posits itself as an 'individual'. 
As Fichte puts it in the Introduction to the Foundations of Natural Right: 
the rational being cannot posit itself as a rational being with self-consciousness without 
positing itself as an individual [Individuum], as one among several rational beings that it 
assumes to exist outside itself, just as it takes itself to exist. 76 
As this passage suggests, Fichte's reason for presenting his result in this way lies in 
his conception of the individual as an essentially social being. Fichte does not conceive 
of the individual, as he did in the 1793 Contributions, as some sort of 'social atom' 
which is capable, in principle, of independent existence. He conceives of the individual 
as a being that 'owes' its very existence as a rational being to other rational beings. 77 If 
we mean by the term 'human being' a being that is capable of rational choice and self-
determination then such a being is an individual and thus a social creation. Man must, 
Fichte insists, be educated by his fellows to become such a being, he does not spring 
fully-formed from the earth. lt is only by being 'summoned' to autonomy and freedom 
that man becomes autonomous and free. As Fichte puts it: 'The summons to engage in 
free self-activity is what we call education [Erziehung]'. 78 
Fichte's deduction of intersubjectivity pertains, as did the preceding deduction, 
to the project of justifying doxa. For our belief that there are other beings like ourselves 
with whom we interact is central to our pre-philosophical, common sense view of the 
world. Yet whilst the first deduction argued for the necessity of our belief in the 
existence of the external world, the deduction of intersubjectivity argues for the 
necessity of the existence of another rational being. lt is therefore, unlike its 
predecessor, a truth-directed transcendental argument. This is because it is not 
enough, if Fichte wishes to refute Jacobi's charge of egoism, to show that it is 
necessary for us to believe that other rational beings exist. After all, such a belief is, as 
Fichte himself noted in the Lectures, happily accepted by the 'egoist'. Fichte's 
argument therefore seeks to demonstrate that it is a necessary condition of self-
consciousness that another rational being actually exist. 
If successful, Fichte's argument would constitute a definitive refutation of 
Jacobi's claim that transcendental idealism is condemned to transcendental egoism. A 
brief discussion of the details of Fichte's account of how the summoned subject comes 
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to recognize (recognition in the 'cognitive' sense) that the source of the summons is 
another rational being will help us when we come to evaluate Fichte's argument. 
The summons (Aufforderung) is a constraint upon the subject which also impels 
it to act. lt is therefore closely related to the Ansto/3. Indeed, Fichte makes it clear that it 
is a type of Ansto/3. Yet the nature of this Ansto/3 is very different from the nature of the 
Ansto/3 encountered in the 1794-5 Foundations. That Ansto/3 was, we noted, a 
theoretical 'check' to the I, consisting of those qualitative aspects of experience which 
we would now describe as 'qualia' or 'raw feels'. Here, the Ansto/3 is clearly a practical 
'check' which elicits a practical response from the subject. But how does the 
summoned subject come to know that another subject is the source of this Ansto/3? 
Fichte addresses this question by considering what the summoned subject 
must itself posit or assert as necessary conditions of the possibility of the summons. 
The summons exercises an influence upon the summoned subject. This influence is a 
limit to the subject's activity and must, if the subject is to be aware of it as a limit, be 
posited by the subject as a limit. Limitation, Fichte claims, presupposes 'something that 
does the limiting'. 79 The subject must therefore posit 'something outside itself' as the 
determining ground or 'cause' of the influence. This influence is a determinate 
influence, an influence of a specific sort. The cause of the influence must therefore 
possess specific characteristics, and the subject must posit it as possessing these 
characteristics. What must the 'characteristics' of this specific, determinate ground be? 
Fichte claims that the influence is understood as a 'summons to the subject to 
exercise its free efficacy' and could not be understood in any other way. If the influence 
isn't understood as a summons to act, it would be totally unintelligible and would not 
actually be a summons. 80 Now the ultimate 'goal' or 'end' (Zweck) of the summons is to 
provoke the summoned subject to exercise its capacity for free efficacy. The summons 
'invites' the subject to determine itself to act. But this invitation presupposes that the 
subject understands what is required of it. The subject has to grasp what is required of 
it, if it is to determine itself accordingly. Now if the goal of the summons is to stimulate 
the subject to determine itself to manifest its free activity, and if this presupposes that 
the summoned subject understands what is required of it, then: 
the external being that is posited as the cause of the summons must at the very least 
presuppose the possibility that the subject is capable of understanding and 
comprehending; otherwise its summons to the subject would have no purpose at all. The 
purposiveness of the summons is conditional on the understanding and freedom of the 
being to whom it is addressed. 5 1 
That being the case, the source of the summons must possess the concepts of reason 
(it conceives of the summoned subject as a rational being that is capable of 
understanding) and freedom (it conceives of the summoned subject as a being capable 
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of free deliberation and action). But, if the source of the summons possesses these 
concepts, it must be a being that possesses the theoretical capacity of intelligence -
for only such a being can possess and use concepts. And as Fichte's argument has 
shown that intelligence or the 'theoretical 1', is only posited as the condition of the 
possibility of the 'practical 1', the possession of the 'theoretical I' presupposes the 
possession of the 'practical I' or freedom. The source of the summons must therefore 
be a rational being possessing intelligence and freedom, viz., a being of the same sort 
as the summoned subject. The summoned subject must therefore posit the source of 
the summons, the summoning 'object', as a rational being like itself. 
Fichte tells us that the summoned subject's 'inference' (Schlul3art) is necessary, 
being 'originally grounded in the nature of reason'. 82 Nevertheless, there is a distinction 
to be drawn, Fichte suggests, between 'rational', qua the nature of human reason, and 
'rational', qua justified, for what is 'rational' with regard to the former may very well be 
irrational when judged by the standards of the latter. The nature of human reason may 
necessarily compel us to draw certain inferences, but this is not enough to show that 
they are justified (this is, of course, Hume's point about induction). lt is therefore 
necessary to show that this necessary inference is justified. In order to show this, it is 
necessary to rule out any possibility of error, any possibility that the subject might 
mistakenly infer that another rational being is the cause of the influence. Fichte 
approaches this task by considering the question: 'which effects can be explained only 
by reference to a rational cause?' 83 
The obvious answer to this question - 'those that must necessarily be 
preceded by some concept of them' - is true, but simply raises the more complex, 
'higher' question, 'which, then, are those effects about which one must judge that they 
were constructed only in accordance with a previously constructed concept [einem 
vorher entworfenen Begriffe]?' 84 Fichte's answer to this question explicitly refers to 
Kant's conception of reflective judgement and thus implicitly refers to Kant's account of 
the traveller. The traveller, upon encountering the hexagon traced in the sand, 
reflectively sought a universal concept or idea with which to think it. The concept he 
settled upon was the idea of a rational being. As we have seen, one complaint against 
this inference is that it only guarantees a possibility; it does not guarantee that the 
author necessarily is a rational being. Here Fichte advances another complaint: insofar 
as it is the traveller who unifies the sensible manifold with the idea of rationality, it is the 
traveller who is the rational cause. The phenomenon is only meaningful by virtue of an 
idea that the traveller has introduced. That being the case, with what right can the 
traveller infer that another rational being is the author of the hexagon? How can he 
possibly tell, Fichte asks, that the hexagon qua meaningful artefact is a/so produced by 
another rational being and is not simply his own production? Fichte's point, in short, is 
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that the traveller can never know with certainty whether the 'traces of a man' 
('vestigium hominis') he sees are really his own traces. As Fichte puts it: 
Every effect, once it exists, can very well be comprehended, and the manifold within it fits 
itself into a conceptual unity more gracefully and felicitously, the more intelligence the 
observer himself has. Now this is a unity that the observer himself has brought into the 
manifold, by means of what Kant calls reflective judgement; and reflective judgment must 
necessarily bring such a unity into the manifold, if there is to be an effect for the observer 
at all. But who can guarantee to the observer that, just as he now orders the actual 
manifold under his concept, so too, prior to the effect, the concepts of the manifold he 
perceives were themselves ordered, by another intelligence, under the concept of the 
unity that the observer now conceives; and who could justify the observer in drawing 
such an inference? Thus it must be possible to point to a higher ground of justification; 
otherwise the inference to a rational cause is entirely groundless [ ... ]85 
Thus, reflective judgement cannot tell us what effects must be the effects of a rational 
cause, for it is impossible to distinguish between the rationality of the author of the 
inference and the rationality of the putative author of the meaningful phenomenon. lt is 
therefore necessary to find a higher ground of justification for the inference to a rational 
cause. 
Fichte approaches this task by claiming that it is definitional of a rational cause 
that it 'constructs a concept of a product to be realized through its activity' and that this 
concept, which is the 'concept of an end', serves as a norm which guides its action. 86 
The summoned subject can only grasp its capacity for free efficacy in relation to 
an object against which it can exercise its efficacy. lt must therefore have cognition of 
the 'object' (for 'I must represent whatever I will') and this 'object' is, as we have seen, 
the summoning subject. Now, this cognition must have been the goal or end of the 
summoning subject, in performing the summons. The summoning subject must have 
sought to produce a cognition in the other party. Fichte writes: 
Thus a sure criterion for determining that something is the effect of a rational being would 
be this: the effect can be thought as possible only under the condition that there is some 
cognition of the object of the effect. But there is only one thing whose possibility can be 
thought only through cognition - rather than through some merely natural force - and 
that is cognition itself. Thus if the only possible object of an effect - and here that also 
means its end -were the production of cognition, then one would necessarily have to 
assume that the effect had a rational cause. 
But in this case, the assumption that the production of cognition was intended 
would have to be necessary. That is, it would have to be impossible to think that the 
action had any other end, and the action itself would have to be incomprehensible and 
not actually comprehended at all, unless it were comprehended as one that intended to 
produce cognition 87 
Thus, something is the effect of a rational being just in case it is only intelligible on the 
assumption that it is intended to produce a cognition. Here, a comparison of this 
argument with the argument of the Lectures is illuminating. The Lectures rejected 
purposiveness as a sufficient mark of rational authorship on the grounds that many 
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things possessing purposiveness could be explained in terms of organic natural 
necessity. lt was therefore necessary to discover a sufficient mark of rational 
authorship and this mark was freely achieved purposiveness. Understanding freedom 
'negatively', as an absence of natural causation, Fichte argued that if no natural cause 
for the purposive action of the other being could be discerned, we could legitimately 
infer that it's action was based upon the 'law of freedom' and thus that it was a rational 
being. 
Here Fichte settles upon a different criterion: the lack of any explanation for the 
other being's action, other than the attempt to produce cognition. This criterion allows 
us to be sure that the being is not a natural being, insofar as we cannot impute such an 
intention to a natural object. For although we might say that nature 'intended to teach 
us something', it is simply a figurative way of speaking; we do not, Fichte thinks, 
seriously impute this intention to natural entities. 88 lt should be noted that although 
Fichte's criterion is the absence of any explanation except the intention to produce 
cognition, the being which is discovered if this criterion is satisfied, is not (as it was for 
Kant) simply the human being as a 'theoretical being', a being characterized by its 
theoretical capacity for geometrical construction. lt is also the human being as a 
'practical being', a being capable of rational deliberation and action and thus a being 
worthy of 'respect' (Achtung). Indeed, the summoning subject intended to produce a 
cognition of itself as just such a being, and thus intended that the subject respect it. 
Now, it might plausibly be objected that Fichte's account of how recognition 
occurs is vulnerable to the very criticism he raises against Kant; viz., that nothing 
guarantees that the rationality attributed to the other being is anything more than the 
rationality of the judging subject. For what guarantees us that the attribution of an 
intention to produce knowledge is not simply a figment of the judging subject, an 
illegitimate projection of his conception of rationality? This is a serious objection. For no 
matter how 'certain' Fichte regards the abductive inference to rational authorship, it is 
always possible that it is mistaken. Indeed, why should the failure to find an alternative 
explanation for the action be anything more than just that, i.e., a failure to find an 
alternative explanation? Why couldn't the effect be the chance product of natural 
processes? 
lt seems to me that these criticisms are well-placed. Nevertheless, I think they 
can be mitigated once we realize that Fichte thinks that we can only claim with 
certainty that an effect is the product of an intention to produce cognition if certain 
conditions are satisfied. The first of these conditions is hinted at in the criticism we 
cited earlier. For Fichte opens his criticism by saying that: 
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Every effect, once it exists, can very well be comprehended, and the manifold within it fits 
itself into a conceptual unity more gracefully and felicitously, the more intelligence the 
observer himself hasa9 
The clue here is 'once it exists': for Fichte is attacking those inferences from the effect 
to a now absent cause. lt is a necessary condition of the certainty of the inference, 
Fichte suggests, that it takes place at the very moment at which the cause produces 
the effect, at the very moment in which the effect is produced in the affected subject. I 
must experience the impact of the summons, and it is this impact which allows me to 
infer a rational author as its cause. However, this necessary condition is only a 
sufficient condition for a merely 'problematical' inference, an inference which asserts 
the mere possibility that another rational being is the author of the cause. In order for 
this inference to become 'categorical'90 , that is, necessary and thus certain, another 
necessary condition must be satisfied. As we shall see in our discussion of the next 
argument, this condition is that the other being confirms our judgement by continuing to 
act in a way which evinces respect. 
Fichte therefore claims that the subject is compelled to infer that another 
rational being is the cause of the summons. Having inferred that the summons is a 
summons to free activity whose author is a rational being, the subject responds to the 
summons by establishing a relationship with the rational being, and it is this 
relationship that is a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. 
The Deduction of Mutual Recognition 
The 'third theorem' of the Foundations of Natural Right states that: 
The finite rational being cannot assume the existence of other finite rational beings 
outside it without positing itself as standing with those beings in a particular relation, 
called a relation of right [Rechtsverhaltnis]91 
The summoned subject attains self-consciousness as a rational being with a 
determinate 'sphere' (Sphare) of freedom. Within this sphere, the subject chooses 
freely and is the 'final ground' of what it wills. Yet the subject possesses this sphere of 
freedom by virtue of the fact that another rational being has decided to summon the 
subject by limiting its freedom. The subject therefore posits another rational being as 
the 'ground' of what it wills. In order to assert itself as a free independent agent, the 
subject must be able to distinguish itself from the other being. Now it can only do this, 
Fichte claims, by distinguishing between the extent to which it is the foundation of its 
sphere of freedom and the extent to which the other is the foundation. 
The subject's sphere of freedom is founded upon the subject with regard to 
'form', by which Fichte means the fact that there is activity at all. Nevertheless, the 
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subject's sphere of freedom is only partially founded upon the subject's activity with 
regard to form. For the subject's activity constitutes a response to a summons to free 
activity, and the source of this summons is the other subject. Without the other subject, 
the subject would not have manifested its free activity. The subject's sphere of freedom 
is therefore, with regard to form, conjointly founded upon the subject and the other. 92 
The subject's sphere of freedom is founded upon the other subject with regard to 
'content', by which Fichte means the set of possible actions available to the subject. 
This is because the other subject, in summoning the subject to act, restricted its activity 
and undertook a commitment not to hinder the exercise of the subject's activity. In so 
doing, the other subject delimited its 'sphere' of action and thereby delimited a sphere 
for the subject in which to act, which sphere contains certain possibilities of action. The 
other subject therefore determines the subject's activity as to both form -that there is 
free activity at all, and content - delimiting the sphere in which the subject may act. 
However, within the sphere that has thereby been created, the subject is absolutely 
free to choose from the possibilities available to it. By freely choosing one of the 
possibilities available to it, the subject constitutes itself as a free 'individual', a rational 
being of a specific kind. And it is only an individual, and it can only grasp itself as an 
individual, in opposition to another individual (the other subject) who, by limiting its 
freedom, secures a sphere in which the subject can act. The subject therefore grasps 
itself as an individual by differentiating and opposing itself to an individual who is not it. 
We might say that the other individuates the individual. 
The subject therefore opposes itself to the other subject. But in order to do this, 
it must posit the existence of this other subject and its corresponding sphere. 
Moreover, the subject posits the other subject as a free being and thus as capable of 
crossing the boundary of its respective sphere. The other subject could have 
'overstepped' the sphere in which it acts and, having done so, could have invaded and 
appropriated the summoned subject's sphere, thereby depriving it of its freedom. But 
the other subject did not overstep its sphere and therefore 'materially limited its 
freedom through itself', i.e., limited the set of possible actions available to it by virtue of 
its formal freedom. 93 The other subject could have done anything it pleased. lt could 
have appropriated all the available resources, but it chose not to. lt instead chose to 
restrict its free activity and summon the subject to act freely. By restricting its freedom 
in this way the other subject demonstrated that it recognized the subject as a free 
rational being. lt recognized the subject 'cognitively' as a being that possibly possessed 
certain characteristics. Yet, insofar as it fully understood the import of these 
characteristics, it was led to recognize the subject 'honorifically', to respect the subject 
and to exhibit this respect in action Fichte considers the expression of respect in 
appropriate behaviour to be crucial, if this respect is to have any relevance for the 
143 
subject who is recognized, for 'only in action does there exist[ ... ] a recognition valid for 
both'. 94 
The summoned subject therefore posits that the other subject limited its 
freedom in order to perform the summons. But this means that the other subject 
restricted its freedom in accordance with a concept of the subject as a free and rational 
being - it set this concept as the end of its action. Yet this could only have been 
possible if the other subject possessed a concept of the subject as a free and rational 
being. Now the other subject does indeed possess such a concept, and has set it as its 
end. However, this concept and the judgements involving it are at first only 
'problematical', expressing the possibility that the subject is a free rational being, and 
must, in order to constitute genuine knowledge, become 'categorical' or necessarily 
true. Whether this transformation takes place depends upon the response of the 
subject. The other subject's cognition must be intersubjectively validated; the response 
of the subject determines whether the other subject's judgement becomes categorical: 
the actualization of the other being's categorical knowledge of the subject as free is 
conditioned by the subject's own knowledge and by its acting in accordance with such 
knowledge. 95 
Two cases of failure are conceivable here. In the first case, the subject simply fails to 
recognize the other being. In the second case, the subject recognizes the other being, 
but fails to manifest this recognition in appropriate behaviour, i.e. by restricting its free 
activity and 'summoning' the other. In both cases, the other's problematical judgement 
cannot become categorical, for 'the other could not infer that the subject was a rational 
being, since such an inference becomes necessary only by virtue of the subject's self-
limitation.'96 The other is therefore not obliged to treat the subject as a rational being. 
What is crucial here is that the subject manifests its recognition in appropriate 
behaviour. The fact that the subject may 'privately' respect the other within the inner 
sphere of its conscience is irrelevant and is, Fichte emphasizes, a matter for moral 
philosophy. 97 Within the sphere of right, recognition is only of value insofar as it is 
publicly exhibited. 
If the subject responds appropriately it confirms the other's judgement, 
transforming a problematical judgement into a categorical judgement. The other 
subject now knows with certainty that the subject is a rational being and must act 
accordingly, limiting its activity so that the subject may act. The other's recognition of 
the subject is therefore conditional on the way the subject responds, and the subject's 
recognition of the other is conditional on the way the other responds. If the other does 
not respond in a way which confirms the subject's problematic recognition of it, the 
subject cannot know with certainty that the other is a rational being. If the appropriate 
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response - recognition in action - is not forthcoming, the recognizing party is not 
obliged to recognize the other as a rational being. Recognition cannot be unilateral but 
must be mutual. As Fichte puts it: 
Thus the relation of free beings to one another is necessarily determined in the following 
way, and is posited as thus determined: one individual's knowledge of the other is 
conditioned by the fact that the other treats the first as a free being (i.e., limits its freedom 
through the concept of the freedom of the first). But this manner of treatment is 
conditioned by the first's treatment of the other; and the first's treatment of the other is 
conditioned by the other's treatment and knowledge of the first and so on ad infinitum. 
Thus the relation of free beings to one another is a relation of reciprocal interaction 
through intelligence and freedom. One cannot recognize the other if both do not mutually 
recognize each other [beide sich gegenseitig anerkennen]; and one cannot treat the other 
as a free being, if both do not mutually treat each other as free. 
The concept established here is extremely important for our project, for our entire 
theory of right rests upon it. 98 
Mutual recognition and the treatment expressing it are therefore deduced as conditions 
of the possibility of self-consciousness. For I can only attain self-consciousness as an 
individual - as a being with a specific sphere of freedom. But I can only be an 
individual if I respond to the summoning individual's self-limitation by limiting my 
freedom. For, if I refuse to recognize the other, the other may rightfully refuse to 
recognize me, which refusal will lead to the abolition of my sphere of freedom and thus 
the abolition of the set of possible actions which allows me to determine my 
individuality. (The other could, for example, re-exert its free activity and appropriate all 
the natural resources, thereby eliminating the possibilities available to me.) 
Now in order for individuality to be possible, it is not enough that I stand in a 
relationship of mutual recognition with just one individual. I must stand in a relationship 
of mutual recognition with a// other individuals. For I have a concern to preserve my 
individuality, to preserve the sphere of freedom within which I act. Now this concern is, 
Fichte claims, a concern with the future. If I wish to preserve my sphere of freedom, I 
must therefore undertake a commitment to recognize any individual I may encounter in 
the future. As Fichte puts it: 
I must in all cases recognize the free being outside of me as a free being, i.e., I must 
limit my freedom through the concept of the possibility of his freedom. 99 
This is the 'principle of right' (Rechtssatz), which safeguards the 'relation of right' 
( Rechtsverhaltnis): 
each is to limit his freedom through the concept of the possibility of the other's freedom, 
under the condition that the latter likewise limit his freedom through the freedom of the 
former. 100 
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This relation of right is the relation of mutual recognition. If the relation of right is 
disturbed or destroyed, individuality and self-consciousness are destroyed, for the 
relation of right is the condition of the possibility of the former. The individual must 
therefore possess the concept of this relation - the concept of right - and act in 
accordance with this concept. 
Rights, for Fichte, are those entitlements which facilitate a particular 
intersubjective relationship - mutual recognition or the relation of right - and belong 
to subjects insofar as they belong to this relationship. Insofar as this relationship is a 
condition of the possibility of self-consciousness, every subject of experience - the 
sceptic about rights included - must, insofar as they consider themselves to be self-
conscious, acknowledge the existence of these entitlements. Rights are natural for 
human beings insofar as we couldn't be human without them. 
This ends our exposition of Fichte's deduction of the concept of right. As we 
have seen, Fichte's argument seeks to demonstrate that a specific intersubjective 
relationship - mutual recognition or the relation of right - is a condition of the 
possibility of self-consciousness. This is a substantive and contentious claim. Clearly, 
therefore, the cogency and plausibility of Fichte's argument in support of this claim 
must be assessed. Before attempting this, however, I would like to bring out a crucial, 
but often neglected, aspect of Fichte's deduction. This is the attempt, touched upon in 
our discussion of the Lectures, to transform transcendental logic into a logic of 
intersubjectivity. 
The Logic of lntersubjectivity 
In our discussion of the Lectures in chapter 5 I noted that Fichte had 'socialized' the 
categories of Kant's transcendental logic, thereby transforming them into categories of 
interaction between rational beings. Fichte therefore provided the rudiments of a 'logic 
of intersubjectivity'. In the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte develops these 
rudiments further. 
At the heart of Fichte's account is the notion that there are certain concepts and 
judgements which can only be satisfied by intersubjective relationships. We have 
already seen that the modality of judgements attributing rationality to another being can 
be transformed by the response of the being who is the object of the judgment. 
However, there are also certain concepts whose applicability is dependent upon 
interaction between rational beings. The concept of 'free reciprocal efficacy' is clearly 
one such concept. The concept of 'individuality' is also a concept of this type. Fichte 
describes the special status of this concept as follows: 
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the concept of individuality is a reciprocal concept [Wechselbegriff], i.e. a concept that 
can only be thought in relation to another thought, and one that (with respect to its form) 
is conditioned by another- indeed by an identical- thought. This concept can exist in a 
rational being only if it is posited as completed by another rational being. Thus this 
concept is never mine; rather, it is - in accordance with my own admission and the 
admission of the other - mine and his, his and mine; it is a shared concept [ein 
gemeinschaftlicher Begriff] within which two concepts are unified into one. 101 
This conception of a 'reciprocal concept' (Wechse/begriff) represents a prescient 
attempt to break out of what Habermas has called the paradigm of the 'philosophy of 
consciousness' or 'subject philosophy' .102 This paradigm regards concepts as the 
private contents of private minds, and regards the application of concepts as the 
activity of an isolated judging subject. For Fichte, the concept of individuality is not 
privately owned, it is a common possession, and its application is dependent upon a 
consensus between subjects of experience. I cannot apply the concept to myself 
without the consent of the other, my description of myself as an individual requires 
intersubjective confirmation. The same is true for the other, and this concept is 
therefore a 'shared concept' (gemeinschaft/icher Begriff) which binds myself and the 
other together into a 'community' (Gemeinschaft). If I wish to apply the concept of 
individuality to myself, the other must also apply it to me and act appropriately; but the 
other will only do this if I apply the concept of individuality to her and act appropriately. 
We must therefore, if we wish to describe ourselves as individuals, regard each other 
as individuals and act in an appropriate way. And as we must regard ourselves as 
individuals if we are to be free rational beings, we are, Fichte claims 'bound and 
obligated to each other by our very existence' .103 
The concept of individuality therefore has certain normative implications for 
interaction. We must regard and treat others as individuals, allowing them the freedom 
to determine themselves. Yet there must, Fichte claims, be some sort of law that 
guarantees that we will act in accordance with these implications, that we will not be 
tempted to harm or restrict the freedom of others. Now this law cannot be the moral law 
which is, as we have seen, inapplicable to the domain of right. Rather, it is a 
'theoretical' law, the law of logical consistency: 
There must be a law that is common to us both and commonly recognized as necessary, 
a law by virtue of which we mutually abide by the ensuing implications; and this law must 
exhibit the same character by virtue of which we entered into that very community. But 
this is the character of rationality; and the law of reason that governs all further 
implications is called agreement with oneself, or consistency [Konsequenz], and is 
scientifically presented in generallogic. 104 
lt is therefore rationality in the 'logical' or 'theoretical' sense which constrains us to act 
in accordance with the normative implications of the concept of individuality. Fichte's 
thought here seems to be as follows: I can only apply the concept of individuality to 
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myself if the other applies this concept to me and treats me in the appropriate way. But 
the other will only treat me in the appropriate way, if I apply the concept of individuality 
to her and treat her appropriately. I am therefore committed, if I wish to apply the 
concept of individuality to myself, to treating the other as an individual. Now if I assert 
my individuality by disrespecting the other, I am guilty of inconsistency. For my 
assertion of my individuality negates the very condition of the possibility of my 
individuality, viz., the other's respect. I am therefore inconsistent. And since I have 
shown myself to be an inconsistent and irrational being, the other can, quite 
consistently, treat me as such. 
Fichte therefore argues that certain judgements and concepts cannot be 
applied by an isolated judging subject, but can only be applied by two subjects 
interacting with one another in a certain way. This is already a radical transformation of 
Kant's transcendental logic. Yet Fichte's account reaches further than this, touching 
upon the very heart of Kant's 'Transcendental Analytic' - the 'Transcendental 
Deduction'. For Fichte suggests that certain judgements are constituted by a 
'consciousness common to both of us' ( einem uns gemeinschaftlichen Bewuf3tsein) 
which serves to 'synthesize' them. 105 With this, Fichte comes very close to replacing 
Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity with a conception of transcendental 
intersubjectivity according to which judgements are 'synthesized' by a community of 
interacting beings. And whilst it would be implausible to claim that Fichte's attempt to 
develop a logic of intersubjectivity anticipates the 'transcendental pragmatics' of Apel 
or the 'formal pragmatics' of Habermas, it is at least arguable that it represents a step 
in the right direction. 
Assessing the Deduction 
If successful, Fichte's transcendental argument would simultaneously refute the sceptic 
about the external world, the sceptic about other minds and the sceptic about rights. 
This would be an extraordinary result. Unfortunately, it is far from obvious that Fichte's 
argument achieves this result. This is due to the fact that certain crucial claims are 
poorly justified and that the transitions between stages of the argument are often far 
from convincing. 
lt seems a necessary condition of transcendental arguments having any anti-
sceptical force that they start from an uncontentious claim which the sceptic is obliged 
to accept. The claim that we are self-conscious seems to satisfy this condition; it is 
something that even the most inveterate sceptic would not wish to deny. Furthermore, 
even if the sceptic did wish to deny it she would be guilty of pragmatic inconsistency. 
The claim that we are self-conscious therefore provides an ideal starting point for 
Fichte's argument. Problems arise, however, when Fichte specifies the first condition of 
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the possibility of self-consciousness with the claim that the human being cannot be 
self-conscious without 'ascribing a free efficacy to itself'. For why, the sceptic might 
object, should being aware of oneself as a being that is capable of setting ends and 
willing to realize them, be a necessary condition of self-consciousness? Why couldn't 
being aware of oneself as a 'theoretical being' - a being possessing concepts and 
percepts - be the sought-for necessary condition? lt is not at all obvious or self-
evident that the 'practical I is the I of original self-consciousness'. At the very least, 
some argument is needed in order to render this claim convincing. 
We might also want to question Fichte's account of the way in which the subject 
comes to know that another rational being is the source of the summons. That is, we 
might want to ask why Fichte attributes such significance to what is essentially an 
abductive inference, and why he thinks that repeating it (on the occasion of further 
relevantly similar actions on the part of the other) can change its epistemic status. If the 
initial inference is uncertain, it is hard to see how repeating it could serve to make it 
certain. 
Fichte's argument therefore does not seem entirely convincing. Nevertheless, 
some of the claims it seeks to establish do not seem totally implausible and it might be 
possible to provide alternative arguments for them. Thus, the claim that our conception 
of ourselves is dependent upon others recognizing us and treating us appropriately, 
seems plausible and has been defended by philosophers as different as Hegel, 
Habermas, Sartre and Marcel. 106 This claim has also received empirical confirmation 
from the psychoanalysis of Lacan and Winnicott and the social psychology of G. H. 
Mead. 107 The arguments of these writers has led to this claim becoming something of 
an intellectual commonplace. What is seldom recognized, however, is that the 
essentials of this argument are first developed by Fichte for whom the relation of 
mutual recognition is a necessary condition of our conception of ourselves as 
autonomous, rational beings. 
This may seem to be an excessively 'deflationary' reading of Fichte's argument. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that such a reading reveals Fichte's genuine 'original 
insight' -the claim that recognition is crucial to our sense of ourselves as autonomous 
and rational. On Fichte's account, one cannot be an autonomous and rational being 
alone, one's conception of oneself as such a being is dependent upon others. To this 
insight, Fichte adds another: the insight that rights regulate intersubjective relations so 
that human agents cannot harm, and therefore disrespect, one another. According to 
Fichte, the reason why we value rights is not, as the utilitarian would have it, because 
they serve to promote utility, but because they prevent others from acting in a way that 
injures my conception of myself as an autonomous agent. I have a right to freedom, not 
because such a right serves to promote utility in the long run, but because my capacity 
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to choose and act freely is central to my conception of myself as a rational being. The 
plausibility of this view is supported by the fact that many of us feel that there is an 
intimate connection between rights and humanity. The denial of a right is often seen as 
the denial of someone as a rational, autonomous being. If this seems an excessively 
'idealized' conception of the role of rights, one simply need call to mind the many cases 
in which people have sacrificed corporeal needs or even their lives in order to 
campaign for rights which ensure that their conception of themselves is recognized. 
Thus, even though the details of Fichte's argument do not bear much scrutiny, it 
contains insights that are both philosophically interesting and plausible. These insights, 
one might claim, allow us to distinguish between what is 'living' and what is 'dead', in 
Fichte's theory of intersubjectivity. 
We have seen that the 'Deduction of the Concept of Right' argues that the relation of 
right is a condition of the possibility of intersubjectivity which is, in turn, a condition of 
the possibility of self-consciousness. This claim is, as Fichte himself notes, central to 
the Foundations of Natural Right, the remainder of which is devoted to an account of 
the institutions that will guarantee the relationship of mutual recognition. Given the 
centrality of this claim, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Fichte's 'doctrine' or 
'theory' (Lehre) of right is a theory of intersubjectivity. And given the systematic role of 
this doctrine in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre - its mediating function - it would seem 
that a theory of intersubjectivity is, quite literally, central to Fichte's system of 
transcendental philosophy. A theory of intersubjectivity is therefore not a merely 
incidental part of Fichte's system which is subordinated to an overriding concern with 




In the Introduction to this thesis I claimed that Fichte's theory of intersubjectivity had, 
with a few exceptions, been neglected or dismissed as a marginal aspect of his 
transcendental philosophy. I hope to have shown that Fichte advances a compelling 
account of intersubjectivity which is at the heart of his transcendental philosophy. I 
would like to conclude this thesis by retracing the steps of my account and by offering 
some reflections on the significance of Fichte's theory of intersubjectivity for 
contemporary social and political thought. 
I began by noting that Fichte's concern with intersubjectivity is directly related to 
his charge that Kant's philosophy is incomplete because it fails to justify our claim to 
recognize other rational beings. I attempted to demonstrate that Fichte's charge is itself 
justified, by considering the centrality of intersubjectivity within Kant's Critical 
philosophy. I argued that intersubjectivity plays a crucial role in Kant's accounts of 
theoretical reason, practical reason and the unity of reason. I also argued that Kant's 
attempts to account for our knowledge of other rational beings are unsatisfactory, only 
establishing the possibility of such knowledge. 
In the second part of the thesis, I considered Fichte's account of 
intersubjectivity in relation to his system of transcendental philosophy or 
Wissenschaftslehre. I began with an account of Fichte's conception of such a system, 
and then proceeded to consider Fichte's first serious reflections on intersubjectivity -
Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation. I then broached an issue that 
posed a serious threat to my interpretation of Fichte: the alleged inconsistency 
between Fichte's transcendental idealism as presented in the 1794-5 Foundations of 
the Entire Wissenschaftslehre and his emphasis on intersubjectivity. In order to resolve 
this issue, I offered, in opposition to the traditional 'metaphysical' interpretation of 
Fichte's idealism, my own 'non-metaphysical' reading. Having concluded that Fichte's 
doctrine of the Anstof!, provides the basis for an account of how we can recognize other 
rational beings, I then turned to consider Fichte's 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right 
which contains one of Fichte's most influential claims about intersubjectivity: that 
mutual recognition is a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. I argued that, 
whilst Fichte's argument in support of this claim is not terribly convincing, it contains 
insights that are philosophically plausible. I concluded my discussion of the 
Foundations of Natural Right by arguing that it provides a theory of intersubjectivity 
which, due to the role of the work within Fichte's system, is central to his 
transcendental philosophy. 
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In providing this account, I hope to have shown that Fichte's reflections on 
intersubjectivity deserve serious consideration by historians of post-Kantian idealism. I 
also hope to have shown, if only indirectly, that Fichte's account of intersubjectivity 
contains insights that deserve serious consideration by contemporary social and 
political philosophers. 
The first, and perhaps most significant, of these insights is the notion that rights, 
by regulating intersubjective relations, guarantee that others respect us as autonomous 
and rational beings. This argument, which has some affinities with the justification of 
rights advanced by G. Vlastos (according to which rights safeguard 'individual human 
worth'108), has been further developed by Renaut and Ferry. 109 For these philosophers, 
Fichte's philosophy of right provides a powerful response to the Nietzsche-inspired 
Vitalism which, in France at least, threatens to undermine the notion of natural rights. 110 
Within recent Critical Theory, Axel Honneth has also advanced the claim, in his 
programmatic statement of a morality of recognition, that rights serve to guarantee 
respect, although he attributes this thesis to Ernst Bloch's Natural Right and Human 
Dignity. 111 
Fichte's claim that the concept of individuality is a 'reciprocal concept' and his 
claim that an individual is an essentially social being, also have implications for 
contemporary social and political thought. For these claims provide the basis for a 
response to the communitarian charge that liberalism is committed to 'asocial 
individualism'. 112 Fichte's deduction of right demonstrates that 'primacy-of-right 
theories' are not, pace Taylor, committed to an atomistic social ontology. Furthermore, 
Fichte's deduction of right also shows that an emphasis on intersubjectivity does not 
entail a commitment to communitarian notions of community or tradition. Fichtean 
society is not encumbered by the weight of tradition, which determines which 
conception of justice and which conception of rationality are valid. Fichtean society is, 
rather, an essentially 'open' society in which the validity of norms is determined by the 
interaction of free rational beings. 
Fichte's account of intersubjectivity therefore contains insights that are of 
relevance to both Critical Theory and contemporary liberalism. Yet whilst Ferry and 
Renaut have developed what might be described as a 'Fichtean liberalism', Critical 
Theorists have tended to dismiss Fichte's account of intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, 
there does seem to be an affinity between Fichte's theorizing about intersubjectivity 
and the concerns of contemporary Critical Theory. Indeed, I would suggest that 
Fichte's theory of intersubjectivity, properly construed, could provide valuable 
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110 Renaut et al., 1999b, pp. 75-96. Renaut and Sosoe, 1991, Chapter 2. 
111 Honneth, 1995, Chapter 15. 
112 Mullhall and Swift, 1992, pp. 13-18. 
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